VIETNAMESE FOREIGN POLICY: MEMORY AND LEARNING IN THE DOI MOI ERA by Chapman, Nicholas
  
 
 
 
 VIETNAMESE FOREIGN POLICY: MEMORY AND 
LEARNING IN THE DOI MOI ERA 
 By 
Nicholas Chapman 
 
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
  
Ph.D. IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
at the 
 GRADUATE SCHOOL OF INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL 
UNIVERSITY OF JAPAN
  
 
 
 
ⓒ 2018 [Nicholas Chapman] 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Abstract of the Thesis 
VIETNAMESE FOREIGN POLICY: MEMORY AND 
LEARNING IN THE DOI MOI ERA 
By  
Nicholas Chapman 
Ph.D. in International Relations International University 
of Japan, 2018 
Professor Maung Aung Myoe, Supervisor 
Ever since 1988, Vietnam has successfully diversified and multilateralised its relationships, 
whilst placing a strong degree of focus on integration into the international political economy.   
This multidirectional foreign policy is designed to contribute to a peaceful international 
environment and a stable domestic one in order to promote economic growth and build up the 
aggregate strength of the country. At the same time, it is designed to boost the country’s 
autonomy, protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as hedge against potential 
threats.  This multidirectional foreign policy has contributed significantly to the economic 
reformist agenda, formally initiated at the 1986 Sixth Party Congress, otherwise known as Doi 
Moi. Additionally, it has boosted Vietnam’s international profile and reversed the diplomatic 
isolation it faced as the Cold War came to a close. As such, multidirectionalism has become a 
fundamental aspect of the Doi Moi process. This thesis traces the learning process since 
multidirectionalism’s inception and argues that this learning process, along with the economic 
benefits reaped, have evolved into positive memories for the Vietnamese Communist Party. 
This means multidirectionalism continues to be reinforced and as a result, these memories 
shape Vietnam’s continued expansion of that policy.  Additionally, this thesis also offers a 
conceptual definition to the term multidirectionalism as well as explores the mechanisms 
through which Vietnam implements this policy. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Vietnam is a country that has shed its traumatic past to embark on a path focused on economic 
development. The watershed moment of Doi Moi (renovation) saw Vietnam remove the 
ideological lens through which it conducted its foreign policy and place greater emphasis on 
cultivating friends and engagement with the international community. Since 1988 Vietnam has 
embarked on what it calls a multidirectional foreign policy. It has indeed become a friend and 
reliable partner of the international community. Consecutive years of high economic growth, 
an impressive reduction in poverty, and much-improved living standards has alleviated the 
legitimacy crisis the regime faced in the wake of its socially planned economy following the 
reunification of the country in 1975. On the international stage Vietnam has gone from an 
isolated country, largely dependent on Soviet aid, to a country that is bolstering its standing in 
bi and multilateral forums. It is with no surprise, therefore, that Vietnam has continued on its 
path towards promoting a multidirectional foreign policy to diversify its relationships and seek 
the most amount of economic benefit from participation in the global economy.  In fact, 
multidirectionalism has become an integral part of the economic reform agenda.  
At the Eleventh Party Congress in 2011, the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) 
outlined its foreign policy objectives. The VCP wanted to:  
Implement a foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation and 
development; diversify relations, and be productive about international integration; 
be a reliable friend, partner and a responsible member of the international 
community; work for the interest of the country and the nation and for a prosperous 
and strong socialist Viet Nam. The tasks of foreign relation work are to maintain a 
2 
 
 
 
peaceful environment and create favorable conditions for speeding up 
industrialization and modernization while defending independence, sovereignty, 
unity and territorial integrity; to raise the country’s status; to contribute actively to 
the struggle for peace, national, independence, democracy and social progress in 
the world.1 
Speaking in 2014, Hoang Binh Quan, Head of the Party Central Committee’s External 
Relations Commission, stated the core components of Vietnamese Foreign Policy: 
Implementing the foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, cooperation and 
development, multilateralization and diversification of relations, and active 
international integration, which was initiated by the 11th National Congress of the 
Communist Party of Vietnam, party external affairs have over the last 30 years been 
boosted and expanded with the aim of consolidating a political foundation for state-
to-state and people-to-people relations and creating a proactive position in 
international relations to conform to the rapid changing world; party external affairs 
together with state and people-to-people diplomacy has contributed significantly to 
Vietnam’s diplomatic victory and the construction and defense of the Socialist 
Republic of Vietnam.2 
Therefore, we can see that Vietnamese foreign policy is focused on promoting development, 
integrating into the world economy, promoting cooperation in order to construct and defend 
the country. Additionally, this foreign policy seeks to protect Vietnam’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity.  
But what drives this continued emphasis on multidirectionalism and subsequently how 
is it implemented? In the thirty years since Vietnam implemented multidirectionalism 
numerous problems, both extrinsic and intrinsic, have arisen. China’s rise has posed pressing 
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problems for Hanoi and the question as to whether its rise will be peaceful creates a pressing 
headache for Vietnamese leaders. China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has 
done little to quell Hanoi’s fears in addition to threatening Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. At the same time, Vietnam is keen to adopt human rights as an accepted international 
norm; however, you have a contrast when observing domestic situation. Additionally, the VCP 
is eager to protect itself from “peaceful evolution”  
Internally, Vietnam has seen its recent economic growth lead to an increasing amount of 
income inequality, widespread corruption, and environmental degradations. These issues, 
combined with a lack of political reform, have enhanced critics of the regime.  To complicate 
matters, many dissidents feel aggrieved at the government for its muted response to Chinese 
assertiveness in addition to its alleged over-reliance on China for economic growth. This has 
led many to question whether the regime is facing a new legitimacy crisis.   
This empirically grounded work seeks to trace the historical development of Vietnam’s 
multidirectional foreign policy. It examines its origins, its evolution, and how it has become an 
inaugural part of Doi Moi. Subsequently it addresses the issues and problems associated with 
this policy. It focuses on the mechanisms through which Vietnam has implemented this foreign 
policy since the 2011 Eleventh Party Congress. In doing so, it adopts a constructivist approach 
in which the VCP is the unit of analysis. Subsequently, it uses a holistic approach in which 
both structural and domestic level considerations are analyzed.  
Multidirectionalism has been in place for almost thirty years, and whilst numerous 
studies examine its origins, they are mostly from a realist perspective. A realist perspective is 
useful in examining the decisions when looked at individually, but when looked at as a process, 
a realist interpretation ignores legitimacy, history, memory and learning - things this thesis 
argues are equally important.  In order to assess this process, the thirty-years since Doi Moi’s 
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implementation is chosen as the period of study. Thirty-years is an ample timeframe for 
examining the learning process that took place after Resolution 13 was issued. Ultimately the 
thesis will contribute to the discourse on Vietnamese foreign policy, asymmetrical relations, 
and foreign policy analysis, particularly for smaller, less analysed states.  
Research question 
Why does Vietnam continue to emphasise a multidirectional foreign policy and how does it 
implement it? 
Hypothesis 
Collective memory and learning have played a considerable role in the evolution and continued 
development of multidirectionalism, and it has such become a fundamental component of Doi 
Moi. As it has evolved, three key mechanisms have emerged in its implementation: strategic 
partnerships, trade agreements, and multilateralism.  
Methodology 
 This thesis will be an empirical, qualitative analysis of Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign 
policy, focusing on how the collective memory of the Party has been reinforced by domestic 
and structural benefits. Many of the questions asked in this thesis are open-ended - making a 
qualitative method more desirable. Chapter three is based on archival research done at the 
Vietnam National Archives Center. Furthermore, two interviews were conducted: one with a 
leading Vietnamese foreign policy expert at the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam, and one with 
embassy personnel. A wide range of additional primary and secondary sources were also 
consulted. These include scholarly journals, news reports, official government statements, and 
surveys conducted by scholars, independent companies, or media organizations. 
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Timeframe 
The period for anaylsis is predominantly the thirty years since Vietnam enacted Doi Moi, i.e. 
1986-2016. However, explaining Vietnam’s foreign policy evolution cannot be understood 
without looking at the post-reunification era, therefore Chapter Three also analyses the events 
that led to such a dramatic foreign policy shift. Furthermore, the majority of this thesis was 
written in the fall and winter of 2017. Therefore, events occurring after 2016 are also mentioned 
in Chapter Six and the Conclusion.  
The thesis is structured to follow Vietnam quinquennial Party Congresses. A Party 
Congress is the highest organ of the party in which the Central Committee and Politburo are 
elected. Whilst key policy decisions often result in between congresses, documents emanating 
from the Party Congresses usually chart the course of the country for the next five years. Party 
Congresses have been held every five years since 1976.  This, in Carl Thayer’s words, was the 
“regularization of politics” within the VCP.3 By organizing the thesis this way, one can gain 
greater understanding of the evolutionary process of Vietnamese Foreign Policy.  
Limitations 
This thesis has had several limitations. The biggest limitation has certainly been time. With the 
first year of the PhD program dedicated to preparing for comprehensive exams and proposal 
defence, little time existed to carry-out extensive field research conducive to an empirically-
based research project. Bureaucracy has also been a limitation given the fact that it is incredibly 
difficult to gain access to Vietnamese officials willing to do interviews. Furthermore, 
interviews were sought at the US embassy in Hanoi, yet the author was unable to obtain one 
due to the busy schedule of embassy officials. Lastly, language has been a barrier. I have 
attempted to employ a balance of Vietnamese sources but as deadlines approached, I have 
relied more heavily on English-based sources given the fact that Vietnamese is not my native 
tongue.   
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Note on Sources 
Chapter three draws on sources obtained from the Vietnamese National Archive Center 3 in 
Hanoi. When citing these sources, I have used the file name and cited the page number 
according the page number assigned by the archive center. This is often different from the page 
number printed on the page. For example, a “Report on a Parliamentary Visit to Japan” may 
be placed into a larger file entitled “Reports on Visits to Japan in 1992.” The specific 
parliamentary report may have the page number 3 printed on it, but the Archive Center will 
have assigned a page number corresponding to the location within the larger file. I have used 
this assigned number to assist those interesting in accessing the source. 
Worthy of note, however, is that the page number is often hand-written on. Due to time 
constraints as well, I received copies of many of the documents and upon returning home, the 
page number was unclear or blurred. In these instances I have listed the title page in Vietnamese 
to direct researchers should they wish to access the sources. 
Chapter Outline 
Chapter one is the introduction. It contains background information, research question and 
hypothesis along with a chapter outline. 
Chapter two will be the literature review and conceptual framework. . This thesis employs the 
constructivist concept of “collective memory and learning.” This plays a prominent role in 
explaining why and how Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy has emerged in recent years. 
Additionally, Vietnamese policymaking requires understanding the concept of the regime’s 
own interests – that is one in which it places its survival at the forefront. Doing so can explain 
why such an emphasis on stability – whether it be economic or political – has emerged. Whilst 
it is usually implicit, it is nevertheless a key national interest in addition to promoting economic 
growth and protecting Vietnam’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.    
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Chapter three will examine the origins and genesis of multidirectionalism. It argues that 
the period right after reunification resulted in a failed attempt to implement a multidirectional 
foreign policy. This led to it becoming over-reliant on the Soviet Union. It therefore had 
disastrous domestic effects on the economy and subsequently severely damaged the VCP’s 
legitimacy. The subsequent learning process undergone after multidirectionalism was initiated 
in 1988 has alleviated this legitimacy crises, and as such, Vietnam’s multidirectionalism has 
become a key instrument in the Doi Moi process. But the learning process often walked a 
careful balance between reform versus conservatism. This was natural, given the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and eastern bloc and China’s reluctance to posture itself as heir to the socialist 
bloc.. Additionally, significant headway was made on three fronts; first restoring relations with 
China, normalising relations with the US, and the joining of ASEAN. By 1995, therefore, 
Vietnam had restored normalcy in its diplomatic relations and could pursue multilateralism 
with greater vigour. 
However, domestic wrangling within the Party over the depth and scope of economic 
reforms led the brakes being put on reforms. Scared of losing control, the VCP installed Le 
Pha Khieu to act as a bridge between the two camps. Vietnam too, did not emerge from the 
1997 Asian Financial crises unscathed. This reinforced the fear of “losing control” over reforms.  
The threat of being undermined via a US human rights driven agenda similarly emerged 
after the two countries restored diplomatic ties. Therefore, the period from 1996 to 2001 saw 
the emergence of a cautiousness to multidirectionalism. However, by 2001 it was clear that 
Vietnam faced little choice than to fully embrace integration into the international political 
economy. After a decade of multidirectionalism, it was therefore elevated at the Ninth Party 
Congress and also saw the emergence of Vietnam’s third vital component of 
multidirectionalism; economic integration.  
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Chapter four will examine the period from 2001 to 2006. It will argue that economic 
integration became a core component of multidirectionalism. Vietnam’s outlook on the 
international world was changed to accommodate the integrated, globalised economy. 
Additionally, Vietnam’s national interests became codified vis-à-vis Resolution 8 and its 
Defensive White Paper.  This was all part of an economically driven approach to foreign 
relations.  
At the same time, however, integration was not an easy process as it involved reforming 
from within. Diversification and multilateralism meant pursuing greater relations based on 
national interests, however, integration involved external standards being applied and 
completely renovating Vietnam’s domestic policies. Areas of cooperation, and areas of 
struggle emerged. This was demonstrated during the intense, drawn-out process of negotiations 
for the World Trade Organization (WTO). These negotiations, along with its attempts to meet 
its ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) goals, would throw up many challenges and frustration 
as Vietnam needed to come up with concrete changes rather than simply being a friend and 
reliable partner of the international community. Nevertheless, trade-deals began to emerge as 
an important mechanism through which Vietnam stimulated economic growth.  
Chapter five will explore the period 2006 – 2011. It traces Vietnam’s attempts to be a 
more proactive state within multilateral institutions, most notably ASEAN.  At the same time, 
a dual narrative began to emerge in terms of Vietnam-China relations. Relations had never 
been stronger, and indeed the 2008 Vietnam-China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 
signified this, yet tensions within the South China Sea asked worrying questions regarding 
China’s peaceful rise. Therefore, Vietnam, which had focused extensively on economic 
cooperation, began the process of broadening its concept of cooperation; delving into 
military/defensive spheres too.  
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Additionally worrying for the VCP, was its growing trade deficit with China. This would 
lead to greater initiatives for bi-lateral trade in the future, but it is during this period in which 
the deficit and the subsequent leverage China exercised of Vietnam began to become apparent. 
Lastly, domestic undercurrents began forming that began to threaten the legitimacy of the 
regime. This not only impacted the collective memory of the Party but also put Vietnam’s 
development tools in jeopardy. Corruption and the Party’s close relationship with China 
threatened the stability the VCP desired.   
Chapter six is an examination of Vietnam’s recent mechanisms put in place to promote 
its multidirectional foreign policy. It argues that Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy is 
implemented through three key mechanisms: strategic partnerships, trade-deals, and 
multilateralism. Since 2011, there has been a focus on deep, broad-based cooperation over a 
significant variety of areas. Through strategic partnerships, Vietnam has been able to deepen 
this cooperation yet at the same time pursue a highly economically driven agenda vis-à-vis 
trade deals. Since 2011 Vietnam has inked a plethora of strategic partnerships and trade-deals. 
Additionally, it has become more proactive within multilateral organizations, with a focus on 
promoting defensive security and promoting “political trust.” Participation with United Nation 
(UN) peacekeeping forces, the ASEAN community, and greater participation in the Shangri La 
dialogue bears testament to this. These mechanisms provide Vietnam with the option of broad-
based balancing instead of traditional bandwagon and balancing approaches, whilst promoting 
its autonomy and diversity. It also allows it to carefully manage the mature asymmetry it has 
in its relationship with China.  
Chapter seven will be the conclusion. It will offer the findings found throughout the 
thesis and also contain a section on the ongoing developments within Vietnamese foreign 
policy. It will look at three key factors that deserve greater attention in regards to Vietnamese 
foreign policy studies: domestic issues, the diminishing importance of ASEAN, and managing 
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its relationship with China. The kidnapping of Trinh Xuan Thanh, a former oil executive who 
fled to Germany after being charged with embezzling assets from Vietnam’s state-owned 
enterprise, demonstrated the lengths to which the regime will go to promote its anti-corruption 
image.  The event severely strained German-Vietnam relations and therefore, with rising 
problems at home, we might see a shift from realpolitik thinking to more drastic action as the 
VCP seeks to preserve the status quo.    Meanwhile ASEAN’s increasing immobilisation will 
mean a diminished role of significance from the Vietnamese perspective.  Lastly, managing 
the asymmetries with its relationship with China will be a continuing theme into the future. Yet 
Vietnam will resist pressures to pursue balancing and instead promote diversification and 
multilateralization instead.   Additionally, it argues that economic development is the main 
driver of Vietnamese foreign policy and therefore it will tread carefully in its dealings in 
regards to the South China Sea
1 85 Years of the Communist Party of Viet Nam: A Selection of Documents from Eleven Party Congresses (Hanoi: 
The Gioi Publishers, 2015), 1304. 
2 Phuc Van Vu, "Reform Policy of the Communist Party of Vietnam after Nearly 30 Years of Renewal," Tap Chi 
Cong San, December 12, 2014, accessed May 14, 2018, http://english.tapchicongsan.org.vn/ 
Home/Politics/2014/765/Reform-policy-of-the-Communist-Party-of-Vietnam-after-nearly-30-years.aspx. 
3 Carl Thayer, "Vietnam's Sixth Party Congress: An Overview," Contemporary Southeast Asia 9, no. 1 (June 
1987): 12. 
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Chapter 2 
Memory, Learning, Interpolartiy: A Conceptual Framework for Multidirectionalism 
Multidirectionalism has been a process; one that involved learning, reinforcement, and 
evolution. It started out as a means for Vietnam to work its way out of economic backwardness 
but has become much more focused, developed, and beneficial in recent years. 
Multidirectionalism has mutually reinforcing benefits. It promotes economic development, 
contributes to peace and stability in the region, protects Vietnam’s autonomy, territorial 
integrity, and sovereignty. At the same time, the economic development it promotes in turn 
reinforces the Party’s legitimacy. Of course, multidirectionalism is not solely responsible for 
this, but it no doubt is a policy that has contributed to Vietnam’s extensive economic 
development. Additionally, the VCP can point to multidirectionalism as a way to strengthen 
Vietnam’s international reputation whilst at the same time, boosting its autonomy, hedging 
against potential threats, and contributing the aggregate strength of the nation.  
But what do we mean by multidirectionalism? How do we define this concept and what 
is conducive to its formation? Why has the VCP for 30 years resolutely followed such a policy? 
What role has memory and learning played in this process? Furthermore, what are the specific 
characteristic of Vietnamese multidirectionalism. This entirety of this thesis will examine the 
intertwinement of domestic and external affairs arguing that both are relevant in the 
explanation of Vietnamese foreign policy.  
Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to first conduct a review of relevant literature and 
then develop a conceptual compass to guide this thesis. As such it will examine the concepts 
of memory and learning and how this affects the VCP’s collective memory. This analysis is 
played out mainly through emphasising legitimacy vis-à-vis economic development and 
stability to foster that development. However this was not an instantaneous decision by the 
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Party, but rather a process in which economic legitimacy became the principle driving force of 
the Party’s foreign policy and legitimacy    This process was played out at the domestic and 
structural level. It started with Doi Moi.  But while the collapse of the bipolar world after the 
Cold War proved to be a source of confusion, the subsequent interconnectedness of the 
international political economy provided fertile ground for Vietnam to pursue a 
multidirectional foreign policy. Lastly, this chapter identifies the specific characteristics of 
Vietnamese multidirectionalism.  
Literature Review  
Literature pertaining to Vietnamese Foreign Policy is dominated by the writings of Carl Thayer 
and undoubtedly much of his analysis features throughout this thesis. Nevertheless, he and 
many scholars, such as Alexander Vuving, David W.P. Elliot, Edward Malesky, and Thomas 
Jandl, agree that Politburo Resolution 13 in May 1988 marked the beginning of a new era of 
Vietnamese foreign policy. Resolution 13 called for a “multidirectional foreign policy 
orientation” and marked a “major landmark” in foreign policy shift.1  
This foreign policy shift was a necessary component for Doi Moi due to the fact that Doi 
Moi was originally domestically orientated. However, Vietnamese leaders realised that without 
integration into the global economy, little to no economic reform could take place given the 
country’s international isolation due to its intervention in Cambodia. This was all the more 
pressing given the vast reductions in Soviet Aid, Vietnam’s main Cold War ally, during the 
1980s. While subsequent resolutions would slightly modify Vietnamese foreign policy, it has 
remained multidirectional in nature since Resolution 13.  The multidirectional foreign policy 
seeks to cooperate with countries, regardless of their ideological standing, through diversifying 
and multilateralizing its relationships to stabilize and strengthen the domestic economy and 
ensure a peaceful international environment. This then contributes to economic development 
and bolsters national defence.2  The late 1980s and early 1990s marked the beginning of 
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Vietnam’s positive experience with multidirectionalism and its impact should not be 
discredited as it set the tone for Vietnam’s reintegration into the global political economy.  
Integration has become a focal point of multidirectionalism since 2001, after the Party 
agreed to “take the plunge” and embrace globalisation.3 It was a gradual build-up and debates 
erupted within the Party on how to go about reforming. David W.P. Elliott points out that while 
both factions did not want to dismantle the socialist regime already in place, the reformists 
pushed for a shift to a “performance-based legitimacy” and a prioritization of economic 
development, whereas the conservative faction sought to preserve the status quo and place tight 
restrictions on economic reforms. The former won out in the name of realpolitik thinking 
despite almost a decade of “foot-dragging” by the conservative faction in response to “external 
shocks,” such as the Tiananmen Square incident, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern Bloc, and the Asian Financial Crisis. This demonstrates that initially, 
multidirectionalism was primarily centred on economic development as a means to ensure 
regime preservation. Although globalisation has opened Vietnam to “its challenging mix of 
perils and opportunities,” it has nevertheless been successful in abating any crisis. 4 
Additionally, as time progressed, Vietnam has become more aware of the intricacies of the 
integrated international system along with the multipolar world order. Given these two aspects, 
from 2001 onwards, Vietnam has elevated multidirectionalism to be a fundamental component 
of the economic reform agenda. 
From a structuralist perspective, scholars such as Carl Thayer, Pham Quang Minh, Quyet 
Nguyen, and Le Hong Hiep have noted the success in Vietnam’s diversified approach to 
foreign relations. Thayer notes that Vietnam’s approach gives it “equity” in its relationships so 
that no power can wield influence over Vietnam.5 Minh highlights the shift to a realpolitik 
approach to international relations.6 Meanwhile, Hiep notes that Vietnam’s omnidirectional, 
hard and soft approach to hedging against China is giving it more autonomy in dealing with 
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the burgeoning threats from China. 7  Meanwhile Nguyen has noted that from a security 
standpoint, increased diversification of foreign relations fits into Vietnam’s “three nos” 
approach to defence. That is: “no military alignment or alliance with any power, no military 
bases on Vietnamese soil, and no reliance upon another country to counter a third party.”8 All 
of these scholars agree that seeking strong bilateral and multilateral approaches avoid a 
situation in which Vietnam is forced to forge a close relationship with any one particular power 
that might bring this policy into question.  At the same time, Vietnam is able to enmesh and 
hedge against potential threats from China. 
Still, these efforts often utilize a realist outlook into interpreting Vietnamese foreign 
policy orientations in the post-Cold War period. A constructivist approach, however, is lacking. 
Nguyen Vu Trong, in reexamaning Vietnam’s descion to join ASEAN, highlights the dearth 
of constuctivist interpretations in approaching Vietnam’s foreign policy. He notes that: 
Joining ASEAN at first glance would be seen as the rational response to the 
changes in the post-Cold War period. Yet deeper anaylses would suggest that 
it was a result of a process of asserting a new state identity that subsequently 
materialised in the decision to join ASEAN.9 
Trong’s analysis goes on to claim that ASEAN would fill the void of Vietnam’s identity 
crisis in the post-Cold War period. Certainly, both interpretations hold true but this thesis seeks 
to broaden the narrative and encorporate notions of legitimacy, memory, and learning. Nearly 
thirty years have passed since Vietnamese foreign policy transition and therefore ample time 
for us to trace this process. Furthermore,  Trong’s also highlighted  the “internal dimensions” 
of Resolution 13. This is where this thesis seeks to plug a hole in the literature via incorporating 
these internal dimensions and the concepts of learning and memory into the narrative. In doing 
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so, the principal driver in this narrative is economic development to foster two things – 
enhanced legitimacy and stability.   
Elliot’s description above notes the link between legitimacy and Vietnam’s national 
interests. Meanwhile, Casy Lucius identifies “protected values” as the main priorities of the 
VCP. They are: building and strengthening the Party, protecting the homeland, and promoting 
and ensuring economic and social stability.10 Lucius also argues that the Vietnamese political 
process is shaped by a continued obsession with social and political stability with the VCP 
regime perseverance as the main priority, sometimes even trumping realpolitik thinking.11This 
again, demonstrates the limitations of a dominantly realist interpretation. This thesis 
continually keeps this in mind, by arguing that multidirectionalism is part of ensuring stability 
– both at the domestic and international level.  
Memory and Learning 
The academic debate rages about what drives foreign policy and whether there is a need to shift 
from purely rationalist and materialist assumptions about state behaviour. Moreover, do norms, 
memory, and learning matter in foreign policy formation? Do states, like people, undergo a 
learning process that affects their overall actions? Certainly, there has been a rise in scholarship 
pertaining to learning and the role that memory plays in foreign policy formation.12 This thesis 
adopts a constructivist lens in examining Vietnamese Foreign Policy. This is not to say that a 
realist perspective is irrelevant. Certainly, when looking at the decision to implement a foreign 
policy shift in 1988, a materialistic, strategic orientated argument can be drawn. However, a 
constructivist argument provides a complimentary anaylsis to the discourse of Vietnamese 
foreign policy making.  
Alexander Wendt, the leading scholar on constructivism, argues that a state has four types 
of interests. That is: physical survival, autonomy, economic wellbeing, and collective self-
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esteem.13 He goes on to speak of a social process in which interlocking actions seek to satisfy 
identities and interests by adjusting behavior to changing incentives in the environment.14 John 
Hobson has argued that “agents are derived from identity-construction, which is constituted in 
the course of social interaction.”15 Certainly, this thesis prescribes to the notion that identities 
are fluid in nature and defined according to not only to systemic factors, but internal ones as 
well. 16 What is meant here is that the VCP is subjected to two faces of constructions – domestic 
ones and external ones. But whilst identities are fluid, crucial here is what influences the 
continued re-affirmation and evolution of multidirectionalism? 
When scholars talk about identity in regards to foreign policy, they are referring to how 
cultural, historical memory, sociological, and geographical aspects shape and project 
themselves into a foreign policy. Brantly Womack has argued how the memory of history 
weighs heavily on the Vietnamese conscious pertaining to China. A thousand years of 
occupation means that managing their asymmetrical relations with China has been at the focal 
point of Vietnamese consciousness.  Meanwhile, William Turley has stated that the VCP’s 
concept of “socialist democracy in the Vietnamese context,” ushered in during Doi Moi, stems 
from the VCP’s ingrained sense of mass mobilization under the tutelage of the party. 17 
Therefore, historical memories are relevant in the context of explaining the state behaviour of 
Vietnam.  
Vietnam is not unique in having historical aspects shape its foreign relations. N. Ganasen 
talks of “historical overhangs” in international relations within East and Southeast Asia. He 
claims it is “a negative perception that derives from historical interactions and subsequently 
becomes embedded in the psyche of a state, both at the level of the elites and the citizen.”18” 
Maung Aung Myoe elaborates on this concept when discussing Myanmar's international 
relations. He argues that British colonial rule has shaped a strongly anti-imperialist or neo-
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colonialist narrative. Furthermore, he argues that historical overhangs exist within Myanmar-
Thai relations, mostly stemming from the Thai-side. 19 
Constructivist scholars argue that the past can shape current policy through the “prism of 
collective memory.”20 This memory, it has been argued, is a major influence on the policy and 
values of actors.21 Duncan Bell describes collective memory, in a general sense, as the “widely 
shared perceptions of the past,” which shape “the story that groups of people tell about 
themselves, linking past, present and future in a simplified narrative.”22 Meanwhile, Nuzov 
describes the politics of memory as a “state-sponsored approach to shaping the collective 
memory of past traumatic events to justify current politics.”23 In other words, states will shape 
the historical narrative to pursue various policies. Nuzo’s analysis is referring to Ukraine and 
its memorization of certain historical events pertaining to the Soviet Union and its attempts to 
mold public consciousness and legitimize its more centralist orientation. Vietnam is no stranger 
to this. The VCP has continually promoted a version of the past that installs it as the legitimate 
leader of the Vietnamese nation vis-à-vis its revolutionary credentials.24 The VCP evokes 
historical memories of defending the nation from the foreign aggressors (the French, then the 
Americans, and the Chinese, etc.) to legitimize its grip on power and influence policies.  
 
 
 
  
Vietnam is certainly party to the above formula in the sense that the VCP has largely 
shaped the nationalist narrative. As a one-party, semi-authoritarian state, Vietnamese foreign 
policy, historically speaking, has never been subjected to domestic constraints. The VCP is not 
forced to compete with alternative sources in shaping its state-sponsored historical memories.  
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Eric Langenbacher has described the limits on memory studies concerning non-democratic 
regimes. He argues that non democratic regimes foster collective memories based on the threat 
of outsiders harming the nation.  He cites imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, Castro’s Cuba, and 
communist China as examples. These memories are so one sided, he claims, that they are not 
memories but myths.25  
But this is where this thesis adopts a different approach. It does not seek to address how 
the state influences the collective memory of the nation but how internal and external factors 
influence the collective memory of the Party and therefore reinforces the policy of 
multidirectionalism. To quote Langenbacher again, he states that “collective memory helps to 
constitute a political culture, and thus it is an ideational factor that influences the thinking of 
individuals.” In this case the agent is the VCP.  
 
 
 
Studies on memory often conjure up the notion of trauma. That is, a traumatic past lends 
itself to justification of present identities, policies, and actions.26 Many other states have been 
influenced by collective memory, subsequently influencing their present behaviour. For 
Germany, the “Nazi memory” has led to a foreign policy that regards adventurism, power 
projections, unilateral action, or opposing democracy as anathema.27 Brazil has seen its foreign 
policy shaped by its internal ambitions to link together such a vast, diverse geographical entity. 
It thus, avoids engaging in expansionist behaviour. Similarly, its relatively peaceful 
engagement with its neighbours has seen a moderate international diplomacy that seeks to 
reduce conflicts and difficulties whilst emphasizing cooperation with its South American 
neighbours. 28  
State Policy 
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Meanwhile, China’s foreign policy places a large degree of emphasis on sovereignty, 
with little flexibility, stemming from its “century of humiliation” that is always firmly 
imprinted on the collective memory of its citizens and political leaders alike. It is necessary to 
take the China comparison further, given the similarities in governmental structures between 
Vietnam and China. Ning Lao has noted that China’s struggle for national rejuvenation is 
rooted in the collective memory, becoming institutionalized and fostered into a collective 
identity.29 She goes on to point out that there is a “second order” in which foreign diplomacy 
is conducted that is largely shaped by the regimes commitment to following social norms based 
around Chinese nationhood.30 What this means, in terms of this analysis, is that Vietnamese 
foreign policy analysis needs to incorporate both structural and domestic level analysis since 
the VCP faces dual areas of identity construction – the domestic level and international one.   
Therefore, we need to assess what influences the collective memory of the VCP, and 
subsequently what has become a part of that memory. In order to do this, the dichotomy of 
legitimacy and learning need to be discussed. A key difference between Vietnam and many 
other countries is that the survival of the state is intrinsically linked with the survival of the 
Party. The political process of Vietnam continually walks the - at times - contradicting 
tightrope of economic reform vs. political control.  Some argue that the Vietnamese political 
process is shaped by a continued obsession with social and political stability with the VCP 
regime perseverance as the main priority, sometimes even trumping realpolitik thinking.31 
Other scholars agree, “The central party values its long-term survival above all else.”32  This 
therefore demonstrates the shortfalls of a realist approach. It can certainly explain the initial 
development of a multidirectional foreign policy but the constructivist argument helps 
formulate why Vietnam has continued to adhere to such a policy and why it has become a 
cornerstone. It is linked to ensuring the survival of the Party.    
20 
 
 
 
Events at both the structural and unit level can have adverse effects on a state’s foreign 
policy.  Even within constructivism there exist three approaches to foreign policy: a structural 
analysis, a unit-level, and a holistic approach. In the case of Vietnam, explaining the formation 
of “multidirectionalism” requires incorporating both a systemic and unit level analysis because 
both are mutually re-enforcing. Its positive benefits gained at the unit level reinforce the 
performance-based legitimacy of the VCP in place since Doi Moi. The structural benefits of 
further integration and maintaining a diverse array of partners allows for Vietnam to operate 
with a high degree of autonomy and hedge against threats. This positive reinforcement 
strengthens, and has led to the development of, a strong foreign policy centered on 
multidirectionalism.  
But what do we mean by learning? There is little consensus on when or how states learn. 
Nevertheless, scholars have come up with various theories for learning.  Joseph Nye and 
William Jarosz define learning as the “acquisition of new knowledge or information that leads 
to change in behaviour” This would indicate that learning occurs prior to a change in behaviour. 
However, Vietnam’s case is the opposite. A domestic crisis, coupled with systemic pressures 
led to a behavioural change, but the subsequent internal and external benefits it has produced 
has reinforced this behaviour. Ultimately, a learning process took place in the years after 
Politburo Resolution 13. This is more in line with Jack Levy’s approach to learning, in that 
studying learning during the post-change period is more conducive to learning what gets 
translated into policy and how it evolves. He argues, “Conceptualizing learning involves a two-
stage process in which the observation and interpretation of experiences lead to a change in 
individual beliefs and belief-change influences subsequent, behaviour.” Alexender Wendt 
similarly states that learning has a construction effect on identities and interests. 33 
This thesis will trace the learning process undergone by Vietnam. Immediately after re-
unification, the VCP elevated its revolutionary credentials as the prime driving force of its 
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legitimacy. It led the nation to historic victories against the French and American and 
successfully re-unified the country after years of struggle. Yet this became undermined due the 
failure of the socially-planned economy. This in essence became a traumatic event in itself. 
The regime is painfully aware of these mistakes that led to it facing a legitimacy crisis merely 
ten-years after reunification. Doi Moi saved the VCP from “historical irrelevance.”34 But Doi 
Moi was not possible without a fundamental change at the international level.  
Whilst, the emergence of a multidirectional foreign policy has its origins in the structural 
changes in the international environment at the end of the Cold War along with the economic 
crises that led to a shift to a performance-based legitimacy, it does not explain the development 
and continued re-affirmation to such a policy. The subsequent learning process undergone 
since it initiated a multidirectional foreign policy, along with the internal and external benefits 
it has brought, has re-enforced the strength of this foreign policy. In other words, VCP’s 
collective memory has been shaped by the legitimacy benefits of multidirectionalism along 
with the learning process involved at the international level. Multidirectionalism has 
contributed to positive memories such as averting the legitimacy crisis and becoming an 
economic success story, reversing diplomatic isolation, and boosting its international profile 
(henceforth referred to the collective memory in singular form). As such, this policy has 
become a cornerstone of Vietnamese foreign policy, is seen as an intrinsic aspect of the reform 
process, and become a core-component of Vietnam’s diplomatic profile.. Indeed, this thesis 
seeks to trace how the learning process led to these memories taking shape. But before that, a 
greater theoretical discussion on what a multidirectional foreign policy entails and the 
structural nature conducive to its formation is needed.  
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Multidirectionalism 
Vietnam is hailed as one of the emerging regional players in Southeast Asia. But it stands apart 
because of its unique historical, economic and political ties with the world’s dominant powers, 
namely China, Russia and the United States as well as a key European player, France. These 
ties, both recent and further back in time, play into the country’s adoption of a multidirectional 
diplomacy. The study of how Vietnam’s foreign policy has evolved in the post Doi Moi era 
provides valuable insights and lessons for other countries, especially those navigating between 
fewer or less dominant global players. 
Multidirectionalism bears several lexical titles. Omni-directionalism, multi-vectorism, 
and diversified foreign policies are notable interchangeable terms. As is the case with Vietnam, 
small and medium states are the prime adopters of multidirectional foreign policies.  Small 
states frequently use multidirectional foreign policies when dealing with asymmetrical 
relations. Brantly Womack states that an asymmetrical relationship is one in which a disparity 
of capabilities exists between two states, leaving the weaker side more exposed to the 
stronger.35  Yet the stronger side is unable to dictate its terms to the smaller state since the 
smaller side dedicates plenty of resources to resisting the larger state, more resources than the 
larger state is realistically able to dedicate itself. Small and medium-sized states implement 
multidirectional foreign policies to alleviate some of the threats and potential challenges an 
asymmetrical relationship may pose. Traditional forms of balancing and bandwagoning are 
options, but doing so reduces their autonomy. Therefore, they emphasise diversity and 
Collective Memory 
Legitimacy Learning 
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integration within their relationships to maximise gains and reduce threats. States with 
historical asymmetrical relationships are thus more prone to have multidirectional foreign 
policies since doing so allows them to preserve their autonomy vis-à-vis their larger neighbour.  
Another key aspect of multidirectionalism is the evolving nature of a multipolar system 
that differs sharply from the bipolar system of the Cold War and unipolar system that followed 
shortly thereafter. The use of force or unilateral action has become increasingly “self-
limiting”.36 Furthermore, economic growth, energy security, and environmental sustainability 
has led to an “interest-based, problem-driven, and process-oriented” interconnected system that 
creates a greater need for cooperation.37  For larger states, this means that they find their 
behaviour increasingly constrained, yet a global demand placed on them for greater leadership 
in dealing with global, integrated problems. Meanwhile, for smaller states who were 
traditionally constrained to the sidelines of great-power politics, a multipolar world has allowed 
them greater freedoms and platforms to pursue foreign policies that bring them the most 
amount of political, security, and economic benefits possible.  
On the other hand, however, a multipolar world also means that prevailing uncertainty is 
prominent.38 The rise of territorial disputes in the South China Sea, as well as across Asia, 
creates a potential future source of conflict. Financial crises such as the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis, the 2008 financial crisis, as well as the 2015 Chinese Stock Market turbulence, illustrate 
the grave economic uncertainties that pose a threat to the economic well-being of smaller states. 
These states are less capable of riding out the storm created by such financial restrictions. There 
is also a domestic component to this uncertainty with the rise of value/norm-based foreign 
policies. In particular, the US and the European Union (EU) have a high ability to define norms 
in the international context. Given their economic might, they have considerable leverage in 
exerting these norms, which can pose a threat to the sovereignty of smaller states that are less 
resistant to such pressures.      
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Multidirectionalism can also be a useful policy in pursuing a hedging strategy, a strategy 
that is all the more useful in the multipolar world. Hedging is a form of alignment behaviour 
but different from traditional forms of alignment such as balancing or bandwagoning. It allows 
a state to exhibit both forms of “power acceptance” and “power rejection.”39  In other words, it 
is a strategy that strikes the middle ground without committing to a larger power. It maximises 
rewards but mitigates risks and uncertainties.  
Given the high-stakes and high-uncertainty in a multipolar world, states involved in 
asymmetrical relations must attempt to acquire as many benefits as possible yet secure 
alternatives for worst-case scenarios.  Often these policies are contradictory yet necessary in 
order to present a stance of neutrality to preserve gains and minimise losses. As will be 
demonstrated below Vietnam has skillfully implemented a series of mechanisms that allow it 
to hedge against potential military, economic, and political threats. However, it has been 
skillful   at ensuring these preventative measures do not inhibit it from gaining from the 
interconnected, multipolar world.  At times, these mechanisms appear contradictory and wide-
ranging but that is precisely what a hedging strategy is designed to do: maximise benefits and 
reduce potential risks. Ultimately a multidirectional foreign policy allows for the successful 
implementation of a hedging strategy.  
Post-Soviet states, such as Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan, have all 
been proponents of “multi-vector” foreign policies. These are policies that seek neither to 
“balance nor bandwagon.”40  Rather it is a tactical manoeuvre that seeks to maximise wealth 
whilst maintaining a degree of autonomy and thus enhance the bargaining power of itself. 
Given post-Soviet states’ preferences to avoid becoming over-reliant on Russia, but at the same 
time maintain cordial relations, they often seek out further partners in order to give themselves 
both greater flexibility in dealings vis-à-vis Russia, and attract the economic benefits of major 
players such as the US, China, and Japan. These multi-vector foreign policies are geared 
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towards ensuring autonomy and a stable environment that encourages economic development. 
Kazakhstani President Nursultan Nazarbayev demonstrates the use of such a policy by claiming 
that a multi-vector foreign policy develops “predictable and friendly relationships with all 
countries,” creating economic benefits in the process while at the same time minimising 
security threats.41 Similarly, multi-vector foreign policies are designed to avoid being engaged 
in a tug of war between two powers. 
Thailand is another country that has historically been associated with an omnidirectional 
foreign policy. In 1985 then foreign minister Siddhi Savetsil outlined Thailand’s new 
omnidirectional approach to foreign relations after a decade of preoccupation with the 
Indochina conflict. Cheow describes this foreign policy as a desire to play a more active role 
on the global stage in order to strengthen Thailand’s national and economic security. Thailand 
sought to strengthen its relations with larger powers, prioritise ASEAN, and link foreign policy 
to economic diplomacy.42  This foreign policy offered flexibility that accommodated large 
powers, yet maintained a high degree of autonomy in the process, and was one geared towards 
economic growth. As such, Thailand enjoyed good relations with its neighbours and super-
powers alike, and reaped considerable economic benefits, at least until the 1997 Asian 
Financial Crisis.43 
 Although Japan’s present-day foreign policy is more prominent and proportionate to its 
economic size, historically Japan engaged in what it labelled an “omnidirectional foreign 
policy.” Scholars describe Japan’s omnidirectional foreign policy during the Fukuda Doctrine 
as a “simplistic policy, which allows economics to be separated from politics, when it is to 
Japan's advantage, by maintaining friendly relations with all.”44 Meanwhile, Vietnam’s current 
multidirectional foreign policy has been described as the process of forming as many 
equidistant partners to ensure freedom and protect itself from overdependence on one particular 
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power.45 Matthias Maass goes on to discuss Vietnam’s “multi-dimensional foreign policy” as 
seeking to link up with all the great powers and major international organisations.46  
Weaving together the above descriptions, we can characterize multidirectionalism as a 
foreign policy in which a state, usually a small or medium power, attempts to play a more 
active role, which encourages diversity and pragmatism in its relationships to reap the most 
amount of economic, political, and security benefits as possible and at the same time enhance 
its bargaining position, notably vis-à-vis asymmetrical relations. It is a strategy that maximises 
gains but also guards against the potential pitfalls of uncertainty and future conflict in an 
increasingly complex, interdependent, and multipolar world order.   
Based on the definition of multidirectionalism, there are considerable benefits in 
pursuing a multidirectional foreign policy for Vietnam. Economic development is paramount 
for the state as it seeks to meet its 2020 development targets outlined shortly after the Twelfth 
Party Congress, some of which include economic growth rates of 6.5-7 percent, a growth 
domestic product (GDP) per capita of $3,200 - $3,500, and having 80 percent of citizens 
covered by health insurance.47 Economic ties are now a focal point of international relations.  
In pursuing a multidirectional foreign policy Vietnam can draw on additional sources of 
economic growth and avoid becoming over-reliant on a single power for growth. Paramount to 
promoting sustainable economic development, however, is securing peace and stability, and 
ensuring the protection of Vietnam’s national sovereignty and territorial integrity.  Given 
recent events, particularly China’s more assertive posture in the South China Sea, Vietnam’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity have come under threat. By pursuing a diversified foreign 
policy Vietnam can draw on the support of various actors, both large and medium-sized 
powers, in its dispute with China to gain greater leeway. Due to the massive disparity in size, 
in addition to the desire to rectify the problem peacefully, a diversified approach offers Vietnam 
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greater alternatives in quelling the conflict without jeopardising Vietnamese economic and 
political relations with its neighbour to the north.  Additionally, Vietnam avoids a situation 
where it becomes sucked into taking sides between an increased US-China rivalry. It can 
pursue a “multipolar balancing strategy” as opposed to a narrower balancing strategy. 48 
From a security standpoint, increased diversification to foreign relations fits into 
Vietnam’s “three nos” approach to defence. That is: “no military alignment or alliance with 
any power, no military bases on Vietnamese soil, and no reliance upon another country to 
counter a third party.49 Pursuing a diversified foreign policy via multilateral institutions, as 
well as strong bilateral partnerships avoids a situation in which Vietnam is forced to forge a 
close relationship with any one particular power that might bring this policy into question.  
Thus, a multidirectional foreign policy fits into Vietnam’s strategic objectives of creating a 
peaceful, stable environment to bolster its standing, bi and multilaterally, in addition to 
protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Multidirectionalism and Vietnam 
There are three terms related to Vietnamese multidirectionalism: Diversification, 
Multilateralism, and International Integration. Whilst examining these terms in great detail is 
beyond the scope of this thesis, this section will briefly outline what these terms mean within 
the Vietnamese context. Diversification is the process by which Vietnam first establishes, then 
strengthens relations. Politburo Resolution 13 in 1988 initially called for “more friends, less 
enemies.” The Seventh Party Congress in 1991 made note that the overall task of Vietnam’s 
foreign policy is to promote friendship and cooperation in order to create favourable conditions 
for national defence. It also stated that part of the process involved developing friendly 
relations with all countries, and promoting normalisation with both China and the US.50 
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 The first phase from 1991 to 1995 saw Vietnam establish relations with 163 countries, 
restore relations between itself and the West, Japan, the US, and China. By 1995, and for the 
first time it had diplomatic relations with all five permanent members of the UN Security 
Council. The Eighth Party Congress documents therefore started to use the term 
“diversification.”51 Since then, Vietnam has sought to strengthen cooperation with its partners 
and add differentiating layers to existing relationships. After entering the twenty-first century, 
Vietnam has laid the foundation for cooperation by inking numerous strategic/comprehensive 
partnerships with international partners, big and small alike. They have sought to add substance 
to their partnerships and diversify the areas of cooperation. Traditionally this cooperation has 
been economically focused, but the diversification has seen defencive, social, cultural, with 
technological aspects gaining greater emphasis in recent years.  
Ultimately, however, diversification is a relatively simplistic process given the fact it is 
built on the country’s own national interests and involves bargaining with one bilateral 
partner.52 It is worthy to note that Vietnam achieved normalisation with 163 countries in only 
a 5 year period. Yet developing these relationships is an ongoing process. As ties become 
deeper, better mechanisms to promote deepening relations are needed. Subsequently, managing 
those relations becomes additionally more complex as various institutions are required to 
manage it. Chapter Six of this thesis focuses on the mechanisms of deepening bilateral 
relationships vis-à-vis forming strategic/comprehensive partnerships.  
Multilateralism is defined by Robert Keohane as the “practice of coordinating national 
policies in groups of three or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of 
institutions.”53 Meanwhile John Ruggie defines it as “coordinating relations among three or 
more states in accordance with certain principles.”54 In simplistic terms, and in regards to 
Vietnam, it is a process in which Vietnam seeks to firstly join multilateral institutions and 
international organisations alike. Then it seeks to actively participate in such organisations. 
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Vietnam’s first foray into multilateralism in the Doi Moi era began with Vietnam’s ascension 
to ASEAN in 1995. This, as Carl Thayer notes, “signaled a fundamental change in its foreign 
policy orientation” and represented the first time “Vietnam sought security with, rather than 
security against, Southeast Asia.”55  
The Eighth Party Congress in 1996 marked the beginning of Vietnam’s emphasis on this 
multilateralism. Documents from that Congress make note of its dynamic implementation of 
diversification and multilateralization, highlighting joining ASEAN as pivotal. 56  Going 
forward, the documents state that the country needed to initiate the process of joining the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the WTO. This also involved adopting 
international trade norms. 57 However, whilst the initial benefits of multilateralism are evident 
from a purely materialistic perspective, Vietnam is also forced to play by the rules of the game.  
Whilst joining these organisation brings substantial economic benefits, it raises 
Vietnam’s international profile, and gives the country greater strength in numbers when 
confronting threats, but it takes a substantial amount of time for Vietnam to adjust its own 
policies. Writing shortly after Vietnam joined ASEAN, Pham Cao Phong noted that Vietnam’s 
understanding of ASEAN at the time it joined was poor. A lack of English speaking personnel, 
wide-economic gaps, and a lack of information regarding ASEAN cooperative programs meant 
that Vietnam had to step up its integration into the organisation. Phong went on to note that 
“the impact of a subsidised economy cannot be erased overnight and stated that its low GDP 
per capital prevented Vietnam from actively and positively participating in ASEAN economic 
co-operation programmes. 58  
Pham Quang Minh has similarly noted the ‘learning curve’ experiences shortly after 
joining ASEAN along with its initially modest participation. 59  Therefore, multilateralism 
involved a substantial amount of learning. Gradually, and as this thesis seeks to show, 
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Vietnam’s participation shifted to a more proactive stance and learning took place. As Vietnam 
began to bridge the gap its economy and other ASEAN nations, acquire greater knowledge of 
operations, and train personnel capable of navigating the environment, its activities within 
ASEAN shifted from modest participation to proactive participation. Similar patterns of 
learning also emerged in its joining of the WTO. But ASEAN was notable for being the first 
step into the multilateral arena.     
Integration became prominent as Vietnam entered the twenty-first century and as it 
attempted to adjust to the terms and conditions of AFTA, and later on the WTO. Peter Robinson 
defines integration as “the institutional combination of separate national economies into larger 
economic blocs or communities.”60 Based on this definition, the concept of multilateralism and 
integration are intertwined.  Integration, however, is Vietnam adjusting to the rules of the game, 
adopting norms, and rules and regulations to suit that of multilateral organisations or 
multilateral trade agreements. Integration is closely linked with re-structuring Vietnam’s 
economy to be more suited to the demands of the integrated, international economy. It is 
designed to create favourable conditions for the import-export markets, enhancing the 
efficiency of Vietnamese enterprises, and provide impetus for the reformations of socio-
economic management, legal system, and the management of its own domestic resources.61   
Integration is a process that leads to greater rewards. But at the same time, it also exposes 
Vietnam to greater risks. Additional complications arise because it involves a change from 
within yet often dictated by outside forces: forces it is unable to control.62  Integration also 
challenges the absolute sovereignty of the country and this explains why integration came later. 
It wasn’t until the Ninth Party Congress in 2001 that Vietnam began to emphasize the concept 
of integration.  The following chapter will analyse integration’s evolution in greater detail, 
given the considerable debate that erupted within the government about the scope and scale of 
the reform process. Ultimately, the reform camp won out and in 2001 Vietnam momentously 
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agreed to fully integrate into the international political economy in order to reap the economic 
benefits.  
Yet integration is an ongoing process and has not been without its difficulties. Joining 
the WTO was an arduous process. Vo Tri Thanh and Nguyen Anh Duong wrote shortly after 
Vietnam’s ascension to the WTO that integration had considerable positive impacts on the 
economy, such as exports, investment, growth, and employment as a result of access to foreign 
markets, technological transfer and greater business linkages. However, they also state that 
integration also exposes Vietnam to greater risks.63 Additionally, writing in 2007, Carl Thayer 
made note that sovereignty came under challenge as part of its foreign policy geared towards 
reforms. “Paradoxically”, he adds, is that integration “has strengthened the party-state in 
unexpected ways rather than undermining its vertical control.” Therefore, integration is a more 
cautious process. It requires transformation from within, rather than simply pursuing singular 
interests and necessitates reaping the benefits whilst mitigating the risks.
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Chapter 3 
Multidirectionalism’s Origin and Evolution 
For nearly 30 years, Vietnam has embarked on a multidirectional foreign policy. As time has 
gone by, this policy has grown in importance and become deeper and more diverse. Initially 
seen as a way out of international isolation and an attempt to foster economic growth, the policy 
has been reaffirmed at each subsequent Party Congress, growing in scope and nature. But why 
has Vietnam continued to pursue such a policy? Is it merely based on pragmatic calculation or 
does history paint a different narrative?  One could argue that ever since the Democratic 
Republic of Vietnam was formed in 1945, it has engaged in a struggle for autonomy through 
diversity. Upon declaring independence on September 2, 1945, Ho Chi Minh proclaimed a 
foreign policy that would seek to “add friends and reduce enemies.”  Politburo Resolution 13 
in 1988 similarly called for more friends and fewer enemies.1  
Throughout its turbulent war against the French, then the US, the Vietnamese Communist 
Party (previously known as the Vietnamese Workers Party) engaged in a diplomatic offensive 
to cultivate allies in its struggles and carefully sat on the fence during the Sino-Soviet Split. 
Even after the war ended in 1975, again, a foreign policy of pragmatism was promoted with 
Vietnam keen not to ally itself too closely with the Soviet Union or China, but to reopen 
relations with socialist and non-socialist states alike.  
Upon reunification, Vietnam was optimistic about conducting independent diplomacy.2 
However, the war in Cambodia and China, along with failed attempts to acquire Western aid, 
led to Vietnam becoming over-reliant on the Soviet Union. Similarly, Vietnam faced the task 
of reunifying North and South – politically and economically – along with reinvigorating a 
war-torn economy. Disastrous economic policies and international isolation meant that by 
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1986, the VCP was faced with the prospect of “reform or die.” Doi Moi and a foreign policy, 
focused on more friends and fewer enemies ensued.   
As Doi Moi initially struggled to invigorate the economy, given the country’s isolation, 
Vietnamese leaders began to recognize that the only way to do so was through becoming an 
active member of the international community – something that required withdrawing its troops 
from Cambodia and dropping the ideological lens of its foreign policy outlook. Resolution 13 
outlined the new foreign policy-thinking and the Party fully endorsed a multidirectional foreign 
policy at the Seventh Party Congress in 1991. The years from 1991 to 1995 saw Vietnam 
completely diversify its relations. By 1995 it held diplomatic relations with all five permanent 
members of the UN Security Council, joined ASEAN, began laying a framework for joining 
APEC and the WTO, and successfully began a period of economic growth. Vietnam 
proclaimed it wanted to be a friend to all countries in the world. 
The origins of Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy evolved from numerous shocks, 
both internal and external. 3  Politburo Resolution 13 was based on rational and realist 
calculations. Scholars such as Carl Thayer and David Elliot have discussed this at large. 
However, there has been an absence of discussion about the role of learning and memory and 
how it influences the Party’s behavior as multidirectionalism began to evolve.  
Using the VCP as the principle actor, this overall thesis seeks to address the role of 
memory and learning by exploring the disastrous post-reunification period from a holistic 
perspective and the subsequent learning process in which the benefits of multidirectionalism 
began to bear fruit. Memory here is enhanced legitimacy benefits brought about by 
multidirectionalism and contrasts to the failed decade after re-unification. More specific to this 
chapter, however is the failed socially planned economy along with diplomatic isolation and 
overreliance on the Soviet Union.  It argues that, initially, a combination of structural and 
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domestic mistakes exacerbated one another leading to pragmatism veering off course, 
threatening the VCP’s survival. The over reliance on the Soviet Union, along with grave 
economic mismanagement, would prove to be catastrophic. It severely threatened the 
legitimacy of the VCP and left a historical legacy that is firmly imprinted on the collective 
memory of the Party and served as a traumatic experience. Subsequently, multidirectionalism 
has largely abated this crisis and led to Vietnam becoming a proactive member of the 
international community with impressive economic achievements to boot. This has reinforced 
the behaviour of the state and developed into a core component of Doi Moi.  
This chapter will the historical evolution of Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy, 
from its origins in the post-1975 period, to its adoption in 1988, to the learning and socialization 
process taking place during the nineties, culminating in its elevation in 2001. Doing so will 
seek to draw links between memory, learning, and legetimacy with foreign policy orientation. 
Not ignoring or downgrading the role that a rational model plays in Vietnam, the constructivist 
argument in this paper is merely there to act as a supplementary viewpoint to the discourse on 
Vietnam’s foreign policy. In doing so, it primarily looks at the situation through the eyes of the 
state.  
Learning its Lesson 
On April 30, 1975 the long, bitter struggle for reunification of South and North Vietnam came 
to end as the tanks rolled into Saigon. A wave of optimism swept the VCP, proclaiming a 
“historic victory for the great people of the South and indeed the whole country.”4 Yet this was 
the beginning of a new challenge. Attention quickly turned to implementing a successful 
reunification process. Reunification presented the leadership with several daunting challenges. 
How to reunify a country, politically and economically, separated by thirty years of war and 
two vastly different political and economic systems. From the outset, Vietnam demonstrated 
its ambitious targets with the 1976-80 five-year plan, calling for $7.5 billion in investment and 
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highly ambitious agricultural, food, and steel targets – much of which had to be revised down 
after economic realities sunk in.  
From a foreign policy perspective, the VCP faced three pressing questions after 
reunification.5  First of all, how should it approach relations with the non-communist camp? 
Should it pursue a more independent foreign policy or should it firmly ally itself within the 
socialist camp. Would the VCP strike a balance between its ideological goals of continuing the 
revolution and pursuing its own national interests? After all, the country was in desperate need 
of economic aid, and despite Le Duan’s proclamation affirming Vietnam’s commitment to the 
international revolutionary cause, pragmatic calculations would deem that aid was more 
necessary. Secondly, how was Vietnam to handle the ongoing Sino-Soviet dispute within the 
socialist camp? Was it to avoid taking sides and continue its policy of fence sitting and 
encouraging fraternal friendship, or should it ally itself with either side?6 Given that both 
countries had provided a substantial amount of aid to Vietnam’s war effort, the former was 
clearly the more desirable. Thirdly, how should Vietnam approach its relations with its 
revolutionary partners: Laos and Cambodia? 
Of course, Vietnam ultimately became heavily reliant on the Soviet Union, entered into 
a costly war with Cambodia – causing China to invade, and was diplomatically and 
economically isolated as a result.7 However, there is considerable academic debate as to how 
this happened. Some have argued that ideological considerations played a part, but others argue 
that structural issues forced Vietnam into its position. This paper tends to side with the latter 
argument, but what is crucially important for the current debate is that Vietnam failed to 
maintain its autonomy and became less independent, which had a trickle-down effect on 
economic performance; all of which threatened the regime’s survival.  
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This was even though leaders were awash with optimism for an independent foreign policy 
that cultivated friends with socialist and non-socialist countries alike. For the first time the 
country faced no external threat. China and the Soviet Union were natural backers for the 
regime, and to boot, Richard Nixon’s secret promise of billions of dollars looked like a strong 
bargaining chip in any attempts to reconcile with the VCP’s former adversary.  
At the Fourth Workers’ Party Congress, Nguyen Duy Trinh stated that Vietnam would 
expand its relationship with all countries, in a clear statement of pragmatism. Vietnam was in 
desperate need of aid and would take it from whatever source it came from.8 Evidence of 
weariness to become over-reliant on a superpower was also there. Prime Minister Pham Van 
Dong in 1978 proclaimed that: “Whenever in our four-thousand-year history Vietnam has been 
dependent on one large friend it has been a disaster for us.” 9 He similarly echoed Vietnam’s 
attempts to be a friendly country to all countries when asked about the matter by a Japanese 
reporter: “We expand diplomatic relations with all countries in the world on the basis of respect 
for independence, sovereignty, equality and all parties benefit.”10  
Meanwhile Hoang Quoc Viet proclaimed that: “Sometimes dealings between big nations 
can be made at the expense of a small nation and crush it.”11 Similarly, the resolution of the 24 
plenum of the Party Central Committee desired: “Favorable conditions (at the international 
level) for the rapid construction of the material and technical bases of socialism and for 
consolidation of national defense and security.”12 Writing in 1980, Lee Dutter and Raymond 
Kania outlined that one of the fundamental goals of Vietnamese foreign policy was: “Political 
independence from all non-Vietnamese influences,” affirming that Vietnam’s ultimate goal 
was independence and autonomy.13 Yet, this goal was never realized. 
Le Duan paid visits to China and the Soviet Union in September and October of 1975 
respectively. The South China Sea issue dampened the Beijing visit but in return Vietnam 
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received a “substantial interest free loan” along with a protocol on commodity exchange.14 
Similarly, the delegation to the Soviet Union secured an economic aid agreement for 1976-
1980 and a protocol on the coordination of state plans for 1976-80.15  Given the historical 
animosities between Hanoi and Beijing, it was clear that Vietnam was posturing itself towards 
the Soviet Union, yet Beijing was still a fundamentally important ally. 
Still, this is not to say that Vietnam was completely in the pockets of its socialist brothers. 
Hanoi distanced itself from Beijing and Moscow considerably by becoming the first socialist 
country to join the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in September of 1976. Similarly, at the 
USSR Communist Party’s Twenty-Fifth Congress, Le Duan emphasized diversity in foreign 
relations, irking its host. Vietnam similarly refused to join the Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance (COMECON) initially, waiting until ambitious economic targets of the five-year 
plan forced it to join in June 1978 with Nhan Dan stating that the move was of “economic 
necessity.”16  
In a sign of how important aid was to the re-construction of Vietnam, Hanoi published a 
liberal code for foreign investment indicating it was open for business. It was even shown to 
US bankers beforehand. Furthermore, Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, in a speech to the 
national assembly, formally extended an invitation to the US to normalize relations. 
Meanwhile, Bank of America and First National City bank were invited to Vietnam, indicating 
how desperately they craved US aid.17 Pham Van Dong similarly paid a visit to France and 
ASEAN countries in 1977 to attempt to secure a diversification of aid before becoming over-
reliant on the Soviet Union.18   
From a military perspective too, Vietnam indicated that it was no Soviet pawn since it 
resisted overtures from the Soviet Union to set up naval bases in the south of the country in 
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addition to setting up a treaty of friendship. Vietnam even declared that no foreign country 
would be permitted to establish a military base on its soil.19  
Arguably two factors led to Vietnam’s dependence on the Soviet Union – its souring of 
relations with China and its failure to normalize relations with the US. All of which was 
compounded by stark economic necessities. After reunification, relations with China began on 
a downward spiral. During Le Duan’s visit in September 1975, schisms within the relationship 
were abounding. On the eve of the arrival, China sent radio broadcasts to Vietnam and China 
regarding developments on the Paracel and Spratly Islands. China, having seized the Paracel 
islands in early 1974, had awakened Vietnamese concerns over China’s expansionist 
ambitions. Similarly, it weakened the pro-China faction within the VCP.20  Additionally, Deng 
Xiaoping castigated Duan for Vietnam continually stirring up anti-Chinese sentiments, 
reminding Duan that China had not annexed a “centimeter of Vietnamese territory.21 In a sign 
of Vietnam’s disapproval, they failed to issue a return banquet invitation to their hosts along 
with not issuing the standard joint-communiqué.22 To add insult to injury, all of these were 
offered during Duan’s visit to Moscow the following month.  
Yet China was still an essential partner for Vietnam. It had allegedly pledged $1.5 billion 
in aid. 23  Future Prime Minister Do Muoi met with Hua Guofeng in December of 1976 
requesting assistance in settling projects in Vietnam. Yet, Hua Guofeng indicated that domestic 
factors were pre-occupying China. Mao’s death had thrown up a leadership transition, and 
prolonged droughts along with the Great Tangshan earthquake had hampered China’s 
commitment to aid. This meeting reinforced the sense of “ungratefulness” China felt from 
Vietnam. 24 Adding to the already strained relations, Vietnam’s expulsion of ethnic Chinese 
led to China terminating 51 aid projects and public criticism of Vietnam. Then, in December 
1978, Vietnam launched a full-scale invasion of Cambodia after years of border clashes.  
Ultimately, Vietnam’s embracing attitude towards the Soviet Union, territorial disputes, 
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Vietnam’s expulsion of ethnic Chinese and its invasion of Cambodia, led to the 1979 Sino-
Vietnamese War. All compounded by on-going economic crises in both countries.25 
Attempts to normalize relations with the US did not materialize. An overconfident 
Vietnamese negotiating team, determined to secure the $4.75 billion promised by Richard 
Nixon in 1973, scuppered initial attempts at normalization. The Vietnamese negotiating team 
presented the infamous letter to the Woodcock Commission arriving in Vietnam in March of 
1977.26 Vietnam’s precondition for aid proved to be a strategic miss-calculation, with relations 
with China souring and the economic realities pushing it closer to the Soviet Union. Meanwhile 
the larger, geopolitical landscape proved to be to the detriment of Vietnam. Zbigniew 
Brzezinski viewed Vietnam as a Soviet Proxy and did not want to offend Chinese interests. 
Brzezinski travelled to Beijing in May of 1978, where he learnt the depth of the Sino-
Vietnamese split.27  By the time Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach indicated in a meeting in 
September of 1978 that aid would no longer be a precondition for normalization, the possibility 
of a war with China was clearly on his mind. 28 
In an interview with the New York Times in October 1978 he stated that: “We hope, of 
course, for peace. But if we were to assume an ostrich posture we would certainly end up with 
a war on our back. We have to prepare for the worst.”29 And preparing for the worst they were. 
Shortly after the interview Thach flew to Moscow where the Soviet Union and Vietnam signed 
the “treaty of friendship” on November 3, 1978.  Although Vietnam was heavily reliant on the 
Soviet Union, it has been pointed out by scholars that Vietnam was certainly autonomous in its 
decision making to invade Cambodia, in addition to the economic policies set out in its failed 
Second Five Year plan. Adam Fforde and Vldimiry Mazyrin point out that the leadership 
suffered from a “dizziness from victory” after winning the Vietnam War.30 Yet the invasion of 
Cambodia set in chain a series of events that would lead to Vietnam becoming almost entirely 
economically reliant on the Soviet-Union.   
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Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia put the final nail in the coffin of Vietnam-US 
normalization. The American trade embargo stuck. Western and ASEAN countries similarly 
withdrew aid, with ASEAN imposing its own embargo. Vietnam’s political isolation worsened 
its economic difficulties. Industrial output dropped 15% from 1978 to 1980, mismanagement, 
corruption, and shortages were rife.31 Food shortages led to widespread theft, and refugees 
increased. Even one Politburo Member commentated that Vietnam would be “poor and 
hungry” until the end of the century.32 By 1981 the Soviet Union contributed to roughly 90% 
of Vietnam’s food imports, 100% of its oil imports, and almost 90% of its cotton imports, 
indicating how economically vital they had become.33 
Le Duan addressed the Fifth National Congress by admitting the “failure of the leadership 
to realize the difficulties and complexities of the advance to socialism from a primarily small 
production economy.”34 However, military prioritization was still key, with a tense situation in 
Cambodia, and with troops stationed in the North in case of a repeat Chinese invasion. Roughly 
50% of the Vietnamese budget was spent on the military. The military component was 
highlighted in Party documents stating: “The need to stand ready to cope with the possibility 
of a large-scale aggression by the enemy.”35 “It was clearly evident by the Fifth Party Congress 
that Vietnam was firmly sitting within the Soviet Camp. Le Tho Duc spoke out firmly against 
the Chinese, stating that: “The entire Party and people must regard the militant solidarity and 
all-round co-operation with the Soviet Union, Laos, Kampuchea and other fraternal socialist 
countries as a principle and a matter of strategic significance of our Party's and state's foreign 
policy.”36  He went on to stress that relations with socialist countries, the COMECON and the 
non-aligned movement, were priorities.37   
Nevertheless, the Fifth Party Congress also saw Vietnam come under criticisms from the 
Soviet side for Vietnam’s misuse of aid.38 As a result, the Soviet Union placed more advisors 
within the Vietnamese bureaucracy to monitor the use of its aid, dealing a further blow to the 
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concept of autonomy.  Additionally, Vietnam had become wary of Chinese territorial 
ambitions. Vietnam caved into Soviet demands for access to Cam Ranh Bay. The Soviet Union 
began leasing the base rent-free in 1979. In July 1980, Vietnam and the Soviet Union signed 
an agreement for technological assistance, as well as fixing and repairing much of Cam Ranh’s 
facilities.39  Additionally, the number of Soviet Naval Warships using the facilities increased 
from twelve to twenty-four from 1982 to 1985.40 Despite Vietnam being eager to assert that it 
was maintaining an independent position, it was clear it was not.  
As a result of its political isolation stemming from its invasion of Cambodia, Vietnam’s 
aid was almost entirely from the Soviet Union and socialist bloc. The table below shows how 
much aid dwindled from 1976 to 1985 from non-socialist countries. 41 
 
 
Total 
from 
DAC 
Countries Sweden France Japan Denmark Finland 
Total 
ODA 
1976 160.9 87.1 2.4 28.4 16.4 1.5 185.6 
1977 200 113 25.3 12.5 12 1.4 247.6 
1978 208.3 77 23.8 28.5 32.8 0.4 369.6 
1979 229.5 63.6 44.9 38.7 15.8 4.3 336.5 
1980 151.9 91.9 15.1 3.7 12.8 10.1 228.5 
1981 125.2 71.2 13.4 0.9 0.5 11.4 242.4 
1982 101.9 65.5 3.8 1.3 2.2 8.8 135.5 
1983 70.9 49.8 4 0.7 0.3 7.8 105.9 
1984 80.7 63 4 1.1 1.4 4.1 109.9 
1985 54.2 37.5 2.8 0.6 1 5.8 114 
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The 1985 plan for foreign delegation visits stated that the socialist bloc would be the 
main source of visits.42  Indeed by this time, the realization of Vietnam’s poor economic 
management began to hit home. Vo Van Kiet told Nhan Dan that year: “Our inadequacies in 
economic management in the last 10 years are the main obstacle to the economic construction 
of the country.”43  
September of that year saw economic reforms introduced to alleviate the problems of the 
rigid, centrally planned economy. Even Nguyen Van Linh, who had been ousted at the Fifth 
Party Congress but later oversaw somewhat successful reforms in the South, was brought back 
into the fold in 1985.  However, problems were abounding, with inflation rife, and little to no 
management expertise, accessible markets, and investment or outside assistance. To compound 
this problem, technological assistance coming from socialist countries was generally outdated 
and inferior, rendering Vietnam substantially uncompetitive in the East Asian market place.44 
Le Duc Tho similarly admitted to the mistakes of the Party. He stated: “We have made big 
mistakes in a number of policies on the economic front which have, therefore, influenced many 
respects of life, the economy, society and politics.” 45   A United National Development 
Programme (UNDP) report also noted that conflicts had an adverse impact on economic 
performance.46 
It was clear just before the Sixth Party Congress in December 1986 that something had 
to change. Reflecting on this time period, Phan Doan Nam, Former Assistant Secretary to 
Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach, stated that long lasting mistakes had placed Vietnam into 
a socio-economic crisis and diplomatic isolation.47  The veering off course of a foreign policy 
designed to ensure autonomy, coupled with two costly wars, had devastating impacts on 
Vietnam’s economy; thus, threatening the regime’s survival. Whether or not one subscribes to 
the ideological or nationalistic argument as the causes of Vietnam’s isolation, ten years of 
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failed socialist economic planning had eroded the VCP’s claims to legitimacy, and a renovation 
was needed both at the domestic and international level.   
Doi Moi – the Catalyst for Foreign Policy Re-orientation 
The Sixth Party Congress is most notable for Doi Moi – a series of economic liberalization 
policies, including agricultural reform, the end of collectivization, price controls, subsidies, 
and opening up Vietnam to international trade, with an emphasis on export growth. These 
reforms were a “…reaction to an economic crisis that threatened the legitimacy of the 
regime.”48 Yet the Sixth Party Congress is also notable for its less ideological rhetoric stance 
and the VCP’s growing awareness that economic strength was linked to military strength, and 
that the welfare of the people was of paramount of importance. Similarly, the concept of peace 
at the international level became a vital part of that equation. Party documents state that: 
The tasks of the Party and State in the field of external affairs are to strive to 
combine the strength of the nation with that of the epoch, firmly maintain 
peace in Indochina, and contribute actively to the firm maintenance of peace 
in Southeast Asia and the world.49  
Yet at the same time, there was no indication that Doi Moi would apply to the political arena. 
In fact, there was an abundance of text dedicated to strengthening the Party. In these regards, 
1986-1991 was a time of great learning for the Party. They had one foot in the reform door, but 
were still on a steep learning curve before “renovation” could truly begin.  
Complicating these matters was the startling changes occurring amongst the socialist 
bloc.  China had already embarked on its own set of reforms; the Soviet Union was undergoing 
its own reforms via Perestroika and Glasnost. Soon the Eastern-bloc would begin to crumble. 
Ultimately, this time is notable for three concepts emerging within the collective memory of 
the Party: comprehensive security, a linkage between economic reforms and international 
46 
 
 
 
cooperation and peace, and reforms as a means to strengthen Party leadership – all of which 
continue to be emphasized to this day.  
The concept of “comprehensive security” is a term that includes all aspects of national 
strength: economic, political, cultural, as well as the military component. David Elliot argues 
that the Party was forced to adopt this concept as the world around them was becoming more 
complex. 50  The more ideological, military-driven concept of security was evaporating. 
Increasingly, failure to develop was seen as the major threat to the nation. Seeing fellow Asian 
states such as Thailand and Indonesia follow in the footsteps of South Korea, Taiwan, and 
Hong Kong brought home the fact that Vietnam was being left behind in an area of high 
economic potential. In the lead up to the Sixth Party Congress, Truong Chinh asked whether 
or not the Party’s policies had helped develop the nation’s economy and whether or not national 
defence and security were subsequently strong.51 
The Sixth Party Congress resolution called for “enhancing the strength of the entire 
system of proletarian dictatorship, closely combining the economy with national defense.”52 
Reflecting twenty years later, the National Assembly’s report on 20 years of Doi Moi claimed 
that Doi Moi had helped the country come out of a social-economic crisis in which the 
collective strength of the country improved dramatically.53  Furthermore, current secretary 
general Nguyen Phu Trong, writing almost thirty years later, spoke of the Sixth Party Congress 
as “concretizing” the general guideline of economic construction.54 
The concept of comprehensive security was a pivotal realization for the Party as it led to 
the linkage between economic security and securing peace at the international level. 
Essentially, all tools were necessary for ensuring the national defence of the country – 
economic, diplomatic, and political in addition to military. The collapse of the Eastern-bloc 
and the Soviet Union would bring this point home further. A linkage factor emerged in May 
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and June of 1986, when the politburo adopted Resolution 32. This resolution called for a 
solution to the Cambodian problem, but also linked the concept of “peace and development” 
as the highest priority.55 At the same time, a more reform minded leadership emerged from the 
Sixth Party Congress. Le Duan, died in July 1986, replaced by Truong Chinh who was then 
replaced by the reformer, Nguyen Van Linh in December 1986. Similarly, other reform minded 
personnel joined the Politburo, such as Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. This appointment 
also indicated the prioritization of diplomatic affairs as a means to ensure development. This 
linkage factor, however, was strengthened by Doi Moi’s growing pains and failure to attract 
aid from foreign investors.  
Inflation in 1986 was already at a whopping 774.4% - an eight-fold increase from the 
previous year.56 Grain production fell significantly, leading to severe food shortages by 1988. 
Disagreement within the Politburo over the scope and depth of the reforms essentially led to a 
mini-economic crisis in itself. State enterprises lost huge amounts of money due to the shift to 
market prices. Overvalued exchange rates also caused difficulties for export companies.57 
Prime Minister Do Muoi painted a grim picture of the economic state of the economy in an 
address to the National Assembly in October, 1988, claiming that Vietnam had become one of 
the poorest nations and that economic renovation was hampered by poor organization and 
management.58  
However, writing in 1993, David Wurful pointed out that fortunately for the reform 
process, the reformers were firmly in control. Had they not been then the conservative faction 
could have used the economic disasters to further scale back reforms. 59  Ultimately, the 
reformers’ response was to take the brakes off the reform. In 1988, Vietnam devalued its 
currency by seven-fold in an attempt to secure loans from the IMF – a move one government 
economic advisor said was “…pure economic reality.” 60  Hanoi also invited an IMF team to 
give advice to the government – the first time it had been done. Furthermore, the government 
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enacted a new foreign investment law resulting in more than fifty projects with low capital, a 
move Vo Van Kiet stated: “Interpreted the trend for the expansion of International Relations.”61 
Nguyen Van Linh had declared that the “state must get foreign loans” and it was clear that 
foreign aid and loans was becoming crucial to Vietnamese strategic thinking, and that further 
diplomatic efforts were needed to ensure aid could be secured.62  
In the diplomatic sphere, Doi Moi, at first, did not produce any major achievements. 
Some western newspapers at the time noted that: “Western nations and particular the United 
States, would not pay much attention to the reforms.”63  Then secretary of state, George P. 
Schultz, called the political changes to take place after the Sixth Party Congress “discouraging” 
and again urged Vietnam to withdraw from Cambodia. Similarly, ASEAN nations were intent 
to keep Vietnam isolated until it withdrew from Cambodia and reversed its economic policies.64 
ASEAN, in particular, viewed Vietnam’s isolation as self-inflicted, and that Vietnam was the 
root cause of ASEAN’s frustrations to build a zone of peace, freedom, and neutrality.65  
Speaking to the author, a Vietnamese official described the situation as follows:  
Vietnam was basically on its own. People were poor. It had opened up in 1986 
but no one came because of the Cambodia crisis so after resolving that, 
Vietnam was desperate to lift itself out of poverty. They, in a sense, were 
forced to build trust and open up.66  
Carl Thayer also agrees that the leadership was becoming increasingly aware that Doi Moi 
could not be accomplished without settling the Cambodian issue.67 In 1987, the VCP secretly 
adopted Resolution No. 2, which decided to withdraw troops from Cambodia. As such Vietnam 
issued its codified foreign policy re-orientation, Politburo Resolution 13, in May 1988 calling 
for a multidirectional foreign policy with an emphasis on maintaining peace and taking 
advantage of favourable world conditions.  
49 
 
 
 
The failure of Doi Moi to take off at first led to the Party undergoing a realization that 
domestic reforms could not occur without peace in Cambodia, along with a significant policy 
re-orientation committed to pursuing balance within its external relations. Do Muoi, speaking 
in 1988, spoke of the lessons learnt from the Sixth Party Congress. He claimed that “combining 
the strength of the nation with the new situation” of paramount importance, with a focus on 
trade, economic, and technological cooperation. He also stated that Vietnam had been reliant 
on the USSR and other socialist countries but that is was trying to develop relations with other 
countries on the basis of “equality and mutual benefits.”68  The first priority for Vietnam was 
to navigate the international system and create a more balanced situation vis-a-vis normalizing 
relations with the US, Western partners, ASEAN, and even China.  
As some of the domestic teething problems of Doi Moi were starting to subside, Vietnam 
announced in the spring of 1989 that it was withdrawing its troops from Cambodia. It was 
essentially the beginning of the end of the “Cambodian Problem” and was met with 
international praise. The US State Department welcomed Vietnam’s announcement stating that 
the withdrawal would be a “positive development.”69  Additionally, a considerable number of 
voices emerged from the US that favoured ending Hanoi’s international isolation and “weaning 
it off its dependence on Moscow.”70 
Meanwhile headway was made with ASEAN relations. Nguyen Van Linh indicated 
that Vietnam was opening a “new page” in relations with ASEAN states by “building friendly 
and cooperative relations with all countries in the region for the sake of a peaceful, stable, and 
cooperative South-East Asia.”71 The Thai Prime Minister publically stated his support for 
Vietnam’s joining of ASEAN. Then in November 1990, President Suharto of Indonesia became 
the first ASEAN leader to pay an official visit to Vietnam. On the visit Suharto echoed Linh’s 
proclamation of a new page by claiming the visit marked a “new chapter in the history of south-
east [sic] Asia.”72 Finally, in 1991 the Malaysian Prime Minister claimed that his country saw 
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no problem in Vietnam joining ASEAN.73 Resolution, 32, 2, and 13 and the subsequent small 
diplomatic successes boded well for Vietnam, and further brought home the fact that ensuring 
a peaceful international environment to foster economic growth had now become equally, if 
not more important, than traditional sovereignty related security issues. Vietnam was, starting 
afresh, and pragmatism could again lead the way. 
However, another crucial concept that also emerged during this time was the concept 
of strengthening the Party through economic reform. The VCP has always emphasised 
strengthening the Party’s leadership role at every Party Congress. Party documents indicate 
that the Party must become more powerful politically, ideologically, and organisationally and 
renew its thinking economically.74 As already described, it was clear that the economic crises 
in the post-unification era had severely damaged the legitimacy of the Party. In the wake of the 
economic crises, Truong Chinh stated that mistakes had created “widespread doubt about the 
future” and a “lack of confidence in the leadership of the Party.”75  
Yet this did not mean renovating the political system. Rather, it emphasised broadening 
democracy, something that essentially meant the cultivation of greater debate regarding policy 
within the Party.76 As part of this process, the National Assembly, previously a rubber stamp 
institution, held elections in 1987 in which some candidates were nominated instead of 
appointed. It gained a greater debating role. Nevertheless, broad-based political pluralism 
would not be tolerated and the Party would use lessons from its decade of economic hardship 
to strengthen its leadership role in getting the country out of the crisis.   
In addition to economic stability, the Party also placed a great deal of emphasis on 
“political stability.” Speaking in 1988, Nguyen Van Linh insisted that: 
We will gradually stabilize the socio-economic and political situation and the 
people's livelihood, and then we will move from instability to basic stability 
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to create a favourable situation for our rapid and vigorous advance, extricating 
the country from its dire straits and developing it, and making our people 
happy.77 
In order to achieve economic and political stability, and to quell its legitimacy crisis, the Party 
adopted the concept of “performance legitimacy,” in which legitimacy is linked to economic 
performance and people’s livelihoods. This became coupled with the VCP’s other forms of 
legitimacy: charismatic leadership, Ho Chi Minh thought, and defending Vietnam from foreign 
domination.78 Performance legitimacy is linked to the economy. As described thus far, the 
Party linked economic performance with an open attitude towards all countries, regardless of 
standing, focused on cultivating better relations in order to attract desperately needed foreign 
aid and diplomatic support. As the Party realized Doi Moi could not occur at the domestic level 
without a substantial foreign policy re-orientation, foreign policy became a core component of 
economic renovation. Therefore, Doi Moi and the linkage between domestic economic 
reforms, securing peace and cultivating friends at the international level, was the first step in 
intertwining elements of the Party’s legitimacy at international level. Scholar Pham Quang 
Minh notes the importance of what he calls an “open door policy” when he states: 
The Communist Party of Viet Nam understood the country’s survival could not be 
ensured without the open-door policy and that the policy could have an impact on 
its position as the ruling party. With this in mind, Viet Nam foreign policy has 
always been implemented cautiously and deliberately.79 
Indeed, the same language applied to domestic reforms, were applied at the international 
level. The concept of favourable conditions became a focal point, both internationally and 
domestically, with the Party at the forefront of such struggles.  Documents from the Sixth Party 
Congress state that: 
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The international activities of our Party and State must serve the struggle to defend 
the homeland, maintain political security, … We should secure new favour able 
[sic] conditions in economic and scientifically technological cooperation, 
participate ever more widely in the division of labour and cooperation within the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, and at the same time widen our relations 
with other countries.80 
Thus, Vietnam’s foreign policy re-orientation, along with its renovation in economic thinking, 
became coupled. One could not occur without the other and thus political legitimacy 
intertwined at the international level. This period was, however, the first step. The subsequent 
learning process at the international level would further strengthen this concept. The period of 
1986-1991 was a time of great learning for the VCP. Comprehensive security, the linkage of 
peace and cooperation at the international level, along with reforms were a means to strengthen 
the Party during a time of great changes at both the domestic and international level.  
Overcoming Difficulties - On the Road to Diversification 
The year 1991 was eventful for Vietnam for many different reasons. The Seventh Party 
Congress, taking place in June, fully endorsed Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy and 
sought to forge close relations with countries and international organizations alike.81 It called 
for diversification and multilateralism. On October 25, the Paris Peace Accords were signed, 
bringing an official end to Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia. This opened up the door for 
joining ASEAN, restoring relations with industrialized countries including China, and pushing 
ahead with economic liberalization. However, 1991 was also a year of great uncertainties and 
difficulties for the VCP as the communist camp collapsed. Although the leadership had been 
painfully aware that the old Soviet model socialism was no longer favourable to their national 
interest, certainly the collapse of the Soviet Union instilled a sense of anxiety within the 
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regime.82 The period 1991-2001 can be characterized as overcoming difficulties (vuot qua kho 
khan) via diversification (da dang hoa) and multilateralisation (da phuong hoa).  
The first order of business for Vietnam was to restore relations with China. Since the 
border war in 1979, China had been viewed as the principle threat to Vietnam, with even the 
constitution having a preamble stating that: “China was a dangerous, direct enemy of the 
Vietnamese people.”83 In March 1988, Vietnam and China clashed in the Spratly Islands with 
64 killed on the Vietnamese side, and 54 killed on the Chinese side. Instead of increasing 
hostilities, this event marked the beginning of Vietnamese rapprochement. Three months later, 
Vietnam removed the anti-Chinese statement and Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach called 
for talks. Anti-Chinese propaganda also significantly waned.84   
Secret talks between the two countries took place in Chengdu in September 1990. At the 
talks were Communist Party Leader Nguyen Van Linh, Prime Minister Do Muoi, and former 
Prime Minister Pham Van Dong. The Chinese delegation consisted of Chinese President Jiang 
Zemin and Primer Li Peng. Although it was the highest-level delegation to visit China since 
the border war in 1979, the trip was widely viewed as a diplomatic failure.85  Beijing flexed its 
muscles by indicating that no such normalization could take place until the Cambodian issue 
had been settled. The seemingly anti-Chinese foreign minister, Nguyen Co Thach would be 
forced out, and the Vietnamese hopes of a new Chinese led socialist bloc were ignored by 
China.86 
The asymmetries in Sino-Vietnam relations are a recurring theme. The dire economic 
situation in Vietnam and the crumbling socialist world meant that China was an essential 
partner if the Vietnamese Communist Party were to navigate the changing international 
landscape unscathed.  Ties were normalized almost immediately after the Paris Peace Accords 
in November, 1991. Shortly thereafter, China’s Foreign Minister Qian Qichen visited Vietnam 
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where a memorandum of understanding and agreements concerning communication, 
transportation and economic cooperation were reached.  Trade links then sprouted between the 
two countries with China offering 80 million yuan in preferential loans to boost Vietnam’s 
textile industries. 87  
Trade between the two countries grew gradually but, as always, the Vietnamese acted 
cautiously and acted within the ebb and flow of their asymmetrical relations. Cross-border 
trade naturally began to flourish, although Vietnam called for greater efforts to manage border 
trade with particular attention paid to smuggling.  Yet investment and trade never reached the 
level of countries like France, Japan, or even South Korea.88 Sovereignty issues came back to 
the forefront with China passing a new law on territorial waters that included the Spratly and 
Parcels Islands. China also signed an agreement with Crestone Energy Corporation to explore 
for oil in the disputed territories.89  
Party Secretary General Do Muoi paid a visit to China in November 1995. In a speech in 
Beijing, he emphasized that Vietnam had closed the past and was looking to the future. He 
indicated that globalization would create a new world order characterized by increasing 
cooperation, yet at the same time, increasing competition. Reflective of Vietnamese pragmatic 
thinking, he stated that creating an international environment, one based on peace, stability, 
and cooperation, would ensure development as the main driving force in Vietnamese foreign 
policy.90 Yet, the lessons of the ‘lost years’ were not lost on Vietnam. Operating within the 
context of asymmetry, it chose not to balance against China, as it had done with the Soviet 
Union, but seek a broader base for economic development. Weary of Chinese behaviour, 
diversification became a means to achieve a more equitable partnership with China.  
Economically, the situation had improved slightly since 1988 but substantial diplomatic 
efforts were needed to alleviate the crisis. It became increasingly clear that, aid and investment 
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were high up on the agenda and better relations and greater integration were needed to facilitate 
these goals. In other words, there was no way forward other than diversification. This was not 
possible unless Vietnam normalized relations with the US due to its economic embargo. 
However, the normalization process was relatively slow. Nevertheless, by 1995 Vietnam had 
achieved normalcy in its diplomatic relations, going from having relations with just 23 
countries to 163 by 1995. Vietnam’s opening up bore significant benefits and was subsequently 
widely praised. This justified multidirectionalism and, in the eyes of the Party. It became a 
means to secure significant economic, political, and even security benefits and positively 
influenced the collective memory of the Party.  
Vietnam passed a new constitution in 1992, which acknowledged private property, and 
different economic components of the economy, ensuring reforms would not be reversed. 91 
This move was widely praised by Japanese investors, despite their concerns with poor 
infrastructure, poor banking, and an unforeseeable liberalization policy.92 In fact, 1992 was a 
monumental year for Japan-Vietnam relations. Chairman of the National Assembly Le Quang 
Dao and Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam both paid visits to Japan in April and October 
of that year respectively. During Dao’s visit, Japan praised Vietnam for Doi Moi and its 
attempts to foster greater relations with other countries. Vietnamese documents also make note 
of Japanese linkage to Doi Moi and the solving of the Cambodia crisis, stating that the 
international community developed “different attitudes” towards Hanoi after the Sixth Party 
Congress and the Paris Peace Accords. 93 Despite there being many difficulties to overcome, 
the Japanese delegation reminded Dao that Japan was willing to cooperate with Vietnam.94  
Shortly after this trip, Japan resumed Official Development Aid (ODA) to Vietnam after 
a thirteen-year hiatus. Additionally, two-way trade between the two countries had tripled since 
1989 and Japan had thirty-seven investment projects in Vietnam.95 Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet 
paid a visit to Japan in March 1993, signing agreements to increase financial aid and economic 
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projects to Vietnam. Then, Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam stated that the visit marked: 
“The start of a new era in the relations of cooperation and friendship between the two states 
and peoples of Vietnam and Japan.”96 Trade relations increased substantially from 1992 to 
1994 as seen in the table below. 97 
 1992 1993 1994 
Non-refundable aid 15.8 66.8 94 
Preferential Aid  970 470 580 
Total 385.8 536.8 674 
 
 
South Korea and Vietnam established diplomatic relations in 1992. Nguyen Manh Cam 
visited in February 1993 and for the first time, a Vietnamese Prime Minister visited South 
Korea later that year. On this visit, Kiet secured a $58 million aid package with $8 million 
being non-refundable. He also secured a $100 million loan through the Export-Import Bank of 
Korea. In addition, two-way trade between the two countries grew from 1992 to 1994. In 1992, 
it stood at $493.5 million but by 1995 it was over $1 billion. 98 
In the spring of 1995, General Secretary Do Muoi paid a visit to both Japan and Vietnam. 
Do Muoi stoked similarities between Vietnam and South Korea in terms of their 20th century 
wars. He also noted that he hoped to emulate Korea’s development path and achieve an 
economic success story. Such sentiments represented Vietnam’s shift to a more development-
orientated foreign policy, one that sought to raise it out of poverty as opposed to one rigidly 
based on ideology. Additionally, Muoi reasserted that Vietnam was committed to solving 
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issues diplomatically and respecting the independence of other nations, symbolizing that peace 
had become an inaugural part of Vietnamese foreign policy thinking.99 Without peace, there 
could be no development, and without development, Vietnam would surely fall back into 
economic chaos.  
In a speech to South Korean President Kim Young Sam in 1995, Do Muoi outlined how 
joining ASEAN will create a more “peaceful” and “stable” region. Similarly, he noted that by 
deepening engagement with the international community, Vietnam was preparing favourable 
conditions and he hoped that South Korea would provide its backing for Vietnam’s 
participation in international organizations such as APEC and WTO. He also added that aid 
was an important component of relations by noting that he hoped cooperation on the 
international stage would translate into economic aid and investment into Vietnam.100  
Vietnam made substantial progress in developing relations with other industrialized 
countries, including France, which began providing annual loans to Vietnam in 1990 and began 
helping it negotiate aid agreements with international financial institutions. French President 
Francois Mitterrand’s visit to Vietnam in 1993 saw 360 million francs of aid guaranteed along 
with a host of cooperation agreements. The President also denounced the continuation of the 
US embargo.101  
After signing an agreement to repatriate boat people in Hong Kong camps in 1991, trade 
relations between the United Kingdom (UK) and Vietnam began to grow. On a 1992 visit 
Nguyen Manh Cam became the first foreign minister to make an official visit to Britain since 
diplomatic relations were established in 1973. Whilst there, Britain noted its appreciation of 
Vietnam’s policy of diversification and issued its intent to support Vietnam in its normalization 
with international organizations. Trade quadrupled between the years 1990 and 1994. 102 
Vietnam also made a milestone agreement with the EU: the EU-Vietnam Framework 
58 
 
 
 
Cooperation Agreement. This shifted the dynamics of their relationship, from one focused on 
humanitarian aspects, to one that cultivated economic assistance through aid, funding, and 
credit.  
Normalization with industrialized countries acted as a lubricant for normalization with 
the US. Restoring relations with the US was key for two reasons. First, it would lead to the 
lifting of the embargo and therefore increase ODA. Furthermore, normalization would mean 
that Vietnam would become able to receive special drawing rights from the IMF, World Bank, 
and Asian Development Bank. (ADB) Frustratingly, the US outlined a series of steps for the 
Vietnamese to take before normalization could take place in spite of the Cambodian conflict 
coming to an end. This became known as the Bush Road Map. A US Official speaking in 
December 1991 noted that: 
The first big element in moving forward toward normalization was the Cambodian 
settlement. That was signed; it's beginning to be implemented. As it's successfully 
implemented we will be able to move forward. We also have said to the Vietnamese 
that we want to see meaningful progress, conclusive progress on the missing-in-
action question in Vietnam. And we've had some progress, but I wouldn't call it 
overwhelmingly conclusive progress at this point. So we think it's important to keep 
pressing for that as part of the normalization process.103 
Despite some saying that Washington was moving the goal posts, Vietnam’s assessment 
of the situation was more optimistic than some scholars have suggested.104 A letter from the 
State Planning Commission on prospects for economic cooperation in 1993 noted that, in spite 
of the embargo being lengthened an extra year, substantial progress has been made in opening 
relations with the US, thanks in part to Doi Moi and warmer relations with US allies. In 
December of 1992, US companies had been allowed to enter Vietnam to set up business 
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contracts in certain sectors, and the business lobbies inside and outside the US, along with 
ODA providing countries, would lobby hard for normalization. They saw the years 1993 and 
1994 as a crucial period in which successful negotiations to end the embargo and restore ties 
would take place.105 
Indeed, they were right. The United States finally lifted its trade embargo with Vietnam 
in 1994, with relations normalized in July 1995. Do Muoi called normalization with the US a 
result of successful implementation of Doi Moi, again indicating how important of a catalyst 
Doi Moi was for Vietnam’s foreign policy re-orientation. Nevertheless, Vietnam was still 
weary of Peaceful Evolution; the concept that the US would use western ideals such as multi-
party democracy or human rights to undermine the Communist Party and bring about political 
change.106 As such, Vietnam sought comfort within ASEAN.  
In the early nineties, the mutual benefits of ASEAN started to become apparent. ASEAN 
provided an umbrella to shield Vietnam from its two identified primary threats - China and 
Peaceful Evolution. Additionally, economic factors also meant joining ASEAN were the 
natural course of action. In fact, some scholars have argued that this was the primary factor. 107 
Vietnam ascended to the ASEAN treaty in1992 in a sign that it accepted the ASEAN concept. 
It gained observer status in 1993 and joined the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. 
Vietnam essentially adopted a two-handed approach to dealing with areas of tension. On the 
one hand there was the promise to vigorously protect its own territorial integrity, while on the 
other to build up strategic trust and diminish areas of tension vis-à-vis cooperating with 
ASEAN.108  
At the Ninth Plenum of the Central Committee, the Party drew up some lessons learnt 
since Doi Moi. First, they argued that they had maintained independence and socialism via Doi 
Moi, Secondly, they had successfully achieved a balance between political and economic 
60 
 
 
 
systems, thus abating the economic crisis and solving the social woes. They highlighted the 
importance of the economy and development and how these aspects enhance national power. 
They claimed that continued diversification and multilateralism were the best way to take 
advantage of the foreign world and that they had, and would continue, strengthening the 
Party.109  
This indicates how important this flurry of diplomatic activity had on the Party’s 
thinking. In the space of less than ten years, they had learnt from the mistakes of the past to 
reinvigorate the economy and Vietnam’s international standing. It was clear too that 
diversification had enhanced comprehensive security, contributed to peace at the international 
level, and strengthened the Party in the process.  
The year 1995 represented the culmination of Vietnam’s diversified approach to foreign 
relations.  As one Vietnamese official put it, Vietnam finally escaped its diplomatic crisis and 
achieved normalcy in its diplomatic relations.110  It normalized relations with the US and 
became an ASEAN member. These steps marked Vietnam’s complete turnaround from its 
isolationist period, drawing international praise and representing an event of huge political and 
economic importance. This approach laid the foundation for economic growth, and a push for 
greater multilateral engagement. But the learning process would continue.   
On the Path to Integration 
By 1995, Vietnam had established relations with 163 countries. Whilst the fear of losing 
political control over widespread reforms was still on the minds of certain factions within the 
Party, there was no doubt that further liberalisation and integration with the international 
political economy was the way forward.  
Still, a Nhan Dan article in 1996 widely criticised Vietnamese foreign policy for lacking 
any clear, distinct identity. It criticised the use of the word assimilation (hoa nhap), rather than 
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integration (hoi nhap).111 Using the word assimilation, it argued, would mean that Vietnam 
would be swallowed up into a capitalist world. Whereas integration would allow Vietnam to 
enter the global system, while maintaining its distinct political and social economic 
characteristics. Therefore, it was at that time the Party began putting forward a foreign policy 
centred around an “open economy, integration with the region and the world, and strong export 
orientation.”112  
The period from 1996 to 2001 saw Vietnam continue to diversify and multilateralise its 
relations and move hesitantly towards integration before fully embracing and elevating a 
multidirectional foreign policy at the Ninth Party Congress in 2001. The Eighth Party Congress 
in 1996 made note of Vietnam’s vastly improved economic situation. Annual GDP growth 
rates from 1991 to 1995 were 8.2%, exports had increased by 20%, FDI projects reached over 
$19 billion, and the inflation rate had decreased from 67.1% to 12.7%. 113 They also made note 
of the four dangers originally mentioned in 1994: lagging behind economically, peaceful 
evolution, corruption, and deviating from socialism.114  
Normalisation with international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank, and the 
ADB, had taken place in October 1993. This was according to Resolution of the 3rd plenum of 
the Seventh Congress in June 1992 that called for expanding relations with international 
organisations. However, this merely marked the start. A more comprehensive framework for 
integration was necessary.  
The integration period officially started with Vietnam’s accession to ASEAN. The 
integration process however, is different from simple diversification. Diversification was based 
on Vietnam’s own self-interest of securing aid and restoring relations to normalcy, but 
integration meant having to change within; and sometimes these changes are out of your 
control. It was like joining a club, as one author put it. Joining obtains benefits, but with those 
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benefits also come obligations. 115   This dichotomy would become a recurring theme as 
integration brought with it growing pains, and stressors on the domestic situation.  
Diversification had merely been the first step, but a much easier one to accomplish. Yet 
Vietnam’s positive experience would ease the pressure of implementing step-by-step 
integration. In fact, Vietnam’s diversification process was largely vindicated by the substantial 
amount of praise it received, in addition to a massive increase in aid, funding and foreign direct 
investment (FDI). Take for example the projected assistance for the year 1996. Total assistance 
from industrialised countries stood at $1.3 billion. This compared to just $114 million ten years 
prior. There was also a further $824.6 million coming from multilateral institutions such as the 
ADB, the European Union, the UNDP, and the World Bank.116  
A parliamentary delegation visit by Russia praised Vietnam’s achievements in recent 
years such as normalising relations with the U.S. and joining ASEAN, noting that these steps 
served as no hindrance to Russian-Vietnamese relations. The Vietnamese side noted that socio-
economic achievements had abated the crises and created stable conditions that would 
contribute to the modernisation of the country. They also affirmed their commitment to peace, 
stability, development and cooperation in the international arena.117  
Similarly, a British Parliamentary delegation also made note of the same achievements. 
During this visit, the Vietnamese highlighted their economic and diplomatic achievements 
made possible via Doi Moi.118 Doi Moi was seen as a catalyst for a more open, integrated 
approach to international relations. In a visit to Australia by Nong Duc Manh in 1998, the 
leader of Australia mentioned that Vietnam had now become a meaningful partner in the 
Pacific-Region and reiterated support for Vietnam joining of international organisations such 
as ASEAN, ARF, APEC, and the WTO.119 
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A European Union parliamentary delegation made a visit to Vietnam praising the 
country’s diversification and multilateralisation efforts, whilst at the same time announcing 
their instructions to banks to lend further credit to Vietnam for development projects.120 As 
mentioned in the previous section, industrialised countries were stepping up investment into 
Vietnam by a considerable amount. Compare this to 10 years prior when, according to former 
Deputy Prime Minister Vu Khoan, Vietnam faced complete isolation at international 
conferences.121 
With Vietnamese relations returned to normalcy, the groundwork was in place for further 
integration into the international system and greater multilateral engagement. In early 1994, 
Do Muoi spoke at the Pacific Economic Cooperation Council. He stated that joining APEC 
was a logical development for Vietnam. He also reiterated: “Vietnam has given first priority to 
the task of broadening cooperation with countries in Asia and the Pacific along with promoting 
relations with other countries in the world.”122  Vietnamese diplomats echoed this sentiment 
when they stated their hopes that ASEAN membership would help them in joining other 
international bodies such as APEC and the WTO in a diplomatic meeting with Japan.123  
Restoring bilateral relations and a policy of openness had allowed Vietnam to garner 
strong support for its bid to join APEC. Even though a US official widely denied that ASEAN 
membership constituted “backdoor to membership” of APEC, joining ASEAN certainly 
boosted Vietnam’s cause.124 At the Ministerial Meeting in November 1995, ASEAN formerly 
requested that APEC admit Vietnam as a member early the following year. This was despite 
the fact that APEC had frozen membership for three years in 1993 in order to prioritise 
fostering cooperation.125 Vietnam subsequently applied for membership in June 1996.  
Vietnam’s membership, along with Russia and Peru, was approved at the November 
1997 summit and accession would take place the following year. The economic significance 
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of joining this organisation was immense. In 1997, two-way trade between APEC countries 
and Vietnam stood at $15.7 billion. Trade with APEC countries also represented about 80 
percent of Vietnam’s trade, and members represented a significant source of ODA and FDI.126  
At the accession ceremony, Nguyen Manh Cam noted that accession was “of great 
significance and marked a new step in Vietnam’s integration process into the regional and 
global economy.” He also extended his thanks to the support of various countries and 
international organisations for helping Vietnam achieve membership. Whilst making note of 
the challenges ahead, he reiterated: “Vietnam will strive to expand the mutually beneficial 
cooperation with regional countries and actively contribute to the implementation of the 
forum's objectives for Asia-Pacific development and prosperity.”127  Obviously, joining APEC 
was a major milestone in Vietnam’s integration process. It also represented the culmination of 
a new degree of openness to foreign relations that had a socialising role on the leadership’s 
experience with multidirectionaism. This, coupled with the success of Doi Moi, meant that the 
leadership was in a much stronger position.  
Speaking almost 20 years later, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs Bui Than Son stated 
that joining APEC in 1998 had helped the country’s efforts to push ahead with reform, 
economic restructuring, and integrating into the global economy. He also highlighted the 
political significance, noting that joining helped improve relations with member countries and 
fostered greater cooperation through bi lateral meetings held on the sidelines.128 Joining APEC, 
it was believed, would also pave the way for Vietnam to join the WTO. However, this would 
be a longer, tedious process with greater challenges and pressure placed on Vietnam’s domestic 
reform.  
Vietnam applied for WTO membership in 1995. It was, in Nguyen Manh Cam’s words, 
“an inevitable step” for Vietnam despite the challenges it presented the country.129Another 
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significant event that reinforced the merits of cooperation and multilateralism was Vietnam’s 
experience hosting a major international summit. The Seventh Francophone Summit took place 
in November of 1997. At Vietnam’s insistence, economic matters were at the focal point of the 
summit.130 They issued the Hanoi Declaration, which emphasised the interconnectedness of 
peace and development. The summit saw praise heaped upon Vietnam for its integration and 
its economic successes. Twenty years later, a seminar was hosted in Hanoi to mark the 20th 
anniversary of hosting the summit and discuss memories of the event. Belgian Ambassador 
Jehane Roccas noted that the summit marked the success of Vietnam’s diplomacy and openness 
towards multilateralisation.131 
Vietnam tried to rally support for its WTO membership via its membership of ASEAN, 
APEC, and strengthened bi-lateral relations.  Support was forthcoming from most sides with 
Australian Foreign Minister, Alexander Downer expressing his support for Vietnam’s entry 
into the WTO.132 Nevertheless, the complexities of joining the WTO hit trade officials hard as 
the first round of negotiations began in July 1997. Trade officials were given a questionnaire 
of more than 2,500 items regarding Vietnam’s eligibility for membership.133 Furthermore, 
complicating this matter, were two factors: the emerging cautiousness within the Party that 
brakes on reform were needed, and the Asian Financial Crisis.  
The resolution of the Fourth Plenum of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central 
Committee, passed in Hanoi in December 1997, stated that while the economy has continued 
to grow and progress has been made, economic development has not yet been consolidated; " 
limitations and weaknesses remain" and "research on political theories has not caught up with 
the demands of the new era."134 This indicated the degree of scepticism the Party held towards 
the speed of reforms. There was a sense they were losing control. Nevertheless, the same 
resolution also praised the Party’s foreign policy orientation, saying that: “It proved the 
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correctness of the Party and state lines and policies.” It also highlighted the importance of 
cooperation and assistance from the international community.  
What this indicated was that the dichotomy between control and integration were posing 
fundamental questions to the Party. Political control and the strength of the Party, as already 
discussed, were widely important aspects. The tradeoff between economic growth and the 
political risks were becoming hard to bear. Arguably, the Thai Binh Peasant Protests against 
corruption, tax demands, land disputes, unfair rice prices, and labour contributions caused the 
Party to question the political cost of economic reform.135 The Asian Financial Crisis that hit 
in 1997 would compound these matters.    
In December 1997, Do Muoi stepped down as secretary general and was replaced by Le 
Kha Phieu who came from a military background. Tran Duc Luong became President and Phan 
Van Khai became Prime Minister. Some scholars have written that Phieu’s appointment was a 
means to reassert control and stabilise the political situation.136 The more conservative faction 
within the Party cited the fact that Vietnam had largely escaped the damage of the crisis as 
evidence that full-on integration was detrimental to Vietnam’s interests.  
However, as much as this was initially true, as time went on Vietnam found itself 
indirectly affected by the downturn. FDI dropped, exports declined, and the Dong’s strength 
made it uncompetitive with its regional neighbours. An ADB assessment in 1998 significantly 
downgraded Vietnam’s GDP projected growth from 9.2 to 4-5 percent. 137  Therefore, 
Vietnam’s economy and indeed the more reluctant reformers were caught between a rock and 
a hard place. On the one hand, partial integration had led to benefits. On the other it had exposed 
Vietnam to the risks, but not provided insulation from them.138 
At the same time, the complex issue of restructuring the financial sector and State Owned 
Enterprises (SOE) became apparent. An IMF report in 1998 stated that Vietnam’s banking 
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reforms implemented from 1988 to 1992 had boosted macro-economic performance. However, 
those reforms had waned, leading to a weakening of the banking system, further compounded 
by the Asian Financial Crisis. 139 The argument for halting integration became weaker as 
Vietnam’s economic performance continued to wane in the late nineties. Arguably, Vietnam 
was facing its second post-Doi Moi test – the first being when reforms failed to take off due to 
Vietnam’s diplomatic isolation. As at that time, a coupling of foreign policy initiatives, along 
with further domestic reforms, was needed to escape the current crisis. The deeply ingrained 
failure of the post-reunification era on the collective memory of the Party meant that turning 
back now was not an option.  
The hesitant nature of the Party’s decision-making in the late 90s can be seen in their 
negotiations with the US for a trade deal. In the summer of 1999, Vietnam and the US achieved 
a bilateral trade agreement. This would give Vietnam access to the coveted US market and also 
entice the US to support its entry into the WTO. Such an agreement would also help with the 
restructuring of Vietnam’s domestic legislation and remove barriers to free trade. However, 
Vietnamese officials allegedly balked at the terms because it would remove many of the trade 
barriers protecting SOEs. Therefore, they initially shelved the agreement.140 
Three things reversed this. First, China signed a similar deal with the US, meaning that 
Vietnam would become uncompetitive with its neighbour. Secondly, Bill Clinton dangled a 
carrot by sending a letter to Vietnam in May of 1999 indicating the US’s support for Vietnam’s 
efforts in joining the WTO. And lastly, the continuing economic slump caused by the Asian 
Financial Crisis and waning domestic reforms had started to threaten the notion of 
comprehensive security. Therefore, the Vietnamese reversed their position and the official 
signing took place in July 2000. The agreement came into effect in December 2001 and was 
instrumental in reducing tariffs on numerous goods and services, bringing Vietnam in line with 
a number of WTO requirements.141 
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As Vietnam geared up for its Ninth Party-Congress it was clear that there was no turning 
back. Ten years after being formerly adopted, a multidirectional foreign policy had ended 
Vietnam’s diplomatic isolation, enabled domestic reforms to take place and ensure economic 
growth, providing a solid foundation for Vietnam’s integration into the international political 
economy. The learning process had been one of great success. As such, it stated: 
The achievements of the past five years have increased our aggregate 
strength, changed our country’s physiognomy and our peoples’ lives, firmly 
consolidated our national independence and socialist regime, and improved 
the status and prestige of our country on the international arena.142 
Additionally, it fully incorporated the concept of integration. It stated it would continue:  
Proactively integrating into the international and regional economies in the 
spirit of maximizing our international strength, raising international 
cooperation efficiency, ensuring independence, autonomy, and the socialist 
orientations, safeguarding national interests and national security, preserving 
national cultural identity, and protecting the environment.143 
The Ninth Party Congress essentially elevated multidirectionalism as a core foundation for 
Vietnam’s development. Despite some hesitancy on the part of the conservative faction, the 
Congress resolved to “broaden the multifaceted, bilateral and multilateral relations with all 
countries and territories, major international political and economic centers, and international 
regional organizations” 144 In a sense, multidirectionalism had become a quintessential aspect 
of Vietnamese Foreign Policy.Furthermore, the Ninth Party Congress saw a leadership 
transition with Le Kha Phiu stepping down as Party Secretary General with General Nong Duc 
Manh succeeding. Arguably, Vietnam had decided to “take the plunge” into the world of 
globalisation as it sought to modernise, and lift Vietnam from underdevelopment.  
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However, this merely marked the first phase of multilateralisation and integration. The 
process would continue to evolve as Vietnam entered the twenty-first century. 
Multidirectionalism thus adopted the concept of integration and this too became a focal point 
of ensuring Vietnamese autonomy, strength, independence, and territorial integrity were 
maintained.  
Conclusion 
In the twenty-five years after re-unification, Vietnam’s foreign policy tells two stories: one of 
failure and one of success. The overconfidence shortly after re-unification proved to be 
disastrous as relations with China deteriorated and normalisation with the US never 
materialised. Add to that, the complex threat stemming from Cambodia and China, Vietnam 
faced little choice than to begrudgingly move into the embrace of the Soviet Union. Doing so 
compounded the disastrous socially planned economic policies enacted after re-unification. 
Essentially, isolation at the international level placed a bottom down pressure on an already 
precarious economic situation.  
The Eighties were then a time of grave mistakes and trauma, with catastrophic 
consequences for the VCP. Over-reliance on the Soviet Union ebbed away at Vietnam’s 
autonomy, while economic mismanagement ebbed away at its legitimacy. The two forces 
combined and severely impacted the collective memory of the Party. Hence the need for Doi 
Moi and a multidirectional foreign policy focused on diversity and ensuring economic growth. 
These two abated the legitimacy crisis and corrected the mistakes so frequently mentioned by 
Party members.  Speaking 30 years after Doi Moi was initiated, Vu Khoan, former Deputy 
Prime Minister stated: “That foreign policy is a supporter of domestic policy.”145  This is 
certainly the case, as Doi Moi acted as the catalyst for a bottom-up change in foreign policy. 
But multidirectionalism did not bring about an instant change. In fact, it has, as the Party has 
continually reiterated, been a step-by-step process. Diversification led to a restoration of 
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Vietnam’s external relations to normal, laying the groundwork for integration into international 
economic and political organisations.  
What had started as a bottom-up change now became coupled with a top-down learning 
process. Vietnam’s diplomatic efforts to pursue deeper bilateral relations with different 
countries bore considerable tangible benefits, mostly through aid, as well as praise for 
Vietnam’s change in foreign policy and for its economic reforms. Coupled with this, Vietnam’s 
effort to become more integrated into international organisations also had a socialising effect 
on the VCP, reinforcing Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy. Furthermore, the late 
nineties saw Vietnam turn towards integration as a way out of economic crisis as opposed to 
turning inwards. As such it bore greater importance and took root as a fundamental concept in 
Vietnamese foreign policy thinking.  
Therefore, we can see that a multidirectional foreign policy became the bedrock of the 
VCP. It played a pivotal role in avoiding the legitimacy crisis and became a cornerstone of 
Vietnamese foreign policy. This chapter has attempted to trace the origin and initiation of 
Vietnamese multidirectional foreign policy. Although Politburo Resolution 13 was based on 
rational and pragmatism, the memory of failure – both at the domestic and international level 
– has not been forgotten. This drove the continued evolution of such a policy. Yet, as 
multidirectionalism became elevated and further expanded with integration becoming a focal 
point, the policy itself was predominantly economically driven. Furthermore, the growing pains 
from integration would begin to take hold as Vietnam entered the twenty-first century. 
Complicating this matter was globalization and the interconnected nature the international 
arena.  The following chapter will explore the impact of those growing pains, along with the 
evolving integration and the changing international landscape that required broadening 
multidirectionalism.
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Chapter 4 
Multidirectionalism in the Twenty First Century: On the Path to Integration 
The previous chapter demonstrated the origins and learning process of Vietnam’s 
multidirectional foreign policy. Many teething problems occurred, but by 2001 the elevation 
of multidirectionalism indicated how strategic of a policy it was for the Party. In fact, Vietnam 
had firmly set its course on further integration, diversification, and multilateral engagement. 
Vietnam remained committed to its philosophy of being a friend and reliable partner of the 
international community.  But how did Vietnam continue this path as it entered into the twenty-
first century? 
As has already been mentioned, multidirectionalism has been a process, one filled with 
both benefits and challenges. It has evolved in the thirty years since it was first implemented. 
The first decade of the twenty-first century was testament to this. Within the Party there 
emerged a new line of thinking in terms of how it approached foreign relations. It began to see 
relationships, not as black and white “us against them,” but complex and multi-faceted. These 
relationships would throw up areas of cooperation, yet also areas of struggle. 
As such, multidirectionalism underwent some policy changes to reflect the changing 
nature in which the Party now viewed the international system. First, Resolution 07 codified 
the integration aspect within multidirectionalism. Shortly thereafter Resolution 13 fully rid 
Vietnam of ideological considerations and accepted the multipolar, complex nature of the 
international system.  Vietnam also outlined its national security goals by publishing a White 
Paper, first in 1998, then the second one in 2004. Being a friend, a reliable partner, promoting 
diversity, multilateralism, and integration, and bolstering aggregate economic strength were 
the cornerstones of Vietnam’s policy. Yet so too was maintaining “political and economic 
stability.” 
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From 2001 onwards, the Party had firmly decided that it was to “take the plunge” and 
embark on international integration, whilst promoting diversification and multilateralism.1 The 
desire to promote economic growth proved to be the main driver behind deepened cooperation. 
Continued economic growth rates, reduction in poverty, and further liberalisation of its 
economy displayed how multidirectionalism at the international level was having a trickledown 
effect on the country. Pham Quanh Minh agrees that economic cooperation was becoming 
increasingly important for the VCP. He states: “It (the VCP) wished to cooperate on the basis 
of not only friendship, but also economic partnership and benefit.”2 
Yet taking the plunge was not without its struggles and tribulations. Restructuring one’s 
economic system to fit into the larger international system was no easy process. It involved 
renovating oneself from an external-based pressure. Vietnam’s struggles, as it entered the 
twenty-first century, centred around securing membership of the WTO and deepening 
economic ties at the bilateral level. The negotiation process would be a huge source of learning 
for the Party and was reflected in the aforementioned policy directives.   
Additionally, cooperation at the bi and multilateral level was primarily economically 
focused. The White Papers development of the ‘three nos’ was reflective of the Party’s 
traumatic experience of its over-reliance on the Soviet Union. Similarly, having achieved 
“mature asymmetry” in its relations with China, Vietnam did not want to jeopardise its 
relationship with this increasingly pivotal partner. Nor too did it want to become a pawn in the 
Sino-US rivalry that began to emerge with China’s rise. Therefore, Vietnam attempted to build 
upon its foundations of normalization with countries via adding more substance to its now 
broad ranging bilateral relations.   
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse the period from 2001 to 2006 to show the 
complexities evolving from deepened integration and increased bi and multilateral 
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engagement. These complexities were extremely evident in negotiations to join the WTO. 
However, positive benefits were associated with membership. Additionally, the Party began to 
see the benefits of two key mechanisms to implement multidirectionalism: trade-deals and 
strategic partnerships. This took place vis-à-vis increased cooperation with ASEAN and with 
larger powers.  Nevertheless, the collective memory of over-reliance and economic stability 
meant that cooperation became centred on economics. The successes of such an approach were 
widely praised after the 2006 Tenth Party Congress, indicating how positive an effect they had 
on the learning process – subsequently reinforcing multidirectionalism.  
Codification 
Vietnam’s motto during the 2001-2006 period was: “Expanding relations and proactively 
engaging in international economics.”3 Shortly after the Ninth Party Congress, the Politburo 
Issued Resolution 07-NQ/TW. This codified and elevated international economic integration 
as a key orientation of the Party and subsequently became the third element in 
multidirectionalism. If successful, economic development was a means to propel Vietnam into 
becoming an industrial country.  
Resolution 07 outlined four principle guidelines: 
1. Economic integration was a cause for the entire population 
2. Integration included both cooperation and competition 
3. There had to be a clear road map for integration 
4. And integration had to go together with political stability.4 
Again, the regime’s prioritisation of political stability came to the forefront. The Party 
saw economic integration as a key component to achieve Vietnam’s development targets, 
whilst promoting economic reforms within. Cooperating bi and multilaterally would also go 
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together with this approach. Accompanying this resolution were laws and guidelines designed 
to bring about the institutional change required of integration. The Government revised its trade 
law so that companies and individuals no longer required a special licence to export their goods. 
Meanwhile, the pace of equitising state-owned enterprises began to take off.5 
At the same time, the international arena was becoming increasingly complex. The events 
of 9/11 threw up insecurities and highlighted non-traditional security threats. Additionally, big-
power relations were becoming much more complex given the increasing interpolarity of the 
international situation. China’s rise, Russian resurgence, along with India’s growth, provided 
new pastures for economic and political engagement. Yet at the same time, interpolarity also 
raised the potential for conflict. Vietnam sought to manoeuvre itself away from being caught 
in the middle between larger powers, particularly given the rising US-Sino rivalry.   
Yet there was a growing sense of cooperation. The ASEAN Summit in Bali 2003 
emphasised a strong degree of regional cooperation, both within ASEAN via establishing an 
ASEAN Community, and working closely with regional partners such as Japan, South Korea 
and China. The Asia-Pacific region was a region on the up, with dynamics and complexities 
that would lead to opportunities, but also potential conflicts.  
As such, the Eighth Central Committee issued Resolution 8 In July 2003. Resolution 8 
diverged from Vietnam’s traditional ‘friends vs. enemy’ approach. The concept of partner (doi 
tac) and opponent (doi tuong) emphasized that within a relationship, areas of cooperation and 
areas of conflict can simultaneously operate. The resolution also called for a flexible approach 
to relations. Since then Vietnam began to recognize the integrated international system with 
other emergent power sources, such as Russia, China, and India, etc.6  
This resolution also promoted national interests as the foundation for foreign policy. It 
claimed that there was “no permanent enemy nor no permanent partner.”  Rather the Party 
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should identify long-term strategic partners and create stable benefits that promotes building 
the “fatherland.”7 Pragmatism was the name of the game. Alexander Vuving points out that 
this policy had three implications. Firstly, it dampened the previously solidarity orientated 
approach to foreign policy.   Secondly, it injected a firm basis into the “intergrationists” who 
defined foreign policy according to national interests, rather than ideological consideration.  
And lastly, it would allow Vietnam to move closer to the US. This did not mean Hanoi walking 
warmly into the embrace of the US, however. It merely meant a “balancing” of Vietnamese 
partners.8  
Indeed, the significance of this policy has not gone unnoticed. Carl Thayer pointed out 
that Resolution 8 was made considering territorial disputes in the South China Sea and “new 
opportunities” in relations with the United States. Vietnam sought to cooperate as much as 
possible with China, due to its economic and political importance, yet guard against China 
when its national interests were threatened, usually in the form of disputes pertaining to the 
South China Sea. At the same time, Vietnam would cooperate with the US, mainly in the 
economic sphere, but struggle against it when its interests were threatened. These threats 
primarily stemmed from Peaceful Evolution.9  
Vietnam provided an overview of the issues the country faced in its first-ever Defense 
White Paper, published in 1998. In 2004, it released its second white paper. This paper outlined 
numerous threats to the nation, but it stated, “guarding against the danger of lagging behind 
economically” as the principle threat. As such, fostering stability, cooperation, development, 
and peace should be at the heart of Vietnamese foreign policy. It stated that Vietnam’s foreign 
policy of independence, diversification, multilateralization was a cornerstone for achieving 
these goals. It highlighted the contributions to international organisations of ASEAN, ARF, 
and APEC.  Additionally, this white paper reiterated the ‘three nos’. No joining an alliance, no 
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military bases on Vietnamese soil, and no taking part in any military activity that uses force or 
threatens to use force against another country.  
What can be interpreted from this was a strong sense of independence, but also a large 
amount of emphasis on comprehensive strength and bolstering economic power. The ‘three 
nos’ indicated Hanoi’s cautiousness in moving ahead with military alliances. The collective 
memory of its overreliance rang true in diplomatic discourse too. After China, Russia and the 
US showed interest in utilising Cam Ranh Bay a Vietnamese official admitted: “It is just the 
idea of bases we don't like. The deal with the former Soviet Union was signed at a time when 
we were a little weak and worried about China and Cambodia.” 
Summarizing the Party’s new outlook on the international system, Vu Khoan stated that 
the purpose of Vietnam’s foreign policy served two goals: development and security with 
development at the forefront. Additionally, integration is neither a trend nor an enforced 
concept. Rather it is a clear “choice” of Vietnam to pursue its development goals.  As such, 
and with the world no longer divided into two poles, Vietnam must occupy a flexible, active 
position that creates mutually beneficial components for itself and its partners. Therefore, 
maximising diversification, multilaterlateralism, and integration would go a long way to 
realising Vietnam’s development goals, along with providing a sense of security for it to do 
so.10 
This encapsulated the economic orientated approach to multidirectionalism that emerged 
during this period. Yes, security and defensive concepts still mattered, but “lagging behind” 
economically was the principle threat. A foreign policy based on diversification, 
multilateralisation, and integration was a method through which Vietnam could transform 
itself, and as such, security matters, whilst still warranting some attention, took a back seat to 
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trade liberalisation. The emergence of free trade deals, Vietnam’s WTO accession, and 
stepping up diversification would subsequently display this approach.  
Multilateralisation – A Means to Step up Integration  
When Vietnam joined ASEAN in 1995, many marked it as a major milestone in Vietnam’s 
diplomatic achievements since Doi Moi. Vietnam indeed gained significantly from joining 
ASEAN since it helped Hanoi integrate into mainstream international affairs and diversify its 
relations, particularly with regional states. Although fears existed that Vietnam would go 
against the ASEAN way after initially joining, these fears did not come into existence.11 
However, Vietnam did encounter institutional challenges that would require time, and 
adjustment upon joining.  
For Vietnam, there were two clear benefits for joining ASEAN. Firstly, there were 
economic ones. Secondly its ability to provide an enmeshment strategy, vis-à-vis larger 
powers: namely China. From 2001 to 2006 these benefits came to fruition, albeit with certain 
limitations. Two examples will be demonstrated; the Declaration of a Code of Conduct in the 
South China Sea, and in the promotion of free-trade, both within ASEAN and with regional 
partners.  
The South China Sea issue was the largest barrier to cooperation between Vietnam and 
China, externally speaking. Joining ASEAN had acted as a shield from which to protect Hanoi 
as well as a means to amplify its bargaining position on the matter. In 1992, prior to Vietnam 
joining, ASEAN released the Manila Declaration, which emphasised ASEAN’s unified stance 
on the matter and called for establishing an international code of conduct on the South China 
Sea. Then in 1995, after China occupied Mischief Reef, ASEAN issued a sterner statement 
calling for “self-restraint by the parties concerned.”12 Nevertheless, in November 2002, on the 
sidelines of the ASEAN summit in Phnom Penh, ASEAN foreign ministers and China’s Vice 
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Foreign Minister, Wang Yi signed the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China 
Sea. (DOC).  
The declaration outlined: “The need to promote a peaceful, friendly and harmonious 
environment in the South China Sea.” It was in fact the first document concluded between 
ASEAN and China regarding the South China Sea issue.13 Furthermore, the DOC represented 
a successful attempt by ASEAN states to multilateralise the issues. China had until this point 
insisted on bilateral negotiation.14  
Yet as many scholars have pointed out, this represented a failure of ASEAN and China 
to agree on a binding code of conduct. The DOC, whilst building trust and confidence-building 
measures, fell short of a legally binding one. Vietnam also lost out in two regards. It failed to 
include the Paracel Islands into the declaration, and Vietnam’s demands that no new structures 
were built on the islands were not met.15 Initial hopes were that this would be a baby step in 
fostering greater cooperation that would coerce China into realising a legally binding code of 
conduct was in its interests. 
Writing ten years after, Carl Thayer noted that the DOC was essentially “stillborn” and 
its implementation was slow, fraught with tension and sticking points. He points out that it took 
25 months for senior officials to reach an agreement on just the terms of reference for the 
ASEAN-China Joint Working Group to implement the DOC. Even then the final draft took a 
further twenty successive drafts whilst China continued to promote bilateralism as its preferred 
way of negotiating the issues.16 The ASEAN-China joint working group also failed to contain 
tension throughout the latter half of the noughties. This tension would be played out in greater 
detail ten years later at the same location.  But for the time being, it represented both the 
benefits and limitations of ASEAN for Vietnam.  On the one hand Vietnam’s “instrumental” 
role in the ASEAN-China negotiations had secured a status quo result in the DOC. On the other 
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hand, it had given up grave concessions and failed to secure a binding solution, even within 
the parameters of collective bargaining.17 
Despite the frustration experienced in regard to the South China Sea, Vietnam certainly 
enjoyed greater political clout in dealings elsewhere. The ASEAN Free Trade Area would serve 
as a valuable learning process for Vietnam, particularly in boosting its WTO ascension. Le 
Dang Doanh, consultant to the Minister of Planning and Investment, stated that: “The AFTA 
is a training ground, and the WTO is the stadium.”18 ASEAN had been Vietnam’s first foray 
into the multilateral arena in the nineties and the AFTA was the first step in Vietnam’s path to 
integration.  
Vietnam had signed up to AFTA in January 1996 with the decision providing significant 
benefits. FDI attracted from the region increased rapidly and reached $7.8 billion by 1997.19  
AFTA’s completion had been scheduled for 2008 as per the original decision at the 4th ASEAN 
Summit in Singapore in January 1992. However, this was accelerated to 2003. As Vietnam did 
not join until 1995, it was given until 2006 to complete its tariff reduction to 0-5%. ASEAN 
had become one of Vietnam’s major trading partners. In the year 2000, it made up 18 per cent 
of Vietnam’s export turnover and 28 per cent of the country’s exports. In 2001, the 
implementation of tariff reduction under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff within 
AFTA began. By 2002, 5,500 (roughly 86 per cent) of items had their tariffs cut. This was in 
line with Vietnam’s roadmap to AFTA ascension.20 
Although by 2003 Vietnam was firmly on the course to implementation, Vietnamese 
officials were aware of the realities in joining AFTA. Deputy Trade Minister Luong Van Tu, 
speaking in 2003, noted that “the open market is a battlefield, and there will be a natural 
elimination in this competitive process.” He noted that the challenges to Vietnamese businesses 
are stepping up to the plate and “seizing the opportunity AFTA presents.”21 
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Still, on July 1 2003, Vietnam implemented an import tax cut on over 700 items to 20 
per cent or less.22 This had originally been scheduled for January of that year under the original 
road map, but it was delayed because of legal and institutional frameworks not being 
adequately prepared. 23  Certainly, economic growth that year remained strong, despite 
difficulties such as the SARS epidemic, Iraq War, and droughts. The official economic growth 
rate for the year 2003 stood at 6.9 per cent officially, 6.4 per cent according to the ADB, and 
5.7 per cent according to the IMF. Despite the variations, it was indeed positive signs for the 
VCP.  
Speaking in 2003, Ministry of Planning and Investment, Vo Hong Phuc again 
emphasised that AFTA would serve as a stepping-stone for WTO accession. He went on further 
to state that joining AFTA would enable Vietnam to become a bridge - to 500 million people 
in ASEAN and, due to its geostrategic location, 1.3 billion Chinese consumers. 24 There was 
no doubt that growing pains associated with joining AFTA and the WTO would ensue, but the 
rewards reaped would certainly trump them. Throughout 2005, Vietnam continued to bring its 
own domestic policies in line with AFTA. Reforms of state-owned enterprises and state-owned 
commercial banks were accelerated, albeit limited to smaller companies. By 2006 it had 
reached completed tariff reduction on all relevant products.  
AFTA and the Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA), with the US (discussed below), were 
two fundamental trade deals that Vietnam had become a part of. In fact, it is through these trade 
deals that a core mechanism of multidirectionalism came to fruition. Trade deals with 
ASEAN’s regional partners exposed the benefits of such deals. In November 2002, Chinese 
Premier Wen Jiabao and leaders of ASEAN signed the Framework Agreement on China-
ASEAN Comprehensive Economic Cooperation at the Sixth China-ASEAN summit. This had 
the objectives of strengthening economic, trade and investment cooperation, liberalise and 
promote trade, explore new areas for development, and facilitate effective economic 
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integrations of the newer ASEAN member states.25 The agreement called for the establishment 
of an ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA) within ten years.  Then two years later 
ASEAN and China signed the “Agreement on Trade Goods of the Framework Agreement on 
Comprehensive Economic Co-operation” which would come into force in January 2005. The 
agreement set tariff reduction rates with an aim to eliminate them. The agreement also 
distinguished between WTO and non-WTO countries, allowing for non-WTO countries’ 
liberal time frames for implementation.26 
ASEAN and South Korea also began to explore the possibilities of establishing an 
ASEAN South Korea Trade Agreement (AKFTA) at the 2003 ASEAN- Korea Summit. An 
Expert Group was established to pursue avenues for an FTA. Just two years later, negotiations 
commenced, and the two sides signed the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic 
Cooperation between ASEAN-Korea in December 2005. Shortly thereafter, in August 2006, 
the two sides signed the ASEAN-Korea Trade in Goods Agreement.27 Under this Agreement, 
ASEAN exports would enjoy greater market access to Korea with all tariffs on outline goods 
eliminated by 2010. This would be reciprocated by ASEAN states in 2012 except for newer 
ones, such as Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, and Myanmar, which were given greater time for 
implementation.28 
Japan too was involved in trade deal negotiations with ASEAN during this period. This 
deal was more limited in scope and labelled a Comprehensive Economic Partnership (CEP). 
As such, the original declaration made at the Japan-ASEAN summit in 2002 called for elements 
of an FTA to also be pursued.29 The Framework for CEP was agreed upon in October 2003. 
The two sides went through numerous rounds of negotiations before concluding a deal in 
November 2007.30 
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This growth in free-trade deals not only provided Vietnam with greater access to markets 
amongst the fastest growing region, it also had the internal impact of stabilising the domestic 
economy and promoting a conducive environment for business to flourish, and the economy to 
grow. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted: 
Active participation in ASEAN economic cooperation activities also 
contributes to stabilizing the domestic trade environment, avoiding major 
fluctuations, negatively affecting the rolling stock, the national trade balance, 
contributing to a healthy business environment in the country, putting 
pressure on domestic enterprises to improve their competitiveness, 
contributing to strengthening and improving the quality of trade activities, 
and making business processes and procedures simpler and more 
convenient.In recent years, the trend of expanding comprehensive 
cooperation with major trading partners such as China, Japan and South 
Korea has opened up great opportunities for Vietnam, which helps develop 
export markets and attracts foreign investment, to develop a comprehensive 
and stable economy.31  
The process of reforming Vietnam was not without its challenges. Writing in 2007, 
Nguyen Vu Tung criticized that bureaucratic inertia and protectionist pressure from state 
enterprises that prevented the preparation and implementation of AFTA. He also highlighted 
the absence of ASEAN’s enforcement measures, indicating that cooperation agreements were 
merely for the purpose of “gaining political scores.”32 Certainly, there is a large degree of truth 
to the latter half of that statement, but again this highlights the learning process in which the 
state, and indeed the VCP, was going through. The change was being dictated from outside, 
but being initiated from within and natural tensions would certainly arise. AFTA was the first 
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step, and a much lighter step than WTO accession. And as those negotiations would prove, 
would be much harder and cutthroat in nature.  
It was clear that by the Tenth Party Congress, the economic integration process was seen 
as a means to promote cooperation, and that FTA and Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) were 
a means to do so. Writing for Tap Chi Cong San in 2007, Trinh Minh Anh, now Chief of the 
Office of the Inter-sectoral Steering Committee for International Economic Integration, 
claimed that integration facilitates bi, regional, inter-regional, and multilateral cooperation. He 
went on to state that liberalisation is taking place via FTA and RTAs and highlighted both the 
immense benefits - yet increasing challenges - Vietnam would face on this journey.33 
Furthermore, for Vietnam participation within ASEAN was providing it dividends 
economically. Vietnam met the majority of targets, and in some cases exceeded them.34 GDP 
growth doubled in the same period. Thus, whilst security matters threw up their own 
limitations, economic benefits were clearly being felt. These benefits were also resonating 
within the leadership. Speaking shortly after Vietnam was granted membership to the WTO, 
newly appointed Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung stated that the step-by-step process of 
integration has led to a process in which the internal strength of the country is raised. He 
highlighted ASEAN FTAs, AFTA, the US-BTA, as important steps in the integration process 
– a process that, despite its internal challenges, was opening Vietnamese business to new 
markets. In order to take greater advantage of these opportunities, he added, further domestic 
reforms were needed.35 
Therefore, we can see the effect that active participation within ASEAN was having. It 
was a means to promote Vietnam’s own domestic reforms, promote trade relations with 
regional partners, and act as a stepping stone in its bid to join the WTO. The learning process 
associated with these trade agreements would play out later when Vietnam began to negotiate 
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bilateral FTAs with regional and international powers. The period from 2001 to 2006 saw trade 
deals establishing themselves as a mechanism for multidirectionalism. This was reinforcing the 
strength of multidirectionalism and positively impacted the regime’s collective memory. 
However, the WTO negotiations would provide a sterner test for integration.  
Joining the WTO 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, joining the WTO would prove to be a long, tedious, and 
at times, frustrating process. The “inevitable step” looked uncertain, but Vietnam nevertheless 
achieved the feat in 2006. In December 2001, China joined the WTO, just days after Nong Duc 
Manh had completed his visit to China during which the two countries issued a joint statement. 
In the statement, Vietnam congratulated China on its accessions and China reiterated its support 
for Vietnam’s entry at the earliest possible date.36 Since Vietnam had indicated its desire to 
join the WTO, its active stance to cultivate friendly relations with all had meant that support 
for its accession was in abundance.  Yet international support, whilst helpful, would not 
overcome the need for the transformation from within of Vietnam’s own domestic policies. In 
fact, at times even the friendliest of countries threw up barriers to entry. Again, this brought 
home the new international environment and how integration into the international system 
would not be an easy task. Diversification and to an extent, multilateralisation means an 
outward change based on your own interests. However, integration means a change from 
within, often imposed externally.  
The man given the responsibility of negotiating Vietnam’s accession to the WTO was 
Vu Khoan. He had played a leading role in negotiating the BTA with the US. The VCP 
appointed Khoan as Minister of Industry and Trade and subsequently elevated him to a member 
of the Politburo at the Ninth Party Congress. He was then appointed Deputy Prime Minister in 
2002. His elevations indicated the prioritisation and importance the VCP regarded WTO trade 
negotiations. Vietnam entered negotiations in 2002. The complexity of the task was illustrated 
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by the fact that they involved bilateral discussions with over 20 countries. Hanoi naively 
thought that Washington held the most sway in WTO accession and that the BTA would 
significantly lubricate Vietnam’s entry. To further illustrate the point, the Vietnam-US FTA 
had covered 300 tariffs. WTO negotiations covered 9,300.37 
Whilst the BTA had set Vietnam on a healthy path towards accession, this was by no 
means a foregone conclusion.  In fact, as negotiations continued into the new millennium 
tensions arose when the US Department of Commerce’s ruled in January 2001, that Vietnam’s 
economy was a “non-market” one. The Vietnamese Trade Minister called the DOC decision 
“non-objective”, and “unjust”, but the US side responded that inconsistent economic policies 
were the barrier to WTO accession. 38  Inconsistent economic policies were becoming a 
prominent problem in Vietnam’s relations as well (see relations with Japan).  
The EU was also a pivotal partner that needed to be negotiated with. Vietnam underwent 
two-rounds of negotiations with them in April and November of 2001. During the second 
round, Vietnam received tough questions for its lack of clarification regarding its WTO entry 
action plan.  Even China’s support for Vietnam did not translate into smooth negotiations, with 
Vice Minister for Trade, Luong Van Tu, indicating that negotiations were often tense and 
lasting long into the night.39 
By 2003, Khoan identified “four-solutions” to boosting Vietnam’s WTO membership. 
These were: “Reforming taxation, raising enterprises’ competitiveness, opening the market, 
and amending the legal framework.”40 This was all part of a big push to join by 2005. Whilst 
Vietnam received praise for its efforts, trading partners indicated that it still had a long way to 
go before entry could take place. Industrialised nations were keen to point out that lowering 
average tariffs to 22 per cent was not enough.41  
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By late 2004, however, Vietnam achieved a milestone in concluding negotiations with 
the EU. The trade commissioner for the European Commission indicated that the deal “unlocks 
the door for Vietnam’s entry into the WTO.” Vice Trade Minister Truong Dinh Tuyen replied 
that concluding negotiations allows Vietnam to move on to finalising negotiations with the US 
and China.42 What the Party began to realise between 2001 and its ascension in 2006, was the 
complexity, voraciousness, and at times, paradoxical nature of negotiations. Although Vietnam 
had a per capita income of less than $1,000, it was not ranked a poor developing country due 
to its health, culture and educational levels.  It was in fact labelled as a lesser-developed 
country, and as such they could negotiate being accepted as a low-level income country, which 
granted them a transitional period to implement numerous WTO required policies.43 
The 2005 deadline would prove to be overly optimistic. By 2005 it had signed WTO 
agreements with the EU, Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Cuba, and Singapore, but big-hitters such as 
the United States, Japan, China, Canada, New Zealand and Australia had yet to sign off on 
agreements. Two other factors caused Vietnam to lower its expectations. The first was the 
realisation that the timeframe was too short for Vietnam’s National Assembly to modify the 
plethora of rules, laws, and decrees it needed to ensure it complied with WTO regulations.  
The second factor was down to China’s ascension in 2001. Complaints that Beijing was 
failing to deliver on its reforms meant that countries aspiring to join the WTO now faced a 
higher bar. Economic advisor to Prime Minister Phan Van Khai stated: “Since the accession of 
China the United States’ requests are higher.”44  Adam Stickoff, director of the American 
Chamber of Commerce in Hanoi, echoed these sentiments when he stated: “China has raised 
the bar of Vietnam’s WTO accessions. Not the United States, not the New Zealanders.”45 
Accordingly, Truong Din Tuyen labelled the 2005 target, as “unrealistic” citing that joining 
the following year would be a more tangible target.46 
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Nevertheless, the emerging consensus was that Vietnam would benefit immensely from 
WTO membership, sooner rather than later. Some academics speaking at the time argued that 
the longer they were outside, the harder it would be to meet WTO standards in the future.47 
Indeed the Vietnamese textile industry viewed the restrictions of growth on its sector as 
“crippling” to its potential. The industry, one of Vietnam’s largest, wanted broader access to 
markets under WTO rules.48 Under the US-Vietnam BTA, the textile industry had access to 
US markets, but this was becoming bottlenecked.  
Perhaps the biggest breakthrough was made after Vietnam and the US concluded a 
bilateral agreement that would clear the way for WTO entry. The US was the final country to 
conclude bilateral negotiations with Vietnam and the negotiations could therefore move onto 
the multilateral stage.49 However, the agreement did not come without significant concessions 
from the Vietnamese side. The US would still consider Vietnam ‘a non-market economy’ for 
the ensuing 12 years. Vietnam also agreed to open its financial sector and rein in its garment 
exports seeing as it enjoyed a large trade surplus with the US in this area. Similarly, the US 
pressured Vietnam to give up rice subsidies. Again, however, these concessions were argued 
necessary given that Vietnam “could not afford to drag out negotiations.”50 
In October 2006, Vietnam’s WTO accession negotiations reached their final phase. A 
Vietnamese delegation headed to Geneva to hammer out its final deal. Complicating the 
process was the fact that countries that already had bilateral agreements in place with Vietnam, 
raised fresh concerns at the multilateral rounds: Vietnam’s special consumption tax, granting 
trading monopolies on certain goods to state-owned companies, intellectual property rights, 
and its lack of sanitary measures in place to ensure the safety of food exports.51 
Nevertheless, headway was made, and Vietnam secured its desired entry into the WTO.  
The organisation invited “one of the rising stars of world trade” to become its 150th member. 
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The timing of this was auspicious given that Hanoi was monumentally the venue for the 2006 
APEC Summit. Joining the WTO, as one Vietnamese official described to the author, 
represented the apogee of multilateralisation.  Indeed, other Vietnamese officials shared this 
sentiment. Foreign Ministry Spokesman Le Dung claimed it a “momentous event in the 
international economic integration of Vietnam, showing Vietnam’s deep and comprehensive 
participation in the global trading system.”52 Still, Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Kiem 
urged a degree of cautiousness when he stated that Vietnam would continue to develop a 
“socialism-orientated market economy.”53 
The long, drawn-out process of negotiations imprinted two things on the leadership. 
Firstly, friendly nations can also put up barriers to cooperation based on their own national 
interests. And secondly, that negotiating trade deals did not come without concessions. 
Speaking in 2007, Luong Van Tu described the cutthroat like nature of negotiations. He recalls:  
“I remember every meeting because each tested my own endurance. Each 
party had its own demand. They consistently asked Vietnam to open the 
market for their exports. For instance, they asked Vietnam to reduce import 
tax rates from 20 percent down to 0-5 percent for their beef and pork. In that 
case, we could no longer raise cows in Vietnam. In my dealings with them, 
no matter more or less friendly, they all upheld their national interests.54 
He went on further to state that even friendly countries remained “intransigeant” on 
securing the best possible deals for the sake of their national interests.55  
As Vietnam stepped up its integration process, Resolution 8 became all the more 
understandable given the complexity of the international arena. Succumbing to concessions 
was no longer a “zero-sum game.” It may be a source of contention, but the overall end product 
would result in much needed economic restructuring, further bolstering Vietnam’s overall 
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economic outlook and, as such boosting the Party’s legitimacy. The world was a complex place 
and negotiating required approaching it with the ideals of cooperation and struggle in mind. 
Shortly before the Tenth Party Congress that would take place in April 2006, the 
government released Resolution NO 01/2006NQ-CP entitled ‘On Major Solutions for the 
Implementation of the 2006-Socio-Economic and Social Budget Place.’ This emphasised high 
growth, in addition to promoting coordination between local markets to take advantage of 
AFTA and WTO commitments whilst limiting the negative effects of international economic 
integration and globalisation.56  The resolution also set out to “step up” the reorganisation, 
renewal, and equitisation of state enterprises in line with relevant action plans.57  What it 
displayed was that Vietnam was serious about bringing its own domestic laws up to 
international standards. The resolution indicated how committed it was to pursuing this 
fundamental aspect of multidirectionalism.  
Adding Substance to Diversification and the Emergence of Strategic Partnerships 
Throughout the nineties Vietnam had begun the groundbreaking in normalising relations with 
numerous countries, laying the foundation for future cooperation. As it entered the twenty-first 
century Vietnam moved ahead with cultivating economic relationships, but at the same time, 
moving cautiously and wearily in fostering areas of defensive or security cooperation. There 
are numerous explanations for this. Vietnam did not want to give the impression that it was 
seeking to ally itself against any potential threat. It did not want to irk China and make it think 
that it was taking measures to balance against it. Similarly, Vietnam wanted to ensure it 
maintained a strong degree of autonomy and not be forced to dance to the tune of any one 
country. Arguably the collective memory of its over-reliance on the Soviet Union loomed large 
in the background, but so too did its fearfulness of peaceful evolution, and jeopardising its 
relations with China. As such, fully rounded cooperation did not develop as such, rather an 
economically driven approach, sprinkled with a liberal dosing of political cooperation, 
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developed. These deepened relations were played out amongst major international partners 
such as Russia, China, the US, Japan, South Korea, and the EU.  
Russia: At the turn of the century, two-way trade between Vietnam and Russia had 
dwindled consistently since the days of the Cold War. Deputy Prime Minister Phan Van Khai 
had visited Russia in September 2000, where an agreement between the two countries was 
signed settling Vietnam’s Cold War-era debts. This paved the way for Vladimir Putin’s historic 
visit to Hanoi in February 2001. It was the first visit by a Russian Head of State in 51 years. 
The two countries proclaimed it a: “New stage in Vietnam-Russia relations.”58 And this is 
essentially what it was – it was the restarting of a traditional friendship. During the visit, there 
was the signing of Vietnam’s first strategic partnership. This strategic partnership saw 
cooperation in electric energy, oil and natural gas, chemistry, mechanics, metallurgy, 
electronics, agriculture, communications, science and technology, culture, and education. The 
two sides also stated they would strengthen their cooperation in terms of defence equipment. 
Russia-Vietnam defensive ties, due to historical reasons, have been close. However, Hanoi’s 
cautiousness was evident in its emphasis that: “Military cooperation between the two countries 
was not directed against any third country.”59  
This partnership was designed to take the countries’ relationship to a new height and 
boost two-way trade between them.  Furthermore, Russia saw Vietnam as a pivotal partner for 
greater engagement with the ASEAN region, something that brought a lot of prestige for the 
Vietnamese. As such Russia appointed Vietnam coordinator of relations between Russia and 
ASEAN. Vietnamese cooperation in the early years of the twentieth century were focused on 
oil and energy production. The joint Russian Vietnamese venture Vietsovpetro, originally 
founded in 1981, focused on developing oil deposits on the Vietnamese continental shelf. 
President Tran Duc Luong indicated the importance of these projects when he stated that it: 
“Serves as the basis of the whole Vietnamese oil production industry” on his 2004 visit to 
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Russia.60 During the visit the two sides agreed to continue political dialogue and expand 
commercial-economic investment cooperation. They also agreed to expand relations to other 
areas such as the humanities. 61  Russian energy business, Silovye Mashiny provided $40 
million of equipment for Vuong’s hydroelectric power plant. Furthermore, another Russian 
business sought to assist in the Vietnam Coal Cooperation in the construction of a heavy-duty 
truck factory at the Chu Lai Open Economic Zone in Quang Nam province.62 
Yet if there is one word to describe Vietnam-Russian relations during this period, it 
would be subdued. Two-way trade between the two countries stood at $651.3 million in 2003.63 
Yet this pales into significance when compared to other partners, and when compared to 
Soviet-Vietnamese trade prior to the end of the Cold War. Russia did not even make it into 
Vietnam’s top five trading partners.64 The lack of substance in their relations was demonstrated 
in an interview with Phan Van Khai by Russian News Agencies, Ria Novosti and Itar-Tass. He 
pointed to common views on regional and international issues, but merely heralded the 
Strategic Partnership and aforementioned projects.   The relationship was symbolic – rather 
than strategic.  It indicated the waning of Russia’s significance, in terms of practical measures, 
in Vietnam’s burgeoning diversification efforts.65 
The US: Relations with the US at the turn of the millennium looked optimistic. Bill 
Clinton had visited in November 2000, the first US president to do so, where the BTA between 
the two countries was agreed. Yet the election of George W. Bush saw the Jekyll and Hyde 
nature of US-Vietnamese relations come to the forefront. Hanoi was extremely cautious, not 
to move too closely into Washington’s arms. It was also extremely wary of the threat of 
peaceful evolution.  
Such worries were exposed when George W. Bush delayed the signing of the treaty 
because of Vietnam’s human rights records. Nhan Dan responded by stating “we strongly 
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criticize and reject the intentions of forces in the United States which are creating or raising 
many new hurdles for the process of normalization of Vietnam-US relations.”66 Hanoi’s 
paranoia was further exposed when the spokesperson of the Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs issued a strong rebuttal of American media claims that Hanoi had sabotaged the deal 
due to the arrest of the priest and dissident: Nguyen Van Ly. The ministry spokesman 
labelled the claims as a “total fabrication.”67 
Yet throwing wrenches into cooperation was not only coming from the US side. In 
January 2001, Vietnam cancelled the visit of Admiral Dennis Blair, the commander of all US 
military forces in Asia and the Pacific. Compounding the embarrassment was the fact that the 
cancellation occurred at the last minute.68 This represented the cautiousness of the Vietnamese 
not to antagonize China, nor stray into the embrace of any one country, as well as its overall 
careful approach to cooperation outside economic matters.  
Still, Admiral Blair made the visit the following year in which Blair was allegedly “very 
keen” to gain access to Cam Ranh Bay.69 The Russian lease of the geostrategic port expired in 
2004, yet Russia decided to withdraw one year earlier. Vietnam’s recently proclaimed ‘three 
no’ policy would of course rule out any further leases being developed with Vietnam, which 
proclaimed that the port would be “for the cause of national construction and defence.”70  
Vietnam was extremely cautious in broadening its relationship with the US. Fearfulness 
of peaceful evolution, Hanoi’s eagerness not to jeopardise its relations with China, and an 
economic orientated approach to foreign relations were certainly reasons behind this. However, 
November 2003 saw a historic event take place with the Vietnamese Defence Minister 
Lieutenant-General Pham Van Tra. He became the first post-war Vietnamese defence minister 
to visit the United States. Vietnamese observers were quick to point out that this represented a 
“thaw” in military relations and that they were also becoming more “rounded.”71 
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Yet tensions were there. Tra registered a complaint, about a recent Congressional 
Resolution denouncing Vietnam’s human rights abuses.72 In the meeting with Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld, much of the dialogue was regarding remnants of the Vietnam War. 
Issues such as missing US soldiers and Agent Orange appeared to trump those of regional and 
security. Indeed, a major symbolic event took place the following week as well.  
The USS Vandegrift frigate became the first American warship to make a port visit to 
Vietnam since the end of the war when it called at Ho Chi Minh City.73 These two events had 
largely symbolic importance, but did not encapsulate an inclusion of military cooperation. 
Merely, the barriers for this were falling. Economic ties were still, from Hanoi’s point of view, 
of greater importance - demonstrated by Deputy Vu Khoan’s visit to the US in December 2003. 
It was an attempt to promote investment and trade with the US. He led a large delegation of 
business leaders to numerous cities and met with trade representative Robert Zoellick, along 
with Secretary of State Colin Powel. Khoan noted his disappointment that the US was not the 
number one investor in Vietnam. However, US trade officials remained optimistic about the 
future, especially given the progress in WTO negotiations. Khoan too, was eager to play down 
fears that corruption and slow progress in reforming the financial sector would hamper 
Vietnam’s economic growth.74 
Still, political relations continued to move closer. In 2005 Prime-Minister Pham Van 
Khai made a historic visit to the US. He proclaimed that Vietnam-US relations had entered a 
“new-stage of development.”75 Along with meeting then-President Bush, he also met with the 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, witnessed the signing of an agreement to purchase 
four Boeing787 aircraft, met with Senator John McCain, and spoke at a dinner hosted by the 
US-Vietnam Business Council.76 Khai’s visit resulted in the establishment of the framework: 
"Friendly relations, building partners, multi-faceted cooperation, stability, long-term based on 
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mutual respect, equality, and mutual benefits,” something that would set in motion deeper 
cooperation in the future.77 
China: Scholars such as Brantly Womack and Carl Thayer have noted that Sino-
Vietnamese relations during this period had achieved “mature asymmetry.”  Mature asymmetry 
essentially refers to the careful management of relations to keep the peace.78 Or in other words: 
normalcy.  Secretary-General Le Kha Phieu visited Beijing in February 1999 where a 16-word 
guideline calling for “long-term, stable, future-orientated and all-round cooperative 
relations.”79 A flurry of meetings, increase in trade, and treaties followed. This included: “The 
resolution for disputes on the land border, and the maritime rights in the Gulf of Tonkin, and a 
Joint Statement for Comprehensive Cooperation in the New Century.”80  Whilst the South 
China Sea territorial dispute was not resolved, due to its complexity, these treaties “narrowed 
the scope of their territorial disputes” and therefore provided the impetus for greater 
cooperation.81  
According to Thayer, the 2000 joint statement set out a “long-term framework for 
cooperative bilateral state-to-state relations with a provision for the regular exchange of high-
level delegations led by their respective State Presidents, Prime Ministers, other Ministers, 
national legislatures, and other political organizations.”82 Indeed this period marked a drastic 
reverse, albeit expected, given that diplomatic relations had only been restored just ten years 
previously. 
Alexander Vuving has gone on to argue that Le Kha Phieu’s replacement, Nong Duc 
Manh, continued, “lip-service to China.” Manh, in the beginning of his reign, certainly sought 
strong relations with China. He visited China in November 2001 with Jiang Zemin 
reciprocating in February the following year.  During Jiang’s visit to Vietnam, he invoked Ho 
Chi Minh’s sayings - the “brotherly states” and “comrades plus brothers.” He recited a song 
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that states: “Vietnam China, mountains are connected with mountains, and rivers are linked 
with rivers.” 83 During the visit – Jiang and Vietnamese leaders agreed to promote “mutual 
trust to a new high order to promote long-term stability, future orientation, good-
neighbourliness and all-around cooperation.”84  
Normalisation in 1990 was primarily driven by political concerns. Vietnam needed a 
political ally in a world littered with crumbling socialist regimes. Yet the turn of the century 
marked the beginning of economic factors becoming a prominent factor in shaping each other’s 
policies towards one-another. The strengthening of relations, from the Vietnamese perspective, 
was initially driven by political solidarity, but bolstering trade relations became equally, if not, 
more important.  
Chinese investment into Vietnam was meagre in 1991. By 1999 it had risen 
dramatically. 85 As such, the ministry of planning and investment called for multifaceted 
cooperation, especially in areas of investment, tourism, and trade relations. 86 Certainly, 
economic relations between the two countries improved and even became labelled as the 
highlight in good relations between the two countries. Vietnam and China had initially set a 
target of two-way trade to grow to $5 billion by 2005, yet it surpassed that significantly and 
reached $8.73 billion. Trade around the border areas showed significant improvement with 
Guangxi province pouring $21 million into 49 projects in Vietnam. The two sides also began 
forming joint ventures that would produce and sell products in third countries.  
Accompanying this increase in trade and economic cooperation was the start of a 
worrying trend - a growing trade imbalance with China. Vietnam’s trade deficit was just $0.2 
billion in 2001 yet by the following year it grew five times to $1.03 billion.87 From 2003 
onwards, it would continue to grow and became a source of anxiety amongst the ruling elite, 
who were keen to avoid overreliance yet at the same time maintain cordial relations.  Whether 
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or not Vietnamese leaders believed that China’s rise was to be peaceful, it is clear that in the 
early stages of the 2000s, that cooperation was fostered, and it embraced the cooperation 
mainly in the economic sphere. This was largely a result of geostrategic realities, but as the 
following chapter will demonstrate – provide a stimulus for broadened cooperation.   
India: India had always been a supporter of Vietnam’s cause for independence, but after the 
Ninth Party Congress, it became a pivotal partner in Vietnam’s attempts to bolster economic 
cooperation as well as provide an outlet for political support. The support was not one-way. 
India, much like Russia, saw Vietnam as a gateway to greater opportunities within the ASEAN 
region. Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Bajpayee visited Hanoi in January 2001. 
 In addition to promoting relations in the name of “peace, stability, cooperation and 
development in the region and the world,” they agreed to increase bilateral cooperation 
significantly.  This was especially felt in the economic sphere with five accords signed, 
including a $238 million oil and gas exploration deal. During the meeting, Vajpayee 
emphasised Vietnam’s “critical role in fostering better relations with ASEAN.”88  
Nong Duc Manh subsequently visited India in May 2003. The two countries signed a 
“Vietnam-India Joint Statement on Comprehensive cooperation.” This included three action 
plans and a focus on cooperation in politics, economics, trade, investment, industry, credit, 
science and technology, agriculture and telecommunications. They agreed to raise two-way 
trade between the two countries, and India granted $4.7 million in non-refundable aid. 89Then 
in 2004, in a meeting between Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien and his Indian 
counterpart Natwar Singh, Singh issued his support for Vietnam’s bid for accession to the 
WTO. 90Whilst India-Vietnam relations would take some time to further integrate and develop, 
certainly a budding relationship was on the horizon. This relationship would be strengthened 
later on.  
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Japan: Throughout the nineties, Vietnam-Japan economic relations experienced a boom  
with Vietnamese exports to Japan doubling from $1.2 to $2.4 billion from 1994 to 2000.91 
Entering the twenty-first century Japan had become Vietnam’s leading trading partner in 
addition to being the biggest giver of ODA. It was no surprise, therefore, that Prime Minister 
Phan Van Khai labelled Japan Vietnam’s number one partner, at a seminar on the future of 
Asia in 2001. Nong Duc Manh paid a visit to Japan in October 2002, where he met Prime 
Minister Junichiro Koizumi and the Emperor of Japan. The build-up to the visit was 
overshadowed by the closure of a Honda factory after the Vietnamese government lowered the 
annual ceiling on imported parts. The Japanese side was worried about “inconsistent” 
Vietnamese investment policies.92 The visit also came at a time when Japan was looking to cut 
government spending.  
Still, this did not stop the sides from agreeing to “reinforce economic relations,” with 
Vietnam re-affirming its commitment to facilitating a stable environment for Japanese 
investment and business to flourish.93 Indeed, the two countries had set up a wide variety of 
dialogue mechanisms and high-level forums that met annually, contributing to mutual trust and 
understanding between them. This included bilateral summit meetings, including meetings 
taking place vis-à-vis ASEAN.94 Continuing from Manh’s successful visit, Vietnam and Japan 
signed the Japan-Vietnam investment agreement, which came into force in late 2004. The 
agreement was designed to stabilise the investment climate in both countries.95  
Two-way trade value increased rapidly during the period 2000-2005 with an annual 
growth rate of 14.2 per cent. Japan continued to be the largest donor of ODA to Vietnam with 
a focus on developing human resources, construction, agriculture, education and healthcare, 
and environmental protection. By August 2006, Japan had 677 investment projects with a total 
capital of $6.8 billion. The two countries had also deepened cooperation into other spheres, 
such as tourism and educational cooperation.96  
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Then in October 2006, Japan and Vietnam signed the Joint Statement Toward a Strategic 
Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in Asia, on the occasion of newly-appointed Prime 
Minister Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit to Japan.97 Dung noted that the two countries wanted to take 
their relationship to “another level,” and certainly Vietnam’s second strategic partnership did 
exactly that. 98   As part of the strategic partnership, the two sides also agreed to launch 
negotiations for a Japan-Vietnam Economic Partnership Agreement (JVEPA). Strong 
Vietnam-Japan economic relations certainly provided a counterweight to China and the US in 
terms of trade. 
Others:Vietnam and South Korea inked a “comprehensive partnership” in 2001. The 
following year South Korean Prime-Minister Lee Han Dong paid a visit to Vietnam where he 
stressed continued support for Vietnamese industrialisation and modernisation by promoting 
South Korean businesses to invest in the country.99 Indeed, by this time, South Korea had 
become the fourth largest investor in Vietnam. People to people contacts increased with a 56 
per cent jump in South Korean tourists visiting Vietnam.100 Le Van Khai visited Seoul in 2003 
with the purpose of boosting economic ties and fostering greater cooperation in oil refining, 
power plant construction and development projects. The South Korean Minister of Foreign 
Affairs at the time reported, “the main topics discussed were trade and economic issues.”101 By 
2005, trade between the two countries was valued $4.2 billion and Vietnam had become the 
largest recipient of ODA for South Korea.102     
 Vietnam’s relationship with the EU, along with individual countries within the bloc, 
deepened around economic ties. During 2001, Le Kha Khieu paid visits to the European 
Commission, Italy, and France as part of its efforts to “strengthen cooperative relations, expand 
markets and take advantage of capital, investment, science and technology.”103 Close relations 
with the EU were essential for Vietnam’s push to join the WTO. In May 2003, Vietnam hosted 
German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder where he praised Vietnam’s renovation efforts and 
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promised to support Vietnam in its WTO accession bid. Additionally, the two countries signed 
cooperative documents for funds of €25 million. This was to help with funding water treatment 
projects, flood control projects, and the upgrading of hospitals.104 
October 2004 saw Vietnam host French President Jacques Chirac with both sides 
expressing delight at the “fruitful cooperation between both countries.”105 Chirac explained 
France’s desire to assists in Vietnam’s international economic integration and development by 
encouraging French companies to expand trade relations and investment in Vietnam. 
Additionally, he promised to actively support Vietnam-EU relations.106  
Trade relations with the EU had certainly developed. From 1999 to 2004 trade doubled 
to $7.5 billion, with 473 foreign investment projects by 2006.107 The EU’s cooperation projects 
had focused on poverty-reduction aid and speeding up the country’s integration process. 
Vietnam recognised the importance of strong relations with the EU and as such it became the 
first ASEAN country to approve a master plan on the relationship towards 2010 and 
orientations to 2015, a framework designed to improve relations.108  With this agreement 
Vietnam and the EU would set out to set up a Comprehensive Agreement. The degree to which 
Vietnam-EU relations were primarily trade focused was highlighted when Tran Phuong Hoa, 
a member of the Institute for European Studies, stated that the “partnership is still lacking when 
it comes to culture-driven objectives.”109 
Conclusion 
The period from 2001 to 2006 saw Vietnam plunge into the international political economy 
with significant trials and tribulations, but substantial progress. The learning process, however, 
became harsher and the learning curve steeper with Vietnam realising that it must actively 
evolve to adjust to the standards set out by the international community. In relation to 
multidirectionalism’s evolution, this time period was marked with three key aspects. Firstly, 
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economic integration, set out by Resolution 07, was becoming ingrained and positively 
associated with enhanced legitimacy. What is interesting was that integration and international 
cooperation were becoming deeply entrenched within Party thinking, and positively associated 
with enhanced legitimacy. The government’s report on 2003 socioeconomic achievements, 
tasks for 2004, outlines this as such. It stated that: 
The political and social situation has been stabilized and the environment of 
peace and international cooperation has taken shape. These are the most 
fundamental conditions for national development. The implementation of 
various bilateral and multilateral economic agreements, efforts to speed up 
Vietnam's integration into the international economic community, and 
measures to enhance our economic competitiveness are the factors that will 
create new potentials for Vietnam to expand markets and attract more foreign 
direct investments.110 
Integration, along with diversification and multilateralism, was a means to ensure economic 
growth, and therefore greatly influenced the collective memory of the Party in a positive way. 
These benefits created a mutually reinforcing process in which mutltidirectionalism 
contributed significantly to economic development, and as such, legitimacy. The Party 
therefore, began to deepen and expand multidirectionalism, as the following chapter will 
demonstrate.   
Additionally, Vietnam’s outlook on the international system adapted to the highly 
competitive nature associated with trade-deal negotiation. Resolution 13 displayed this. Its 
negotiation to join the WTO was testament to this new arena of struggle and cooperation. At 
the bilateral level, Vietnam began laying the foundations for further cooperation. The 
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emergence of strategic partnerships would later become a mechanism for promoting 
multidirectionalism.  
Foreign Minister Nguyen Dy Nien outlined how Vietnamese diplomacy had made huge 
strides since Doi Moi. He noted normalisation and now the expansion of relations with major 
countries had created multi-faceted areas of cooperation based on equity and mutual benefits.  
He also noted that Vietnam had strongly implemented economic integration with the region 
and the world. Yet the following quote encapsulates the largely economic approach to foreign 
relations: 
Foreign affairs have made great contributions to national development by 
maintaining a peaceful and stable environment. By direct and specific actions, 
external activities have served the purpose of making economic policies, 
especially research, advisory, information, mobilization of aid, investment 
attraction, expanding markets of trade, labor and tourism. We have taken an 
active part in settling problems in economic relations between Vietnam and 
other countries. So far, we have attracted a total of $45 billion in foreign direct 
investment. In 2004, the export turnover reached $26 billion. In the period of 
2001-2005, official development assistance was $13.3 billion. 
One can see how stability – both external and internal – was at the forefront of Vietnam’s 
foreign policy initiative. In doing so, Vietnam could attract aid and investment to promote 
aggregate strength, whilst increasing trade opportunities. 2001-2006 saw advances in this 
regard. The multidirectionalism learning process was seeing positive results and subsequently, 
as the foreign minister’s quote (above) demonstrates, largely reinforced the strength of such a 
policy.  
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It's important to note that Vietnam’s relations with China became shaped and intertwined 
economically. Of course, the South China Sea issue would continue to be a dark cloud over 
relations during this period, but the lack of assertiveness and tension in the region meant 
economic relations could flourish. Le Hong Hiep has stated: “Vietnam seeks to exploit 
conditions conducive to bilateral cooperation, especially in the economic sphere, to promote 
its domestic development.”111 This was certainly the case for the period from 2001 to 2006 
when China was less assertive in its claims. However, this would change after 2009, when 
Chinese Foreign Policy became more erratic and cultivated fears within Hanoi. Therefore, the 
following chapter will look at the structural factors that forced Hanoi’s hand in promoting a 
broader approach to multidirectionalism.  
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Chapter 5 
Broadening Multidirectionalism: Internal and External Complications 
The year 2006 was one of milestones for Vietnam. It successfully hosted the APEC Summit, 
gained membership in the WTO, and it would soon be nominated as a non-permanent member 
of the UN Security Council for the first time in its history. At the same time, it considerably 
deepened its relations with traditional friends and partners at the bi and multilateral level.1 The 
previous chapter demonstrated the learning process through which Vietnam went in order to 
achieve these milestones; how integration became a focal point of multidirectionalism, and 
how an economically-orientated approach towards cooperation soon developed.  
But for the years 2006-2011 the learning process associated with multidirectionalism was 
that of achieving a balance. Vietnam’s explosive trade interdependence with China, along with 
its more assertive posture in the South China Sea, brought into question the economic-centric 
approach. It meant Vietnam would have to broaden the scope of cooperation to ensure it could 
successfully defend its territorial claims to the South China Sea. Yet at the same time ensure 
the status quo prevailed in order to safeguard the economy. Therefore, Vietnam sought 
cooperation with other partners to broaden its economic base. Furthermore, broadening the 
scope of cooperation would provide Vietnam with greater mechanisms for managing the 
asymmetries in its relations with China.  
Ultimately this was a complex time for Vietnam, both internally and externally. 
Structurally, China’s rise, in particular its submission of a map claiming sovereignty over the 
entire South China Sea, thrust the issue back into the limelight. The failure to develop a binding 
code-of-conduct showed the limitations of the DOC. Complicating this was Vietnam’s 
burgeoning trade deficit with its northern neighbour along with the 2008 financial crisis.  As 
such, Vietnam began to not only deepen its cooperation at the bi and multilateral level, but also 
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broaden it. This meant venturing out into other areas of cooperation, namely defensive 
cooperation.  
The principle argument in this chapter is that increasing pressures at the structural level 
necessitated a broadened approach to multidirectionalism, mainly through deepened 
cooperation at the bilateral level, and a more proactive approach at the multilateral level. At 
the same time, domestic undercurrents began to emerge because of the double-Chinese 
dilemma, little political reform, and corruption. These domestic currents, whilst not affecting 
foreign policy, would widen avenues for these undercurrents to flow and impact foreign policy 
in the future.   
The Tenth Party Congress  
The year 2006 marked the twentieth anniversary of Doi Moi. As such, the Tenth Party Congress 
in 2006 reflected on twenty years of renovation in addition to the previous five years since the 
last Party Congress. One of the major lessons learnt, according to the Tenth Party Congress 
Documents, was that Vietnam must “bring into full play international resources while striving 
to take advantage of external resources and combining the nation’s strength with that of the 
new era under the new conditions.”2 The new conditions referred to here are the interconnected, 
interpolar world in which the Party saw areas of cooperation and struggle.  
Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy is intrinsically linked with its domestic reform 
agenda, known as Doi Moi. It is clear how intertwined the two had become. Party documents 
state that Vietnam must “…. take advantage of external resources to promote internal ones, 
with the aim of creating an aggregate strength to develop the country in a rapid and sustainable 
way on the basis of firmly maintaining national independence and socialist orientation.”3 
Whilst Chapter Three showed that multidirectionalism had been a bottom-up transformation 
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process, twenty years later, multidirectionalism was seen as a top-down process in which 
external factors provided opportunities for internal transformation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Multidirectionalism had become a core component of Doi Moi, which in turn contributed to 
the state's prioritisation of boosting aggregate strength, fostering domestic and international 
stability, in addition to creating greater autonomy for the country to act on the international 
stage. As such, the Party praised the “new phase of development” in external relations. They 
stated that: “Activities on [sic] the external relations of the Party, the State, and people have 
developed strongly, contributing to preserving a peaceful environment, boosting socio-
economic development, and heightening Vietnam’s prestige in the region and the world.”4 
Multidirectionalism 
Multilateralism 
1. Aggregate Strength 
2. Stability 
3. Autonomy 
Economic Development 
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International integration was praised for allowing Vietnamese products to become more 
competitive, exports and imports to increase, and for creating a more conducive atmosphere 
for ODA and FDI to flow into the country.5 Looking forward, the guidelines of the Tenth Party 
Congress read remarkably similar to the one five years earlier. It again reiterated the state's 
desire to: 
Consistently follow the foreign affairs (policies) of independence, sovereignty, 
peace, co-operation and development in order to carry out the foreign policy of 
openness, multilateralization and diversification of international relations. To 
proactively integrate into the international economy, and, at the same time, expand 
international co-operation in other domains. To make Vietnam a reliable friend and 
trusted partners of countries in the international community and actively 
participates [sic] in the process of international and regional co-operation.6 
What is different here, however, was the desire to “expand international co-operation into other 
domains.” The Party wanted to “broaden external relations.” What this broadened approach 
entailed would unfold over the five-year period, before being expanded at the 2011 Eleventh 
Party Congress. The previous chapter made note of Vietnam’s concentration on economic 
affairs, but the desire to broaden cooperation would go hand in hand with the structural changes 
ongoing at the international level along with domestic currents caused by Doi Moi.  
One challenge that emerged out of the Tenth Party Congress, according to Hong Ha, was 
simultaneously handling relations with superpowers. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
officially, wanted to establish frameworks for long-term friendly and cooperative relations with 
its neighbours and regional countries, to create a peaceful and stable environment, conducive 
to economic growth.7 But such a framework would need to be across a host of major countries. 
Vietnam of course maintained that it would not use one power to balance against another. Yet 
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broadening the scope and achieving equity in its superpower relations was key to ensuring 
Vietnam could achieve a strong sense of autonomy in its international posturing.  
Enhanced Multilateralism 
Vietnam significantly stepped up its engagement in multilateral institutions, shifting from an 
active to proactive measures.8 Additionally, ASEAN driven initiatives created further space for 
Vietnam to actively engage.  There are four key events that will be analysed in this section in 
regards to Vietnam’s enhanced stance to multilateralism: the ASEAN charter, more ASEAN 
FTAs, Vietnam becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, and 
Vietnam’s stint as ASEAN Chair in 2010. Certainly, these four things influenced Vietnam’s 
cognitive perceptions of itself as becoming more proactive and a “responsible member” of the 
international community. This reinforced Vietnam’s positive association with multilateralism.  
Since it had joined ASEAN in 1995, Vietnam has successfully become a key player.  
Joining had seen tangible security, political, and economic benefits.  In the early 2000s, 
ASEAN sought to establish a legal and institutional framework for codifying ASEAN norms, 
rules and values. This would manifest into the ASEAN Charter. The Eleventh ASEAN Summit 
in Kuala Lumpur in 2005 set up the Eminent Persons Group (EPG) on the ASEAN Charter. 
The EPG comprised of “highly distinguished and well-respected citizens from ASEAN 
member countries” and would provide recommendations on formulating the ASEAN Charter.9 
As such, the EPG invited civil-society actors, the ASEAN-Institutes of Strategic and 
International Studies (ASEAN ISIS), and the ASEAN’s People Assembly (APA). The EPG 
published a report in December 2006, with the High-Level Task Force (HLTF) for Drafting 
the ASEAN Charter forming in January 2007.  
Vietnamese Representative to the HLTF, Nguyen Trung Thanh, spoke of Vietnam’s 
consistent desire for a strong ASEAN.10 The creation of a human rights body within the charter 
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was an extremely controversial topic particularly from the new members of ASEAN such as 
Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, and of course, Vietnam. Drafters from these countries were not 
supportive of using the term ‘human security.’ Nevertheless, they still backed the general 
principle to protect the wellbeing of their citizens.11 Despite this, however, it has been noted 
that the Vietnamese delegates at ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies 
meetings with the EPG were surprisingly constructive and open regarding the matter.12  
Nevertheless, any mention of a ‘human rights body’ was avoided in the first HLTF draft. 
But in July 2007, approval for a clause on the establishment of a regional human rights body 
was approved. Key to achieving this was ensuring the human rights body did not have a 
majority based voting mechanism. Rather it would adopt a traditional consensus-based 
approach. Speaking on the matter, Nguyen Trung Thanh noted: “Before putting their hands on 
the issue, the HLTF members had to consult their respective Foreign Ministers for advice, since 
human rights has mixed implications.” He added: “The HLTF finally came up with a 
formulation of the enabling provision in the Charter that was considered the best-balanced 
option.”13 Additionally, he stated that the HLTF should be proud of their ability to tackle such 
a sensitive issue within ASEAN.  
This new ‘liberal turn’ of ASEAN has created greater windows of opportunity for two 
traditional taboo subjects within Vietnam: democracy and human rights.14  It was widely 
reported at the time that Indonesia was pushing for the promotion of democracy and human 
rights in the ASEAN Charter so that ASEAN, at the very least, subscribes to democratic norms. 
According to interviews with Vietnamese officials by Jorn Dosch, this has at least been 
successful in requiring Vietnam to conform to the issue of how to deal with the requirement of 
establishing a human rights committee. However, Dosch also points out that the consensus-
based approach, something Vietnam indeed pushed for, will limit the effectiveness of any form 
of enforcement.15 Certainly, Prime Minister Nguyen Dan Dung’s comments after the ASEAN 
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Charter came into force demonstrate this. He proclaimed that the Vietnamese delegation played 
an active role in the maintenance of the bloc’s basic principles - those of consensus and non-
intervention. He also noted that the ASEAN Charter would raise cooperation to new heights, 
and therefore “enhance the association’s position, image, and role in the region and in the eyes 
of friends over the world.”16   
Speaking further, Nguyen Tan Dung also praised ASEAN efforts to foster greater 
cooperation and foster economic ties vis-à-vis free trade agreements. The previous chapter 
made note of ASEAN’s nascent FTAs, but the period from 2006 to 2011 saw further trade 
liberalisation take place. The ASEAN-China Trade in Services Agreement was signed in 2007, 
coming into that same year.17Similarly, an Investment Agreement was signed in August 2009, 
coming into force January 1, 2010.18 An Investment Agreement was also signed in June 2009 
between ASEAN-Korea.19 This came into force on September 1, 2009. Meanwhile, a Second 
Protocol to Amend the Agreement on Trade in Goods between ASEAN-Korea was signed on 
November 17, 2011.20  The ASEAN-Japan CEP similarly was signed in April 2008 and came 
into force December 2008.21 ASEAN also set up FTAs with India, Australia and New Zealand. 
The ASEAN-India Trade in Goods Agreement came into force on January 1, 2010, and the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA came into force on the same date. ASEAN had provided 
the initial impetus for Vietnam’s free trade agenda. Joining ASEAN was equally related to 
economics, politics and security. Through these FTAs, Vietnam could further liberalise its 
economy. This was one part of the process and indeed Vietnam would take initiatives to 
facilitate its bilateral trade agreements as described the following chapter.22  
As part of Vietnam’s overall multilateral approach to foreign relations, it had placed a 
considerable amount of emphasis on being active within the UN to support the principles of 
international law, promote world peace and security, and create favourable conditions for 
development. In the nineties Vietnam’s active stance was reflected in its signing the 
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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in 1996, becoming a member of the UN Chemical 
Weapons Convention, and contributing to UN Peacekeeping Funds.23   
Vietnam first decided to push for a bid to be on the UN Security Council (UNSC) in 
1997. That push became a reality on October 16, 2007 when the United Nations General 
Assembly voted unanimously in favour of Vietnam joining for the 2008-2009 period. Le Dung 
proclaimed the large number of votes in favour of Vietnam as signalling the “international trust 
in Vietnam.”24 Meanwhile, Nguyen Tan Dung proclaimed its nomination as a chance for 
Vietnam to “further heighten its image and position.” 25  Some even noted the event as 
signifying “a new global presence” for the country.26 Ta Minh Tuan wrote that its membership 
went beyond symbolism and would give the country diplomatic experience in complex, multi-
faceted issues.27 Certainly, Vietnam’s inexperience showed in the lead-up, with a Western 
diplomat quoted as urging Vietnam to start formulating a position on complex international 
issues. This came after senior foreign officials reportedly said they did not have a position on 
Kosovo and Sudan when asked by said Diplomat.28 
Nevertheless, Vietnam took steps to rectify this. In the lead up to its membership, 
Vietnam set up a core group, consisting of (then) Vice-Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh and 
(then) Director of International Organization Department Le Hoai Trung to liaise with its UN 
mission and work directly with Nguyen Tan Dung.29 During its membership, it twice assumed 
the rotating presidency of the UNSC. As such it hosted meetings dealing with a wide range of 
issues, such as Middle East conflicts, political instability in Honduras, and climate change.  
Vietnam’s contributions to the UN were widely praised by UN General Secretary Ban Ki-
Moon stating that Vietnam’s “contributions to the UNSC helped increase the strength and 
efficiency of the Council.”30 Pham Vinh Quang, Deputy Head of the International Organisation 
Department of the Foreign Ministry, highlighted Vietnam’s international recognition of its 
presidency. Pham Gia Khiem also highlighted this praise, further noting that President Nguyen 
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Minh Triet’s participation and speeches delivered at the UNSC summits demonstrated the 
importance Vietnam attributed to the UNSC and the significant contribution his attendance had 
on Vietnam’s success. Undoubtedly, the milestone of the occasion was not lost on the 
leadership of the VCP.31 
In 2010, Vietnam took up its role of ASEAN Chairmanship. This served as a focal 
diplomatic event. For ASEAN it was the year in which it began shifting to a new stage of 
development - The ASEAN Community. Certainly, Vietnam lived up to its role in facilitating 
this when it hosted the sixteenth ASEAN summit under the theme “towards the ASEAN 
Community: From Vision to Action.” Deputy Prime Minister Pham Gia Khiem highlighted 
Vietnam’s proactiveness in this summit. He noted that, at Vietnam’s proposals, ASEAN 
adopted the Declaration on Economic Recovery and Sustainable Development and the 
Declaration on Cooperation in Reliance to Climate Change. He additionally highlighted the 
fact that Vietnam had helped strengthen coordination between ASEAN leaders and 
representatives of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Assembly.32 
In October 2010 Vietnam hosted the inaugural ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting 
(ADMM) -Plus Eight meeting with the objectives of enhancing regional peace and stability, 
promoting mutual trust, and contributing to the realisation of an ASEAN security community. 
This included Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the 
United States and went together with Vietnam’s recent promotion of defensive cooperation, as 
discussed below. Nguyen Tan Dung had stated that this was a means to “promote and facilitate 
deeper engagement in addressing issues related to regional peace and security.”33 
Vietnam’s 2010 chairmanship left a positive impression on its Southeast Asian Regional 
Partners. The Indonesia President stated that Vietnam generated “a new momentum for the 
grouping to promote solidarity and its role, as well as in the roadmap towards an ASEAN 
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community.” 34  Assistant Minister to the Vietnamese Foreign Minister also played up 
Vietnam’s achievements by stating that ASEAN Vietnam’s “dynamism and responsibility” had 
contributed to a successful year and been widely appreciated by fellow ASEAN members.35 It 
was clear to see that Vietnam had stepped up its proactive approach to multilateralism.  
China- Vietnam Relations: A tale of Two-Stories  
Vietnam-China relations are a tale of two stories during this period. One of close political and 
economic cooperation, with a heavy dose of friction from mounting tensions in the South China 
Sea; the other of the increasing economic dependence on China. Speaking in 2013, Truong 
Trong Nghia, a Ho Chi Minh City National Assembly Delegation member, stated: “There are 
many levels of being inferior to others, but economic dependence is the most worrying 
inferiority.”36 He was of course, referencing China. The economic dependence narrative would 
also become greater as the first decade of the twenty-first century came to an end.  The 
following chapter will deal with Vietnam’s attempts to diversify its economic integration but 
for now, this section will examine how Vietnam’s deepened economic involvement with China 
reached such a depth.  
In 2006, four years ahead of schedule, two-way trade between Vietnam and China 
reached $10 billion.37 To put this into greater context, Vietnam’s share of trade with China 
went from 6.1% in 1999, to 14.3% in 2007.38 Similarly, $2.4 billion of that trade was with 
Guangxi alone. Yet Vietnam also ran a trade deficit of $3 Billion with China as a whole. The 
ratio of exports to imports stood at 41 percent.39 Trade had certainly skyrocketed since the turn 
of the millennium, and would continue to grow. But extremely worrying was the negative trade 
balance as shown below. The following two charts demonstrate Vietnam’s increasing reliance 
on China. Chart one is Vietnam’s imports from the years 2006 to 2011. Chart two is its exports.  
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As one can see, Vietnam’s imports from China rose significantly, from just $7.3 billion 
in 2006 to $24.8 billion in 2011. Meanwhile, exports saw only a slight increase in that same 
period. In general, Vietnam’s major imports from China consist of industrial and 
manufacturing products such as machinery, road vehicles, chemical products, textile products, 
materials and equipment. However, one item that has grown significantly has been products 
relating to the textile industry. In 2009, the import of input products for the textile industry 
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stood at $2.2 billion, a huge increase compared to 2000. 41  The textile industry grew in 
remarkable significance for the Vietnamese economy. In spite of labour shortages, and the 
economic recession in 2008, the textile industry in Vietnam continued to flourish, becoming 
the country’s leading export sector and fifth largest exporter worldwide.42 
This period was also marked by a host of economic cooperation agreements and trade 
initiatives. 43  At the start of 2006, a 179-kilometre expressway linking Nanning to the 
Vietnamese border in Lang Son province opened up at a cost of 3.7 billion Yuan.44 This was 
the first expressway to link China to ASEAN, and was further aided when ADB provided $1.1 
billion for Vietnam to build a 244-kilometre road from Hanoi to Vietnam’s other major Chinese 
border province – Lao Cai.45 These projects formed part of the Two corridors, One Economic 
Belt.  
Trade-themed conferences were also set up between the two countries, particularly at the 
border area. The Conference on Economic Cooperation among Yunnan, Lao Cai, Hanoi, and 
Quanh Ning was set up in 2005. At the third conference in November 2007, Deputy Prime 
Minister Truong Vinh Trong highlighted the great potential of the economic corridor.46 Indeed, 
at the conference the following year, 200 Chinese FDI investment projects with a total 
registered capital of $788.5 million, were signed.47 Similarly, the Vietnam-China Trade Fair, 
set up in 2001 with the aim of promoting business cooperation and tourism, hosted in Lao Cai, 
saw significant growth in activity. At the 2006 fair contracts worth $201 million were signed.48 
At the 2009 fair, numerous incentives, such as tax exemption, allowed Chinese products to be 
showcased duty-free.49 
Vietnam’s joining the WTO, its enhanced efforts to step up its integration, and the 
ASEAN-China FTA created a suitable environment for Chinese FDI into Vietnam. As such 
this period saw a substantial flow of FDI into Vietnam. By 2011 Chinese investors had invested 
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in 805 FDI projects with a total pledged investment capital of $3.184 billion.50 Le Hong Hiep 
points out that from 2005to 2013, Chinese FDI inflows into Vietnam increased eight times 
more than the fourteen previous years combined.51 However, he also noted that the flow of FDI 
into Vietnam is not significant enough to offset the trade deficit. The investment was no way 
near on a par with the level of trade, and therefore the trading deficit, and the asymmetric 
realities of China-Vietnam relations.52 
The South China Sea 
The South China Sea issue has long been an irritant in Sino-Vietnamese relations. Yet in the 
era of mature asymmetry, the issue had largely been swept under the carpet to promote greater 
political and economic relations. The DOC, whilst being limited in scope and non-binding, 
assumed a status-quo result, which would hopefully lead to greater harmony in dealings in the 
South China Sea. Commentators at the time noted that “tensions on the disputes in the South 
China Sea have been reducing considerably since 1999 - a trend that has continued into the 
2000s.”53 However, the period after the Tenth Party Congress saw this end. China’s actions 
become more bellicose and worrisome for Hanoi’s leaders. These actions also awakened 
nationalistic sentiments at home. The following section will examine the escalation in tensions 
regarding the South China Sea from 2006 to 2011.  
The Tenth Party Congress saw significant discussions about Vietnam’s maritime 
economy. It declared that Vietnam should develop a strong maritime economy, maintain 
national defence and security in the spirit of international cooperation. Carrying on from this, 
February 2007 saw the Central Committee adopt Resolution 09-NQ/TW, entitled: “On 
Vietnam’s Maritime Strategy to 2020.” This report was not publicly released, but it is 
understood that the plan was designed to integrate economic development with environmental 
protection and national defence and security.54 This report encapsulated the vital importance 
that the maritime economy held for Vietnam, accounting for 49 percent of GDP in 2007.55 
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At the start of 2006, things were looking up for cooperation in the South China Sea. Nong 
Duc Manh visited China in August of that year and met with Hu Jintao. The two issued a Joint 
Communiqué that hailed the progressions made in the demarcation of the Gulf of Tonkin.  The 
Communiqué also stated that they “agreed to abide by the high-level consensus between the 
two countries, continue to promote maritime talks, and jointly maintain the stability of the 
South China Sea.”56  Certainly, the previous year saw positive developments in maritime 
cooperation.  Vietnam, the Philippines, and China had signed up to a Joint Marine Seismic 
Undertaking.57 Yet this small flame of hope would soon be extinguished.   
Events in the South China Sea began to escalate towards the end of 2006. On December 
28, 2006 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Spokesman, Le Dung, responding to Vietnamese news 
reports that China was constructing military bases on the South China Sea, proclaimed 
Vietnam’s sovereignty over the Paracel and Spratley Islands citing Vietnam’s historical and 
legal basis to prove this.58  
Then, 2007 saw further strains develop in Sino-Vietnamese relations after a series of 
escalating measures in the South China Sea. PetroVietnam, Vietnam’s state-owned oil 
company, and BP signed a joint co-operation project in 2000. China, at that time, allegedly 
registered its disagreement, but BP essentially shrugged this off.  Vietnam’s joining the WTO, 
however, provided the impetus for BP to begin developing gas fields in the South China Sea.59 
Le Dung proclaimed that the project “was completely within the bounds of Vietnam’s 
exclusive zones and continental shelf.” 60 Chinese Foreign Minister spokesman Qin Gang 
retorted that: “Vietnam’s new actions, which infringe on China’s Sovereignty, sovereignty 
rights and administrative rights on the Nansha (Spratly) islands, go against the important 
consensus reached by leaders of the two countries on the maritime issue and are not beneficial 
to the stability of the South China Sea area”61 
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China used its economic leverage to force BP. According to a leaked US cable on 
Wikileaks, “China warned BP that its activity in the blocks infringed on Chinese sovereignty.” 
The claim is that China implicitly threatened BP’s holdings in China.62 Thus, BP cancelled its 
planned seismic surveys in June of that year. Other companies were similarly threatened.63 
ConocoPhillips, Idemitsu, Nippon Oil, Teikoku Oil, and Chevron all caved to Chinese demands 
leaving PetroVietnam in the dark.  
Compounding this economic leverage was the escalation of tension. In April of that year 
Vietnamese Coast Guards reported that Chinese naval vessels had arrested Vietnamese 
fishermen operating in waters near the Spratly Islands.  Then in July, sources reported that a 
group of Vietnamese fishing boats came under Chinese fire. One of the boats sank with, one 
person killed, and several injured.  Vietnamese naval ships raced to the scene but kept their 
distance as a result of superior Chinese firepower. Colonel Le Phuch Nguyen, Deputy Editor-
in-Chief of the People’s Army Newspaper responded to the incident by saying: “In the long 
term, we have to strengthen our navy and upgrade our coast guard.”64 
In November 2007, the People’s Liberation Army Navy carried out exercises from 
November 16-23, which provoked protests from Hanoi. To compound this, the Chinese 
National People’s Congress created an administrative region called Sansha to manage the 
Paracel and Spratley Islands. Le Dung’s response was to state that the act “violates Vietnam’s 
sovereignty.”65 Vietnamese state media echoed this sentiment by carrying a series of articles 
that condemned Chinese behaviour. More telling, however, was that these two incidents led to 
protests erupting in Hanoi. Several hundreds of demonstrators gathered in front of the Chinese 
Embassy in Hanoi in December to make their feelings heard before dispersing peacefully.66 
Further protests also erupted in Ho Chi Minh City, yet this time security forces thwarted their 
attempts to march on the Chinese Consulate. Beijing expressed its concern at the protests and 
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urged Vietnam to take a “responsible attitude” and to “avoid relations between the two 
countries from being harmed.67    
Going into 2008, the escalation of tensions in the South China Sea became worrisome 
for Vietnamese leaders, but this did not translate into a deterioration of relations. In fact, a dual 
narrative typifying the concept of cooperation and struggle began to emerge: cooperating for 
economic benefit, yet struggle in terms of the ongoing tensions pertaining to the South China 
Sea. For example, at the China-Vietnam Steering Committee on Cooperation, the two sides 
agreed to “properly handle their dispute.”68 Then, in May 2008, Nong Duc Manh paid a visit 
to China where the two countries decided to elevate their relationship to that of a 
“comprehensive and strategic cooperative partnership.” Manh stated that: “Vietnam is ready to 
work together with China and make an all-out effort to implement the relevant consensus, 
continue to maintain and increase contact and meetings between the leaders of the two parties 
and two countries, and to set up appropriate mechanisms to strengthen exchange and 
cooperation between the two parties.”69 
Yet shortly after this meeting, China went public with its demand to ExxonMobil to 
pullout of preliminary oil deals with Vietnam. The Foreign Ministry spokesmen’s response 
was subdued, noting: “We welcome and facilitate foreign partners, including those from China, 
to co-operate in the field of oil and gas on the continental shelf of Vietnam on the basis of 
complying with Vietnamese laws.” According to Carl Thayer, China had obtained a classified 
document that noted Vietnam’s plans and used this to apply pressure on oil firms.70 He also 
claimed, at the time, that: 
We are now in a time where Chinese hard power is coming back into the 
equations. And as while the Vietnamese government doesn’t quite know how 
to react at the moment…. they seem to be hoping that by shutting down 
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criticism and negative publicity they can somehow secure a special 
relationship with China that can limit the damage. Certainly, the military is 
hopping mad. Hanoi must also cope with criticism from dissidents and exiles 
that see weakness in the face of China as a great nationalistic rallying point.71 
Nevertheless, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung travelled to China in a bid to alleviate 
tensions. He succeeded. During his meeting with Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao, the two 
countries promised to step up delineation of the Gulf of Tonkin Border. Regarding the South 
China Sea, they also agreed to “refrain from taking action that would complicate or magnify 
disputes.”72  Interestingly too, PetroVietnam signed a series of energy deals with Chinese 
partners.73  
China and Vietnam lived up to the promise to demarcate the border, completing it in 
January 2009.  But in May of that year events begin to hot up again. As part of its attempts to 
internationalise the dispute. Vietnam and Malaysia put forward a boundary demarcation case 
to the UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf. Vietnam submitted its case 
where it claimed sovereignty over both the Paracel and Spratly Islands.74 However, eyebrows 
were raised when China submitted a note that included a map with its infamous nine-dash line. 
China claimed that it had “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea.”75  
Then, later that month, China indirectly reasserted its claims when it announced its plan to 
impose fishing bans in parts of the South China Sea. Le Dung spoke out again, calling China’s 
ban a “violation of Vietnam’s territory.76  
Subsequently, Vietnamese Defence Minister General Phung Quang, giving rare public 
comments, called for a peaceful settlement based on international law. He also refused to rule 
out reports that Vietnam was about to spend $1.8 billion on Six Kilo-class submarines from 
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Russia, a deal that would be completed in December of that year. He went on to say that: “We 
are still in the process or researching, studying and exploring possible partners.”77     
Yet talks throughout the Summer and Fall between both parties continued, with Chinese 
Deputy Foreign Minister Wu Dawei and his Vietnamese counterpart Ho Xuan Son having talks 
in August.78 Then in October, Chinese Vice Premier Li Keqiang and Deputy Vietnamese Prime 
Minister, Nguyen Sinh Hung met on the sidelines of the China-ASEAN Expo where they stated 
their hope for “continued cooperation in trade, investment and infrastructure, and properly 
settle the South China Sea issues as to promote the stable development of bilateral ties.”79 
However, that very same month the ASEAN summit in Thailand saw the South China Sea 
issue omitted from the agenda. China, instead, pointed to the DOC and stated: “China is willing 
to begin talking with the countries (bilaterally is implicit here) under the framework of the 
declaration.”80 
China in November announced that it had decided to establish local governing bodies on 
Woody Island, the largest of the Paracels. Vietnam naturally responded with protestation. It 
also attempted to internationalise the issue when the Diplomatic Academy of Vietnam set up a 
two-day workshop in which experts could come and debate the topic in Hanoi. Vietnam also 
appeared to be posturing for internal balancing when President Nguyen Ming Triet called for 
the modernisation of the military. He claimed: “It is necessary to modernise the army by 
quickly developing military industries to upgrade technologies, weaponry and the army’s 
qualification.”81 
In March 2010, Vietnam protested to China after Chinese naval patrol boats seized 
Vietnamese fishing boats near the Paracel Islands. Then the following month Beijing sent two 
patrol ships to patrol the disputed waters.82 Vietnam lodged further protests in the summer after 
China announced a plan for tourism development. The plan incorporated the Spratly and 
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Paracel islands into the Chinese territory of Hainan and would promote air and sea tourism. A 
Vietnamese government spokeswoman was quoted as saying the “dispute goes against the 
spirit” of the DOC.83 In September, Chinese naval ships arrested nine Vietnamese fishermen. 
China demanded the boat owner pay a fine. A Vietnamese foreign ministry official claimed 
that the arrest and settlement were “irrational”. 
China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea was a cause for deep concern 
within Hanoi on three, intertwined, fronts. First, it served as an irritant in their economic 
relations. Vietnam’s rapid interdependence with China economically meant it served a vital 
part of Vietnam’s economic equation. Secondly, China’s assertiveness stoked domestic 
nationalism as discussed below. Lastly, China’s assertiveness not only threatened Vietnam’s 
physical sovereignty and territorial integrity, but also raised awkward questions regarding the 
leadership legitimacy, both from outside and from within.  
As the above analysis shows, a dual narrative began to emerge. On the one hand, bellicose 
statements reaffirming Vietnam’s sovereignty and promoting a strengthening of its naval and 
military capabilities while on the other Vietnam did, not want to provoke hostilities with China. 
Due to asymmetry, Hanoi tried to de-emphasise the South China Sea issue during bilateral 
meetings with China, and emphasise their cooperation rather the challenges.  
In terms of the collective memory of the Party, there was becoming an awareness that 
too much focus on economic cooperation would mean leaving itself exposed to China. This in 
turn would stoke domestic criticisms and facilitate a narrative of Vietnam not standing up to 
China. Additionally, too much interdependence with China meant that a broader approach to 
cooperation was, needed – both in terms of stepping up cooperation with different partners as 
well as broadening that cooperation to include defensive, political, and cultural cooperation in 
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addition to economic. Certainly, the events taking place in the South China Sea would be a key 
factor in the decision making at the Eleventh Party Congress.  
Deepening Defence Cooperation 
The previous chapter made note of Vietnam’s cautious approach to fostering deeper security 
relations. This was particularly the case with the United States. However, that does not mean 
to say defensive cooperation did not exist. According to Carl Thayer, ‘defence diplomacy’ is 
largely a product of the Minister of National Defense. Indeed, for analysis this paper adopts 
Thayer’s definition of Defence Diplomacy in that military defence relations refer to official 
defence relations between Vietnam’s Ministry of National Defense and its overseas 
counterpart. Furthermore, “Military diplomacy is conducted by means of the exchange of 
delegations, accrediting of defence attachés, defence cooperation programs, and equipment and 
arms sales and servicing agreements.”84  
Thayer notes that from the period 1990-2004, Vietnam hosted thirty-four ministerial 
delegations and made over 40 trips abroad. These delegation exchanges were largely made up 
of three countries: Laos, Cambodia, and China. The concentration of defensive cooperation 
with these three countries is obvious for geostrategic reasons. Vietnam had also bilaterally 
engaged in defensive cooperation with Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, and Malaysia.85 
At the multilateral level cooperative military activities were put into motion at the 2003 Bali 
Accords with the ASEAN Security Plan of Action set up to promote political development, a 
shaping and sharing of norms, conflict prevention, conflict, post-conflict peace-building and 
implementing mechanisms. Additionally, the ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting was set up 
to foster greater confidence-building amongst ASEAN countries. Yet Vietnam engaged in 
enhanced defensive dialogues with regional and global powers alike - in particular, the USA, 
India, Russia, Korea, and Japan.  
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The US: In June 2006, US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld visited Vietnam. The 
two sides agreed to increase military contacts and broaden their military cooperation at “all 
levels of the military.”86 The broadened, multifaceted approach to cooperation with the US was 
seen on Nguyen Tan Dung’s visit in June 2008. During his visit, he met George W. Bush where 
the two endorsed the establishment of a new political-defence and policy dialogue to deepen 
understanding of strategic and security issues between the two sides. Dung also met Secretary 
of Defense Robert Gates, where they exchanged views on the two sides defence cooperation.87 
However, evidence of the Chinese exerting pressure on Vietnam’s growing defensive, 
cooperative relationship with the US was seen in January 2008. U.S. Deputy Secretary of State 
John Negroponte was due to visit Hanoi. However, the trip was cancelled allegedly due to bad 
weather. But a Vietnamese Official, speaking off the record, mentioned that it was a result of 
Chinese diplomatic pressure. The Chinese did not want Vietnam asking for US assistance in 
dealing with the South China Sea – an issue it strictly viewed as a bilateral one.88 
Nevertheless, the US-Vietnam Political, Security and Defense Dialogue held its 
inaugural meeting in Hanoi in 2008. This annual dialogue would become a staple of Vietnam-
US defence cooperation. At the 2009 dialogue, held in Washington DC on June 8, the two sides 
focused on peacekeeping operations and training, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, 
maritime security and counterterrorism amongst other issues.89 The dialogue was described as 
a “natural byproduct of the two countries growing political, economic, cultural and social ties” 
with the overall aim of guaranteeing economic prosperity.  
Vietnamese Defense Minister General Phung Quang Thanh visited the US in December 
2009. Here he outlined that both sides had cooperated effectively in resolving long-standing 
issues from the Vietnam War. Thanh additionally stated that promoting mechanisms for 
dialogue would help develop greater cooperation on both sides. Yet, Thanh also noted the sharp 
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difference in perceptions of human rights. He met with Senators Jim Webb and John McCain 
where he urged them to stop a Vietnamese Human Rights Senate Bill from passing.90 
The following year, US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates paid a reciprocal visit to the 
US where the two sides reached a consensus to not only address remnants of the war, but also 
to engage in joint training of military officers and marine security, army medicine and disaster 
rescue.91 Shortly before Gates’ visit, US Assistant Secretary of State Andrew Shapiro and 
Admiral Robert Willard, head of the US Pacific Command, had visited Vietnam as part of the 
US-Vietnam Political, Security and Defense Dialogue where Williard stated that the “US Navy 
would continue to play a role in the security of the region”92  
The increase in ‘defence diplomacy’ resulted in tangible exercises between the US and 
Vietnam. In August 2010 the USS John McCain patrolled the South China Sea with 
Vietnamese officials being flown out before making a port call to Da Nang. Naval officials 
received a warm welcome from their Vietnamese counterparts in what was labelled a “cultural 
visit.” The following day the Vietnamese and US navies took part in a four-day training 
exercise in defence, emergency maintenance and repair, and fire prevention.93   
India:Yogendra Singh, writing it 2007, noted that Vietnam and India signed a fifteen-
point Defense Assistance Agreement in October 2000. However, he also noted that defence 
cooperation failed to materialise as a result of Vietnam’s focus on economic matters and 
“limited budgetary allocation for defence expenditure.”94 Indeed little had materialised since 
that signing.  However, in 2007 this changed.  First, Prime Minister Dung and his Indian 
counterpart, Manmohan Singh, inked a Strategic Partnership in July 2007. This Strategic 
Partnership provided the framework and impetus for greater cooperation at the political, 
economic, defensive, cultural, and technological level. 95  Subsequently, Indian Defence 
Minister, A.K. Anthony travelled to Hanoi where he met with Dung. The two sides announced 
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the setting up of a joint committee to draw up a comprehensive memorandum of understanding 
(MOU) on defence cooperation.96 Additionally, the visit coincided with India agreeing to 
transfer 5,000 naval spare parts to Vietnam to help in the renovation of its naval fleet.97 
The MOU came to fruition when Minister Antony and Vietnam’s Minister of Defense, 
General Phung Quang Thanh signed the agreement in November 2009.98 Indian Army Chief 
General K Singh became the first Indian Army Chief to visit Vietnam in 16 years during a July 
2010, four-day visit. During the visit, the two nations stressed that Vietnam and India share a 
“special and important relationship.”99 After the first ASEAN Plus Eight Defence Ministers’ 
meeting in October 2010, Indian Defence Minister Antony announced a host of measures to 
improve defence cooperation with Vietnam. This included providing support to Vietnam for 
enhancing its Armed Forces, training Army personnel in English and information technology. 
The two armies also agreed to conduct a joint jungle training warfare exercise in India.100  In 
May 2011, Indian Finance Minister, Pranab Mukherjee, noted that whilst economic 
cooperation had room for improvement, defence cooperation between the two sides was 
“robust” and “growing satisfactorily” and that India would continue to assist Vietnam in 
modernising its armed forces and boosting its technological capabilities.101  
Russia: Russia has historically been a strategic partner for Vietnam when it comes to 
defensive cooperation.102 Russia is Vietnam’s main source of military weapons and equipment. 
The two countries had set up an inter-governmental agreement on military cooperation back in 
1998. However, 2008 witnessed marked developments. Speaking in September, 2008, on the 
occasion of Vietnamese Defence Minister Phung Quang Thanh’s visit, Russian Defence 
Minister Anatoly Serdyukov spoke of a “growing trend” in Vietnam-Russia defence relations. 
He stated that: “Russia attaches great importance to broadening and strengthening friendly ties 
with Vietnam.” He also added that Russia remains committed to helping “equip the Vietnamese 
national armed forces with armaments and military hardware, to upgrade the weapons and 
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military hardware available, and to train Vietnamese military personnel at Russian military 
academies and at military training centres.”103 This resulted in tangible developments as the 
two sides reached an agreement to enhance defence training for Vietnamese students. This 
involved providing scholarships for Vietnamese students to study at military and civil 
academies.104  
Defensive relations developed further when President Nguyen Minh Triet visited 
Moscow the following month and the two countries set up a strategy of military and technical 
cooperation until 2020, by signing an inter-governmental memorandum. 105  Minister 
Serdyukov paid a visit to Vietnam in March 2010. On this occasion, he noted that 14 joint 
events were due to take place both on Russian and Vietnamese territory. Furthermore, he 
proclaimed that Russia would help Vietnam build a submarine base and provide other military 
assistance. 106 He also hailed the growth in arms sales from Russia to Vietnam. In fact, Vietnam 
became one of Russia’s biggest arms clients during this period. In 2007 Vietnam purchased 
two K-300P Bastion-P coastal defence systems, 40 Yakhont/SS-N-26 anti-ship missiles, and 
six Projects 10412/Svetlya patrol crafts.107  Then Vietnam momentously signed a $2 billion 
contract to purchase five Kilo-class submarines from Russia. Furthermore, it also agreed to buy 
12 Sukhoi Su 30MK2 fighter jets for $600 million.108  
Others: Deepening defensive cooperation also took place with numerous regional 
partners. South Korea Defence Minister Yoon Kwang-Ung and his Vietnamese counterpart 
Pham Van Tra met in Vietnam in May 2006 where they agreed to expand cooperation in the 
military-industrial sector and the exchange of personnel. This paved the way for a Vietnam 
People's Army and Naval delegation to visit South Korea in January 2008. The two sides agreed 
to explore setting up a military cooperation pact.109 Vietnam and Singapore set-up a Defence 
Policy Dialogue, with the inaugural meeting being held in December 2008. 110  Defence 
relations with Japan did not bloom when compared to others, however, during Nong Duc 
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Manh’s visit to Japan in April, 2009. The two countries agreed to promote security and 
defensive exchanges at a high-level.111 Tellingly, just two years later the two countries inked 
an MOU to deepen defensive ties – part of which includes exchanges of military delegations, 
naval goodwill visits, an annual defence-policy dialogue, and cooperation in military aviation 
and air defence.112   
As one can see, the plethora of exchanges, MOUs, its arms deals, and defence-orientated 
cooperation mechanisms put in place broadened Vietnam’s active participation at the 
international level. Of course, economic measures had significant priority over defensive ones, 
but Vietnam recognised the need to lay stronger foundations for cooperation, strategically 
designed to hedge against China due to its increased activities in the South China Sea along 
with the enhanced economic influence it was exerting over Vietnam. At the same time, this 
broad-based cooperation was designed to be non-aligned in nature and to fit into Vietnam’s 
‘three nos’ policy.  
Domestic Currents 
Vietnamese foreign policy has been conducted to promote economic growth and development 
so as to enhance the VCP’s legitimacy. However, it cannot be said that problems did not emerge 
with such an economically-oriented agenda. Writing in 2006, Carl Thayer noted that 
“Vietnam’s accomplishments after 20 years of Doi Moi are undeniable. If current trends 
continue, Vietnam is destined to emerge as a major regional power. Vietnam’s success, 
however, has stirred up cross currents that operate beneath the surface.”113 The currents he is 
referring to are calls for a more pluralistic, engaging form of democracy, corruption, and 
nationalistic responses to Chinese assertiveness. All of these issues have become intrinsically 
linked, and are creating fertile ground for greater domestic considerations for Vietnamese 
foreign policy and indeed their analysis is highly relevant for understanding future Vietnamese 
foreign policymaking.  
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Even in the lead up to the Tenth Party Congress, Vietnam became engulfed in its largest 
democratic movement to date. The Bloc 8404 movement emerged in early 2006, after 118 
people issued a Manifesto on Freedom and Democracy for Vietnam. This was a broad, diverse 
network of dissidents that would go on to publish a fortnightly publication both in hard and 
soft copy format. By May of that same year the manifesto had 424 followers and would go on 
to reach over 2,000. With the eyes of the world upon Hanoi in the lead up to the 2006 APEC 
Summit, the VCP’s response was initially subdued, but shortly before the summit began, 
leading members were placed under house arrests. These members were eventually put on trial, 
including Nguyen Van Ly. They were convicted around the time of the one-year anniversary 
of the start of the movement. 114  Whilst the movement was short-lived, it was the most 
significant democratic movement to take place in modern Vietnam, asking significant 
questions about the VCP’s handling of corruption. 
Occurring at roughly the same time was a massive corruption scandal known as the 
PMU18 affair. In December, 2005, a traffic-police officer - Bui Quang Hung - was arrested in 
connection with illegal betting on European football matches. This was linked to Bui Tien 
Dong, the boss of Project Management Unit 18, a unit of the Ministry of Transport that handled 
projects, often funded by the World Bank, Japan, and European countries., Former PMU18 
boss, Nguyen Viet Tien had subsequently become Deputy Transport Minister. The affair cost 
Dong’s boss, Dao Dinh Binh his job, and indeed Tien was arrested and accused of causing $2 
million cost overruns on a bridge project.115 
The affair was extremely embarrassing for the VCP, particularly as it wanted to be seen 
as taking a tough line on corruption. But things began to get worse. Vietnamese media alleged 
that the Head of the Prime Minister’s Office, his deputy, and Chief Investigator at the Ministry 
of Public Security, Cao Ngoc Oanh, were involved in the PMU 18 affair. The affair even 
touched the upper echelon of the VCP. Dang Hoang Hai, the son-in-law of Party General 
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Secretary Nong Duc Manh, was alleged to be an ally of Nguyen Viet Tien. This was never 
published in the Vietnamese press, but according to author Bill Hayton, common knowledge 
at the time.116 
Nevertheless, the Tenth Party Congress saw all those involved in the scandal missing out 
on promotion. Bui Tien Dung was sentenced to thirteen years for gambling and seven for 
bribery. Others, such as Cao Ngoc Oanh, were cleared of any wrongdoing. The Party even 
restored Deputy Transport Minister Nguyen Viet Tien’s Party Membership. The VCP also 
pushed back against journalists who had reported on the case with two prolific journalists 
convicted for “abusing free and democratic rights to breach the interest of the state and legal 
rights of organisations and citizens.”117 
Certainly, the Tenth Party Congress dedicated a significant amount of attention to 
“resolutely preventing and fighting corruption and wastefulness.”118  Prime Minister Dung 
echoed these sentiments at a National Assembly Session when he noted that the fight against 
corruption “remains serious”.119 He again stressed this dogged approach to fighting corruption 
in February, 2007 when he stated: “It is a danger threatening the existence of a regime. 
Therefore, preventing and pushing back corruption is a special task of the Party and 
Government.”120  Corruption on the service may seem like a domestic factor, but it can affect 
investor confidence and irk governments who contribute ODA to Vietnam, thus threatening 
the development of the nation. In 2006 investor circles and relevant ministry officials claimed 
that corruption remained a “great challenge to Vietnam’s development process.”121 
The VCP was taking the issue of corruption seriously, and recognised the potential 
impact it could have on aid donors. The Consultative Group (CG), set up in 1993, was a 
platform for discussion between government and donor agencies on development policies and 
donor pledges. At its mid-term meeting in June, 2007 a large proportion of its agenda was 
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dedicated to discussing corruption.122 The Government informed leading donors to Vietnam of 
the measures the State had introduced to combat corruption. This included the establishment 
of a judicial committee to monitor anti-corruption and to integrate greater involvement from 
mass media and social organisations. 123  Government inspectors were keen to stress the 
successes in their fight against corruption, highlighting the PMU-18 case.   
Yet the fight against corruption took a major international hit in 2008 when Japan's 
Pacific Consultants International (PCI) fell subject to prosecution in Japan for corruption 
charges. Japan and Vietnam set up a joint committee in September 2008 to prevent corruption 
in relation to Japanese ODA. However, during the Japanese based trial, employees of Japan 
PCI revealed that they had given Huynh Ngoc Sy bribes. Sy was the former director of the 
East-West Highway Project, a VND9.9 Trillion project that drew 65 percent of its funds from 
Japanese ODA. Sy was subsequently suspended during an investigation. Tokyo acted swiftly 
to suspend aid to Vietnam, launching an investigation into the matter.124 Prime Minister Dung 
ordered Vietnamese agencies to work closely with Japanese officials working on the case.  
Japan agreed to resume aid in April 2009 after Deputy Chairman of the Japan 
International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Arai Izumi proclaimed that Vietnam had taken 
seriously the anti-corruption fighting measures initiated by JICA. In a meeting with Izumi, 
Nguyen Tan Dung stated: “Vietnam is fully determined to co-operate with Japan to take 
measures for the prevention of corruption in projects founded with Japanese official 
development assistance.”125  Dr Le Dang Doanh, former chief of the Central Institute for 
Economic Management and speaking after another Japan-Vietnam ODA related corruption 
scandal in 2014, noted that such incidents make it harder for Vietnam to borrow ODA and 
therefore affects Vietnamese development as well as eroding public trust in the government 
further.126 
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Certainly, the event brought a reality check to the VCP in that corruption can seriously 
hinder development efforts. Soon after the PCI scandal, President Nguyen Minh Triet approved 
the ascendance to the UN Convention Against Corruption on June 30, 2009. Government 
General Inspector Tran Van Truyen, speaking, shortly after Vietnam ascendance, said: 
“Vietnam considers the fight against corruption a national policy and a matter of survival for 
the count” He proclaimed that Vietnam is “doing all it can” to combat corruption.127  The 
following December at the CG meeting, Nguyen Tan Dung again highlighted the importance  
of ODA, stating that it “treasures every cent of it.” Indeed, he pointed out that anti-corruption 
measures needed to be accelerated in order to effectively use this resource.128 
As already mentioned, China’s assertive actions in the South China Sea provoked 
domestic outrage and stoked nationalistic outbursts within Vietnam. An interesting component 
of the anti-Chinese conundrum and the impacts it has on the legitimacy of the Party can be 
seen in the Bauxite Mining Crisis.  The VCP placed Bauxite mining as a key component of 
Vietnamese economic development, following the Tenth Party Congress. Bauxite undergoes a 
transformation process before it is converted into aluminium.  However, the conversion process 
produces two harmful side effects, such as red dust and red mud. Shortly after the Tenth Party 
Congress, the Vietnamese National Coal-Mineral Industries Group signed an agreement with 
the China Aluminium Company to build two alumina plants at an estimated investment of $1.6 
billion. 
In 2008, environmentalists and scientists voiced their discontent at the environmental 
impact of such an agreement. These voices largely went unheard, but the government was 
forced to take notice after the legendary general Vo Nguyen Giap wrote a letter asking the 
government to re-evaluate its stance. He claimed that it would displace ethnic minorities in the 
region, negatively affect the environment, and provide China with greater economic leverage 
over Vietnam. In addition, he asserted that it could threaten Vietnam’s national security due to 
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the influx of Chinese workers stemming from the project. Indeed, the national security 
dimension of Giap’s assertions was worrying for the VCP.129 
Criticism from such an elite member of the VCP could not go ignored and the 
government responded by hosting a seminar on the environmental impacts of bauxite mining. 
By this point, however, the opposition had spread to a broad coalition of factions. The “Chinese 
threat” galvanised the debates.130 These factions subsequently filed a petition, one initially 
containing 135 signatures but would later rise to 2,746. Vo Nguyen Giap continued unabated 
with his opposition to the project. In response, and in a conciliatory manner, the government 
authorised the National Assembly, ministries, and local authorities to conduct regular reviews 
of the bauxite mining progress. Nevertheless, Nguyen Tan Dung re-affirmed that bauxite 
mining was still a fundamental policy of the Party.131 Still, the movement had asked awkward 
questions of Vietnam’s growing economic relationship with China.  
This event was unique given its ability to weave various themes together – ones of 
environmentalism, national security and corruption. All of this stemmed from the VCP’s 
alleged collusion with China. In combination with Vietnam’s problems with corruption, this 
issue certainly led to a questioning of legitimacy by a vast sector of society, and therefore will 
have affected the regime’s collective memory. The domestic currents would continue to grow, 
but it is evident that a purely economically driven approach to development was ‘double-edged 
sword’. This would have very little direct effect on foreign policy in the meantime, but the 
currents would continue to grow.  
Conclusion 
Twenty years after Doi Moi had been implemented, the future looked bright for Vietnam. It 
successfully hosted the APEC summit, was about to join the WTO, and was playing a more 
prominent role in ASEAN. Five years later, however, the structural changes caused by Chinese 
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assertiveness and the 2008 financial crisis, along with the domestic undercurrents indirectly 
caused by twenty years of economic - but no political - reform meant that the VCP was in a 
more precarious situation than five years prior.  
Adding to this complexity was the growing trade imbalance with China, reawakening the 
memories for Vietnamese policymakers of the country’s previous dependency on the Soviet 
Union. The asymmetries in the relationship only complicated this further. Indeed from 2012 
onwards, a plethora of articles, journals, and periodicals began speaking of Vietnam’s 
dependency on China.132 This had both international and domestic implications.  
Internationally it meant Vietnam would need to seek alternative trade networks to, at the 
very least, alleviate the rapid deficit it was creating with China. Furthermore, it would need to 
broaden defensive cooperation, making it clear that it was not aligning against China. This 
required a subtle but firm approach. Similarly, Chinese actions provoked nationalistic 
tendencies and provoked worrying protests.  
The domestic undercurrents would grow stronger, and therefore a foreign policy that 
incorporated a broadened approach would lead to a greater sense of autonomy and balance 
amongst Vietnamese foreign relations. Jorn Dosch proclaimed that: “Vietnam’s foreign policy 
is becoming affected by the input and demands from newly emerging groups and shifting 
structures of influences within the state-party apparatus.” 133 Certainly, the collective memory 
of the Party will have been shaken by the fact that its legitimacy was being called into question 
- both in terms of its internal and external posturing.  
Therefore, the Eleventh Party Congress would see Vietnam attempt to step its integration 
and broaden its cooperation even further. Furthermore, it would begin to implement a stronger 
framework to facilitate multidirectional foreign policy, promoting autonomy within the 
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international arena, whilst maintaining its commitment to integration and trade liberalisation. 
These mechanisms will be explored in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 6 
Mechanisms of Vietnamese Multidirectional Foreign Policy 
By 2011, multidirectionalism had gone from strength-to-strength, leading to improved bilateral 
ties, enhanced engagement within international organizations, and greater integration into the 
international political economy. As a result, economic development had continued to develop 
rapidly. By 2010, Vietnam’s GDP stood at $101.6 billion, 3.26 times higher than that of 2000.1 
It was a labelled as a hallmark of how economic liberalisation can lift a country out of poverty. 
Yet as the previous chapter outlined, the 2006-2011 period saw a complicated internal and 
external situation develop. As a result, greater efforts were needed to bolster the VCP’s ability 
to defend its national interests – continued stability to ensure economic development, 
protecting its sovereignty and territorial integrity, and promoting laws – whilst implicitly 
maintaining the VCP’s grip on power.  
 As such, the Eleventh Party Congress again re-affirmed Vietnam’s commitment to 
multidirectionalism but stressed broader, extensive, and proactive measures to continue to 
diversify, multilateralise, and integrate into the international political economy. As such 
stronger framework for carrying this out were necessary. But what framework and mechanism 
would be put in place to fully broaden Vietnam’s multidirectional approach? This is the 
question this culminating chapter seeks to ask. First it briefly outlines the developments at the 
Eleventh Party Congress and beyond, then examines Vietnam’s proliferation of strategic 
partnerships, FTAs and proactive multilateralism as the key mechanisms for broadening its 
multidirectional approach. 
The Eleventh Party Congress and Beyond 
The Eleventh Party Congress Documents, speaking on foreign policy, marked a theme of 
continuation. It states that Vietnam wishes to: 
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Implement a foreign policy of independence, self-reliance, peace, cooperation 
and development; diversify relations, and be proactive about international 
integration’ be a reliable friend, parent and a responsible member of the 
international community…. The tasks off foreign relation work are to 
maintain a peaceful environment and create favourable conditions for 
speeding up industrialization and modernization while defending 
independence sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity; to raise the country’s 
status.2 
 However, two important points are to be noted. First a strong emphasis on 
sovereignty and territorial integrity was seen as a result of the complex nature of the 
world situation. Secondly, a strong emphasis on proactive integration meant that Vietnam 
needed work harder to improve the quality and depth of integration.  The previous chapter 
demonstrated how complex the international and domestic situation had become for 
Vietnam. Rising tensions in the South China Sea, yet close, and certainly necessary, 
political and economic cooperation with China, exemplified this complexity. The anti-
Chinese sentiment arising from discontent was also of considerable worry for the VCP. 
These things certainly asked questions about the VCP’s ability to protect Vietnam’s 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. Carl Thayer has noted that the spread of anti-China 
sentiment had added a degree of complications to the legitimacy of the VCP.3  
 The Eleventh Party Congress made note of the “complicated and unpredictable 
developments.”4  The same report also made not of “hostile forces” that stirred up “subversive 
unresest” and “intensified peaceful evolution.” These hostile could be interpreted as a signal to 
those rallying around the anti-Chinese narrative to pursue a pro-democracy based movement. 
Nevertheless, a subtle debate regarding the China issue from taking place. The Eleventh Party 
Congress also stated that: 
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The objectives of national defense and security are to firmly safeguard the 
Fatherland’s independence, sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity, protect 
the Party, the State, the people and the socialist regime, maintain peace and 
political stability, ensure national security, social order and safety; 
proactively prevent and defeat all schemes of hostile forces against the 
revolutionary cause of our people. 5 
 As such, a large portion of the congress highlighted the need to modernize the People’s 
Army and People’s Public Security forces and strengthen technology, industry, and 
infrastructure. Yet the Eleventh Party Congress also recognised the significant achievements 
of Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy claiming that it had “created a new positon for the 
country,” something that had brought about challenges in terms of economic development and 
protecting national independence.6 It had significantly broadened and strengthened external 
relations proactively engaged with the international community.  
 In recognition of Vietnam’s proactive measures, the Eleventh Party Congress elevated 
integration to "proactive and positive international integration,” with a key focus on diversity. 
In 2013 the politburo issued Resolution 22 which significantly broadened the scope of 
“proactive and positive” integration, focusing not only on the economy, but also areas of 
politics, defence, security, cultural, and social fields. Subsequently, Prime Minister Nguyen 
Tan Dung issued Directive No. 15/CT-TTg which led to the establishment of a National 
Steering Committee on International Integration. This included two inter-agency steering 
committees, one dealing with integration in politics, security, and national defence. The other 
dealt with culture and society, science and technology, and education and training. Ultimately, 
Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy serves its national interest of maintaining a peaceful 
and stable environment, protecting national independence, sovereignty, and boosting 
Vietnam’s position to bolster national construction and defence.  
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Strategic Partnerships 
Strategic partnerships have proliferated since the turn of the millennium and like 
multidirectionalism, a multipolar world is conducive towards their formation. Strategic 
partnerships are goal driven rather than threat driven.7 They are comprehensive agreements 
that signify a long-lasting commitment by two actors to establish a close working relationship 
across a significant number of policy areas and do not invoke the need for an identified threat.8 
Similarly, they are a bilateral means of deepening cooperation to tackle global problems 
stemming from non-traditional security threats and, to neutralise potential conflict areas. 
Vietnam targets strategic/comprehensive partnerships as a means to elevate Vietnam’s 
relations and its standing in the international system, while taking advantage of cooperation to 
bolster national defence and construction, maintain peace, stability, and development in the 
world. 9  These efforts are also not antagonising and represent Vietnam's commitment to 
peaceful solutions and cooperation as well as reflecting Vietnam’s hedging strategy.   
Within the Vietnamese foreign policy lexicon there exist several terms to denote the 
level and the amount of mechanisms to implement their partnerships. They are, in rising order 
of depth: comprehensive partnerships, strategic partnerships, extensive strategic partnerships, 
strategic-comprehensive partnerships and comprehensive-strategic cooperative partnerships.10 
The difference in meaning between partnerships is rather blurred and Vietnamese foreign 
policy makers themselves have yet to come up with a clear definition.11 The contents of each 
partnership varies from partnership to partnership, with comprehensive partnerships generally 
being less dense in nature.  In coordination with its diverse, integrated, and more proactive 
foreign policy, Vietnam, since 2001, has established strategic/comprehensive partnerships with 
sixteen different countries and upgraded three existing strategic partnerships to extensive 
strategic partnerships or strategic-comprehensive partnerships. These agreements are broad, 
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comprehensive agreements that facilitate cooperation across a wide array of areas such as 
economic, political, diplomatic, defence and security, scientific, and cultural.  
Table 1 Vietnam’s Strategic Partners12 
Country Partnership Status Date Agreed 
China Comprehensive-strategic 
cooperative partnership 
2008 (renamed in 2013) 
Russia Strategic-comprehensive 
partnership 
2001(initially a strategic 
partnership) 2012 
India Strategic-comprehensive 
partnership 
2007 (initially a strategic 
partnership) 2016 
Japan Extensive strategic 
partnership 
2006 (initially a strategic 
partnership) 2014 
Spain Strategic partnership 2009 
South Korea Strategic partnership 2009 
The UK Strategic partnership 2010 
Germany Strategic partnership 2011 
Italy Strategic partnership 2013 
France Strategic partnership 2013 
Thailand Strategic partnership 2013 
Indonesia Strategic partnership 2013 
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Singapore Strategic partnership 2013 
The Philippines Strategic partnership 2015 
Australia Strategic Partnership 2009 (initially a 
comprehensive partnership) 
2018 
The US Comprehensive partnership 2013 
 
Vietnam currently maintains comprehensive partnerships with eleven countries, most 
notably the United States and Australia. Australia initially committed to a comprehensive 
strategic partnership, rejecting the term strategic, in 2009. In 2010 a plan of action was agreed 
upon to provide a framework within which cooperation could be identified. 13  Vietnam-
Australia relations failed to take-off after this period until March 2015 when Nguyen Tan Dung, 
on a visit to Australia, witnessed the signing of a Declaration of Enhancing Australia-Vietnam 
Comprehensive Partnership. They also expressed their view to establishing a strategic 
partnership sometime in the future. This came to fruition in March 2018. The agreement 
contained five areas of cooperation:  political cooperation, economic and development 
cooperation, defensive and legal, cultural and technological, and regional and international 
cooperation.14 
The landmark US-Vietnam comprehensive partnership was agreed in 2013. The 
partnership outlines five areas of cooperation: maritime capacity building, economic 
engagement, climate change and environmental issues, education cooperation, and promoting 
respect for human rights. This partnership confirms Vietnam as a geostrategic player in the 
region. Although the partnership also contains a clause on human rights, a traditional sticking 
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point of Vietnam-US relations, there was no mention of human rights abuses during Prime 
Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s meeting with Trump in May 2017.15  
 Vietnam has entered into strategic partnerships with five different European countries. 
In 2009, after President Nguyen Minh Triet’s visit, Spain and Vietnam reached an agreement 
to cooperate in politics, economics, culture, and education. Although Vietnam-Spain bilateral 
trade reached $2.5 billion in 2014, Spanish State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Ignacio Ybanez 
Rubio admits that their partnership is yet to reach its full potential. 16  In 2011, Vietnam 
established a strategic partnership with Germany, designed to strengthen political, economic 
and cultural relations, and development cooperation. Since 2013 there has been a narrower 
focus on education and training, energy, and the environment.17 Vietnam also signed a strategic 
partnership with Italy in 2013 in which they strengthened cooperation in areas of politics, 
global and regional issues, economic relations, development assistance, cultural, education, 
and scientific and technological cooperation, and defence and security.18 
Arguably the two most dense and important European strategic partnerships are with 
the United Kingdom and France. Vietnam and the United Kingdom agreed a strategic 
partnership in 2010 to cooperate in seven key areas: political, global, and regional issues, trade 
and investment, sustainable socio-economic development, education and training, science and 
technology, security and defence, and people-to-people links.19 The year 2015 also saw the 
first visit of a British Prime Minister to Vietnam and in April 2016, British Foreign Minister 
Phillip Hammond met with his Vietnamese counterpart to discuss greater cooperation in 
education including the establishment of a Vietnam-UK Institute in Da Nang. In June 2016, 
Minister of Defence Earl Howe met with Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh to discuss 
future defence cooperation.20 Furthermore, on a visit to Paris in 2013, Nguyen Tan Dung 
signed a joint statement on a Vietnam-France strategic partnership that aimed to cooperate in 
the fields of politics, national defence-security, economics and trade, investment, development, 
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culture, education, scientific research, and law.21 A state visit by French President Francois 
Hollande in September 2016 reaffirmed the two countries’ commitment to strengthen relations 
and cooperation.  
 Vietnam has signed strategic partnerships with four ASEAN partners: Thailand, 
Indonesia, Singapore and the Philippines. The first was Thailand in 2013 after Secretary 
General Nguyen Phu Trong established a strategic partnership with five main pillars: political 
relations, defence and security cooperation, economic cooperation, social-cultural cooperation, 
and regional and international cooperation.22 Almost simultaneously, President Truong Tan 
Sang visited Indonesia to establish a strategic partnership. As well as improving cooperation 
in the fields of water, food, and energy security, the partnership aimed to create regular 
opportunities for dialogue exchanges regarding regional security issues, namely territorial 
disputes in the South China Sea.23 Given that Indonesia is not a claimant state, although it has 
been embroiled in disputes with China regarding excursions into its exclusive economic zone, 
Vietnam’s support for a peaceful resolution to the issue was bolstered. To celebrate the 40th 
anniversary of diplomatic ties, Singapore and Vietnam signed a strategic partnership in 
September 2013. This strategic partnership strengthened cooperation in five key areas: political, 
economic cooperation, security and defence cooperation, bilateral cooperation, and 
cooperation in bilateral forums.24 Vietnam’s latest strategic partnership is with the Philippines, 
which it signed in November 2015. This strategic partnership agreed to enhance political, 
economic, defence and security, maritime and ocean affairs, scientific and technical, socio-
cultural, and multilateral cooperation.25 
 In 2009 Vietnam began a strategic partnership with South Korea after then President 
Truong Tan Sang’s visit to Seoul. The two countries expanded cooperation in politics, science 
and technology, judicial, economics, trade, and security. 26  These relations were further 
strengthened economically when Vietnam and South Korea signed a free trade agreement that 
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was put into place in December 2015. The two countries also established a ministerial-level 
joint committee and subcommittees on goods trades, customs, trade defence, sanitary and 
phytosanitary measures, and technical barriers to trade.27 Japan became the first country to 
enhance its strategic partnership to an extensive strategic partnership. The declaration contains 
sixty-nine points and seven areas of cooperation that reflect the two countries’ political trust 
and deep development of bilateral relations. Building on a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) signed between the Vietnamese and Japanese defence ministers in 2011, this strategic 
partnership created enhanced areas of exchanges for military and defence personnel.28 
 Russia was Vietnam’s first strategic partner back in 2001 and in 2012 the two countries 
upgraded their relations to that of a comprehensive strategic partnership, focusing on seven 
areas: oil and gas cooperation, energy cooperation for hydro and nuclear power, military 
equipment and technology, trade and investment, science and technology, education and 
training, as well as culture and tourism. Since Russia is Vietnam’s biggest provider of military 
equipment and technology, this helps Vietnam modernise and upgrade its navy and military. 
Vietnam’s first planned Nuclear Power Plant, Ninh Thuan-1, was largely Russian financed and 
over 300 students studied in Russia in preparation for this project. However, the National 
Assembly ultimately cancelled this plan in November 2016, citing economic reasons.29 But the 
close cooperation between Vietnam and Russia signalled the depth and degree of cooperative 
measures in place between the two countries. On a brief visit to Hanoi, Indian Prime Minister 
Narendra Modi met with his Vietnamese counterpart Nguyen Xuan Phuc and announced the 
upgrading of the India-Vietnam strategic partnership to that of a comprehensive strategic 
partnership, a title previously only held with Russia.30 The visit of Modi also involved a $500 
million line of credit for defence cooperation, providing a boost to Vietnam’s physical military 
capabilities.31  
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Given the historical and geopolitical significance of China, a strong friendship is of 
paramount importance. Therefore, its partnership is labelled as a comprehensive-strategic 
cooperative partnership. This partnership was established in 2008 (originally as a strategic 
partnership that was subsequently upgraded a year later to a strategic cooperative partnership 
and then renamed to its current title in 2013). This partnership is a “dense network of party, 
state, defence, and multilateral measures” to support this highly valuable, yet at times strained, 
relationship.32 The Joint Steering Committee, set up by the partnership, has met nine times 
since its inception. This committee contributes to healthy relations by acting as a platform for 
consensus on a range of subjects.  Similarly, Vietnam and China have conducted an annual 
Border Defense Friendly Exchange since 2014. Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh 
hailed the program on its third border exchange in March 2016, noting its ability to “strengthen 
mutual political trust.”33 
However, the fourth exchange was abruptly cancelled after territorial issues pertaining 
to the South China Sea were allegedly raised. According to Carl Thayer, Vice Chairman of the 
Central Military Commission, General Fan Changlong asked Vietnamese officials to cease 
drilling in several areas of the South China Sea to which a Vietnamese official strongly 
defended Vietnam’s sovereignty.34 As a result, Fan left Hanoi and cancelled the meeting. The 
event led to a highly charged diplomatic spat in which China, allegedly, threatened the 
Vietnamese ambassador with military force if Vietnam did not stop drilling. Vietnam, wary of 
its economic dependence on China as well as uncertainty regarding Trump’s commitment to 
the region, appeared to back down.35 This event not only undermined political trust between 
the two countries but yet again exposed the contradictions that exist in Vietnam’s relations with 
China.  
Ideological loyalty means a close relationship with China is inevitable and falls firmly 
in line with ensuring the regime’s protected values are secured.36 Economic dependence also 
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means disputes are best resolved peacefully. Yet as demonstrated, China is Vietnam’s principle 
threat towards its sovereignty. Vietnam’s strategic objectives are fostering cooperation, 
economic development, and a peaceful environment while at the same time maintaining its 
territorial integrity. Recent events bring home the importance of a multidirectional foreign 
policy and Vietnam no doubt wishes to cooperate with China as much as possible, yet at the 
same time emphasise its friendly relations with all so that its objectives are maintained.  
 Ultimately strategic partnerships are multi-faceted agreements that deepen bilateral 
relations. Similarly, they offer a wide range of benefits for Vietnam and its partners, all the 
way from economic development, to greater investment opportunities, to enhanced security. It 
is important to note that strategic partnerships incorporate defence aspects, defence agreements, 
and areas of security cooperation. These offer Vietnam opportunities to boost its capabilities 
in a non-threatening way; something that allows Vietnam to strive towards its objective of 
ensuring the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity without jeopardizing its 
relations with China. In fact, since the Twelfth Party Congress in January 2016 Vietnam has 
identified acceleration of its defensive and security cooperation as part of its strategy for 
integration by 2020.37  
The diverse array of strategic partnerships means that Vietnam is not over-reliant on 
one particular partner. Carl Thayer states that: “The purpose of strategic partnerships is to 
promote comprehensive cooperation across a number of areas and to give each major power 
equity in Vietnam’s stability and development in order to ensure Vietnam’s non-alignment and 
strategic autonomy.”38 The diversity in its relations also dampens, or at the very least cushions, 
potential uncertainties and potential areas of conflict. Although Donald Trump’s election in 
2016 cast uncertainty as to America’s commitment to the region, Vietnamese Prime-Minister 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc will have been re-assured by his May, 2017 visit to the White House. The 
two countries issued a joint statement for enhancing the comprehensive partnership in which 
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they pledged to: “Continue high-level contacts and exchanges of delegations, including through 
regular dialogue between the US Secretary of State and Vietnam’s Minister for Foreign Affairs 
to discuss measures to enhance the bilateral Comprehensive Partnership.”39 The statement also 
re-affirmed the importance of freedom of navigation partols in addition to both countries 
commitment to resolving territorial disputes peacefully and in accordance with international 
law. Given the ability of strategic partnerships to elevate and diversify Vietnam’s bilateral 
relations, providing more autonomy in the process, strategic partnerships thus represent a 
mechanism of a multidirectional foreign policy.  
Trade Agreements 
Since Doi Moi Vietnam has no longer defined security solely as defending national sovereignty 
and territorial integrity but has expanded this concept to that of comprehensive security, one 
that incorporates economic, political, and social factors as well.40 Boosting these factors also 
creates social and political stability. Since the 2000’s Vietnam has had impressive growth rates 
with its GDP usually hovering around 6 percent.41 This has also led to a significant drop in 
poverty with Vietnam often touted as a success story for poverty alleviation. 42  In 2009, 
Vietnam became a middle-income country with a per capita GDP over $1,200.43 Economic 
development is a core strategic interest for Vietnam and a multidirectional foreign policy helps 
Vietnam to achieve this through trade agreements. Vietnam is also keen to avoid becoming 
economically dependent on one country, as it had done during the Cold War when more than 
90 percent of its trade was conducted with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries.44 
The Ministry of Industry and Trade has outlined trade agreements as a “platform to further 
open to the outside, speed up domestic reforms, and serve as an effective approach to integrate 
into the global economy and strengthen economic cooperation.” 45  Trade deals are a key 
component of fostering integration, cooperation, and promoting economic growth.  They have 
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had and will continue to have, a significant impact on Vietnam’s development, which will, in 
turn, contribute towards Vietnamese strategic goals.46  
In recent years, Vietnam has put into place numerous trade agreements at the bi and 
multilateral level. What this demonstrates is that Vietnam has actively, and consistently 
pursued trade agreements, deals that reap a lot of economic benefits and act as a mechanism 
for pursuing a multidirectional foreign policy.  Vietnam’s current biggest trading partner is 
China with trade in 2015 valued roughly around $95 billion.47 China is also Vietnam’s most 
important trading partner, given its geostrategic location and pure economic size. Since the 
ASEAN-China free trade agreement was signed in 2000, imports from China have risen from 
7.3 per cent to 30 per cent of total imports, and exports have risen from 7.4 per cent to 11 per 
cent of total exports.48 Vietnam relies heavily on China for the import of cheap raw materials 
that contribute towards Vietnam’s vibrant textile industries. Worryingly, as the vast gap in 
growth between exports and imports to China shows, is that Vietnam’s trade deficit with China 
has grown remarkably in recent years. For example, it reached $32.3 billion in 2015.49  
 The lop-sided nature of Vietnam-China trade relations opens Vietnam to potential 
unfair trading practices as well as giving China considerable economic influence over 
Vietnam.50 Vietnam does not want to repeat the mistake it made during the Cold War of 
becoming economically over dependent on one power.  In line with its multidirectional foreign 
policy Vietnam is developing trade agreements with other countries to reduce its dependence 
on China, most notably the US, Japan, South Korea, the EU, Russia, and Central Asian states 
among others.  
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Table 2 Vietnam’s current bilateral trade agreements (Sally 2013).51 
Trading Partners Nature of Agreement Status of Agreement as of 
December 2016 
Chile Free Trade Agreement Signed and in effect 
Japan Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
Signed and in effect 
South Korea Free Trade Agreement Signed and in effect 
The Comprehensive and 
Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(12 members) 
Regional Trade Agreement Signed but not in effect  
The Eurasian Customs 
Union (Armenia, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia) 
Free Trade Agreement Signed and in effect 
EU Free Trade Agreement Signed but not in effect 
Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (16 
members 
Regional Trade Agreement Negotiations ongoing 
The European Free Trade 
Association (EFTA) 
Free Trade Agreement Negotiations ongoing 
160 
 
 
 
Israel Free Trade Agreement Negotiations ongoing 
 
During the 2000’s, Vietnam’s most significant trade agreement was the US-Vietnam 
Bilateral Trade Agreement which came into force in 2001.52 After five years, the amount of 
trade between the two countries increased significantly, diversified Vietnam’s exports, and 
helped pave the way for complete integration when it joined the WTO in 2007. Unfortunately 
for Vietnam, the recently concluded Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) is essentially a dead deal 
given Donald Trump’s withdrawal shortly after his inauguration.  Vietnam was potentially one 
of the biggest winners from the TPP. This twelve-block trade deal would have offered a host 
of benefits for Vietnam, such as significantly boosting exports, in particular for the clothing 
industry and would have helped enforce much needed structural changes to state-owned 
enterprises while boosting Vietnam-US trade relations. 53  In September 2016 Vietnamese 
Minister for Planning and Investment Nguyen Chi Dung urged outgoing President Obama to 
ratify the agreement, showing how important a deal it was to Vietnam.54  
Currently Vietnam has a trade surplus with the US in excess of $32 billion.55 Even after 
Trump’s election, however, Vietnam took the diplomatic initiative to negate any potential 
backlash from Trump’s bellicose statements on countries holding a large trade surplus with the 
US. They utilised a Washington lobbying firm to seek numerous pathways to Trump, setting 
up a phone call between Nguyen Xuan Phuc and Trump a month before the US President took 
office and sending the Foreign Minister Pham Binh Minh on a trip to Washington in April 2017 
where he met with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson.56   Similarly, trade featured heavily on 
Nguyen Xuan Phuc’s May visit to Washington with the two countries affirming their 
commitment to promoting bilateral trade.  
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Nguyen Xuan Phuc has indicated that TPP or not, Vietnam will continue on its path 
towards increased economic integration and that other trade agreements remain strategically in 
place.57 Tellingly, a revived TPP deal without the US has subsequently risen from the ashes of 
the original TPP; the Comprehensive Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP). The deal, despite some degree of hesitation from Canadian Prime Minister Justin 
Trudeau, was agreed in principle at the 2017 APEC summit in Da Nang. Although a watered 
down version of the TPP (22 provisions of the original TPP provision have been suspended), 
it was formally agreed upon by all 11 countries at a meeting in Tokyo the following month. 
Then in March 2018 all members met in Santiago to formally sign this historic agreement.58 
The CPTPP has been labelled as progressive so to push back against the rising anti-free 
trade narrative developed in the Trumponian era. Certainly this is in Vietnam’s interests given 
its commitment to trade liberalisation. The agreement has been touted to lead to better business 
opportunities, and access to wider markets. A World Bank report claimed that the CPTPP 
would, even by conservative estimates, boost Vietnamese GDP by 1.1% by 2030.59 The CPTPP 
also enhanced opportunities for bilateral engagement. It is telling that shortly after the 
agreement both Vietnam and Australia agreed to up their comprehensive partnership to a 
strategic partnership. 
Regardless, Vietnam has various trade agreements in place that will supplement any 
failure of TPP. In fact, Vietnam is a member of the sixteen country Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP). RCEP member states account for roughly 3.4 billion people 
and has a combined GDP of $21.4 trillion.60 Negotiations are ongoing and likely to carry on 
for the foreseeable future, leading to greater regional integration.   
The EU and Vietnam have pushed ahead with their efforts to put together a FTA, which 
was achieved in December 2015. Ratification is due in 2017 and implementation scheduled for 
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2018. The EU is Vietnam’s second largest export market with exports increasing from 5.59 
percent in 2005 to 29.9 percent of total exports in 2015.61 The trade agreement will eliminate 
99% of all tariffs along with containing strict rules of origins to allay fears of China using 
Vietnam as a conduit. In tandem with this, Vietnam and the European Free Trade Association 
(EFTA) have been holding negotiations to establish an FTA with the thirteenth round of 
negotiations taking place in October 2015. The EFTA has indicated its willingness to recognise 
Vietnam’s market economy status. Currently, WTO members are not required to recognise 
Vietnam as a market economy, and therefore reserve the right to subject Vietnam to temporary 
trade barriers.62 The conferring of market economy status onto Vietnam would bring about 
significant trade benefits as well as prestige.  
The Vietnam EU-FTA does include a clause on human rights. However, with 
Vietnamese leaders being hostile to accusations of human rights abuses from the EU and 
generally dismissive of the EU normative power to influence this, there is little perceived threat 
to domestic interference.63 It is also worth mentioning that this is not the first time the EU has 
included a human rights clause in a trade deal with Vietnam. Despite much reluctance from 
Hanoi, the 1995 EU-Vietnam Comprehensive Framework Agreement contained Vietnam’s 
first bilateral treaty to include human rights. The inclusion came about largely due to its 
political clout, much of which is on the wane in recent years given the Euro Crises, Brexit, and 
the rise of Eurosceptic parties across Europe.64  This does not mean to say that human rights 
could not be a sticking point. In fact, Vietnam’s heavy handed response to political dissidents 
since the Twelfth Party Congress in 2016 has raised the eyebrows of the EU parliament, and 
human rights groups who lobby to reject the deal.65  
Similarly, diplomatic relations with Germany, arguably the most influential member of 
the EU, took a turn for the worse in August 2017. Germany accused the Vietnamese Secret 
Service of abducting Trinh Xuan Thanh, a former Petro Vietnam Official who fled to Germany 
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after being charged in connection with causing $150 million in losses at the state owned 
enterprise. Thanh later appeared on Vietnamese TV proclaiming he had come back by his own 
will but Germany still demanded his return.66 In March 2018, Thanh was sentenced to life 
imprisonment for embezzlement and economic mismanagement.67 Regardless of whether or 
not the event occurred the way German authorities say it did, certainly the event significantly 
impacted German-Vietnam relations. It led to the suspension of the German-Vietnam Strategic 
Partnership. It has also led to a strengthening of the anti-human rights discourse within EU 
member states.68 
Still, multidirectionalism is designed to increase autonomy through diversity, therefore, 
much like the TPP, the EU-Vietnam agreement is not the be-all and end-all trade deal.  Japan 
and Vietnam agreed on an Economic Partnership Agreement in December 2008 with the 
implementation coming into force in October 2009.69  This Economic Partnership boosted 
cooperation in goods, services, investment, business climate improvement, and technical 
transfer. This agreement also agreed to exempt taxes on 92% of the goods exchanged between 
the two countries after coming into force. Since the partnership was signed, the amount of 
Japanese investment into Vietnam has steadily increased with transportation equipment and 
electric machinery for the manufacturing centre being two of the largest areas of investment. 
Vietnamese garment industries have also benefited immensely from access to the Japanese 
market, contributing to Vietnam’s rising trade surplus with Japan. The 2013 trade surplus stood 
at $1.8 billion.70  Certain technical barriers to trade, along with Vietnamese products not 
satisfying Japanese safety requirements, do exist. Despite these barriers, however, Vietnam-
Japan trade relations have benefited immensely from their Economic Partnership Agreement. 
With further tariffs scheduled to be cut during the period 2015-2019, more benefits will ensue; 
benefits that greatly contribute to Vietnam’s economic development and its economic vitality.  
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South Korea and Vietnam signed an FTA in May 2015 with the treaty being ratified by 
both countries domestic legislatures and coming into force in December of the same year. This 
trade agreement will boost trade and cooperation between the two countries. Trade between 
them stood at $28 billion in 2014.71 The FTA will increase the competitiveness of Vietnamese 
exports to South Korea significantly. The trade deal will also work towards cooperation in the 
following areas: tariff elimination and reduction, investment, intellectual property, customs 
facilitation, trade safeguards, technical barriers to trade, e-commerce, competition, and 
institutional and economic cooperation.72 Given that South Korea is constantly ranked amongst 
the top three investors in Vietnam, the liberalising of trade between the two countries will assist 
Vietnam’s economic development to a considerable degree.    
After eight years of negotiation, the Vietnam-Eurasia Economic Union FTA (EEU) was 
signed on May 29, 2015.73 This trade agreement sets out a $10 billion trade target and will 
significantly bolster Vietnam’s nascent automobile industry, increase cooperation in the oil 
sector, and stimulate Russian investment into the country. Much has changed since Vietnam 
relied almost entirely on Soviet assistance during the Cold War. By 1996 Russian investment 
into Vietnam had fallen to one-tenth of what it used to be. Trade gradually picked up during 
the 2000s and hit the $1 billion mark in 2005.74 Still, trade between Vietnam and Russia in 
2015 represented $4 billion, a meagre amount when compared to Vietnam’s larger trading 
partners outlined above.75 Nevertheless, this trade agreement will seek to rectify the lack of 
Russian investment in Vietnam and ASEAN in general. Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov has even touted the Vietnam EEU as a “pilot project for Russian trade liberalisation 
between Russia and ASEAN and adds that Vietnam can act as a “bridge to ASEAN.” 76 
Vietnam-Russian trade relations, in addition to relations in general, look set to grow and given 
Russia’s “pivot to the East,” Vietnam can be a leading facilitator in boosting further integration.  
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Global and regional powers are not the only countries that Vietnam has sought trade 
agreements with. The Vietnam-Chile FTA came into force in January 2014. Vietnam’s first 
FTA with a Latin American country entails provisions on facilitating market access, rules of 
origin, sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers, etc. Vietnam’s textile industry, 
which represented an export revenue of $18 billion in 2015, received an immediate boost from 
this agreement after textile exports to Chile received an instant tariff removal.77 Other areas 
that received a tariff cut include seafood, coffee, tea, computers, and computer components. 
Chile could potentially be the first point of access for Vietnam into a much wider Latin-
American market.78 Vietnam is also currently in negotiations with Israel to sign an FTA.79 The 
first round of negotiations was held in March 2016. Trade between the two countries stood at 
$1.7 billion in 2015. 
Since Vietnam monumentally became a WTO member in January 2007, trade deals 
have become a prominent part of Vietnam’s proactive integration effort. Trade deals bring a 
host of economic benefits for Vietnam and help it achieve its development goals, provide 
boosts to its nascent industries, and increase investment into the country. Trade deals similarly 
help offset the large trade deficit that Vietnam has accumulated with China during the past 
century. Importantly, however, they complement Vietnam’s strong economic relationship with 
China rather than supplement it. Trade deals significantly diversify Vietnam’s economic 
outlook, helping it develop further and also prevent it from being too over reliant on any one 
particular economy for its development. Furthermore, a diverse approach to trade agreements 
can alleviate the potential problems of normative pressure stemming from trade deals 
associated with the US and EU. Given the enhanced diversity, vast amounts of economic 
benefits, and ability to prevent Vietnam from being subject to unfair trading practices, trade 
deals play a prominent role in Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy.  
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Multilateralism 
Foreign and Deputy Prime Minister of Vietnam, Pham Binh Minh has stated that 
multilateralism deserves to "have a higher place" among Vietnamese foreign policy. He adds, 
"growing globalisation and the emergence of challenges on a global scale has fostered a greater 
need for countries, both large and small, to put into place multilateral framework.” 80 
Multilateralism bolsters Vietnam’s voice in international affairs, wins it vital political support, 
and contributes to the peaceful management of disputes, and brings various economic benefits 
that contribute to the development of the country. Vietnam’s multilateral approach extends into 
participation in various multilateral organisations, this article will focus on Vietnam’s role in 
ASEAN, its enhanced contributions to the UN, its role as APEC Chair, and its participation in 
the Shangri-La Dialogue. Multilateralism is, therefore, a key mechanism of a multidirectional 
foreign policy.   
 For Vietnam, it is clear that enhanced participation within ASEAN allows it to gain 
strength in numbers and that it enhances its capabilities to hedge against China, yet also 
strengthen its proactive and diverse approach to multilateralization. As the previous Chapter 
noted, Vietnam hosted the sixteenth ASEAN summit meeting entitled “Towards the ASEAN 
community: From Vision to Action,” which signalled ASEAN’s intent to forge a close-knit 
political-security, economic, and socio-cultural community. This plan of action came to 
fruition in 2015 with the launch of the ASEAN Community in December 2015. This 
strengthens solidarity amongst members, deepens Vietnam’s continued successful integration 
into the organisation, and gives both ASEAN and Vietnam a stronger voice particularly in its 
dealings with China.81   For example, Vietnam has been an active member of the annual 
ASEAN Chiefs of Navy Meetings, which focuses on fostering cooperation amongst 
interoperability among ASEAN Navies  
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At the heart of the ASEAN community are an ASEAN Free Trade Area. The economic 
importance of ASEAN is vital for Vietnam as it attempts to reduce its dependence on China 
and seek diversification in its economic partnerships. ASEAN represents around 15 per cent of 
both imports and exports for the Vietnamese economy.82 Additionally, with predictions that 
ASEAN GDP will surpass that of Japan in 2030, there are certainly a plethora of economic 
benefits in addition to the political and security ones.83  On November 22, 2015 ASEAN 
formally established the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) as part of its ASEAN 
Community initiative, focused around four pillars: 
1. A single market and production base  
2. A highly competitive economic region  
3. A region of equitable economic development  
4. A region fully integrated into the global economy.84 
An ADB report assessing the progress prior to the formations of the AEC stipulated that 
that ASEAN has enjoyed successes in lowering tariffs, liberalising investment and capital 
flows through signing the Comprehensive Investment Agreement in 2012, strengthening 
intellectual property rights via the ASEAN Intellectual Property Rights Action Plan 2011-2015, 
and signing a number of FTAs that signalled ASEAN’s further integration into the global 
economy. However, the report noted that considerable room for improvement exists, namely 
in reducing non-tariff barriers, promoting migrant workers’ rights and reducing their labour 
movement restrictions, fostering greater cooperation amongst members, and reducing the 
development gap that has constantly plagued ASEAN throughout its history.85 In general, an 
ASEAN economic community has the potential to create a deeply integrated and highly 
cohesive ASEAN economy that could support sustained high economic growth and resilience 
even in the face of global economic shocks and volatilities. It would bring considerable 
168 
 
 
 
economic benefits to Vietnam and provide additional alleviation to the lop-sided nature of 
Vietnam-China trade. 
 Vietnam remains committed to the peaceful management of disputes in the South China 
Sea. It is active in its commitment to solving the issue in compliance with UNCLOS, utilizing 
bilateral channels when a dispute is between two parties, and multilateral channels when 
disputes involve a third party. ASEAN has provided Vietnam with greater collective diplomatic 
power in managing the issue, both with China and with claimant states within ASEAN.86 
Vietnam became a member of the inaugural ASEAN Regional Forum in 1994 before 
monumentally joining ASEAN in 1995. Despite its latecomer status, however, Vietnam 
quickly integrated into the ASEAN community and has evolved to be a dynamic member. Its 
membership is considered a “turning point” in Vietnam’s perception of the region and how it 
viewed the world.87  
 In November 2002, ASEAN and China agreed the DOC which strategically committed 
both ASEAN and China towards a peaceful solution that incorporates the principles of the 1982 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 88  However, calls to establish a more binding 
commitment that restrains and binds China from taking unilateral action in the South China 
Sea have largely been ignored by China. The need for a binding code of conduct has intensified 
since 2009 with Chinese assertiveness becoming bolder.  
Nevertheless, throughout the 2000s ASEAN successfully implemented a series of 
“dominance denial acts” that prevented a rising China from asserting its dominance over the 
organisation with the added aim of hedging against Chinese behaviour.89 These acts included 
the inclusion of India, Australia, and New Zealand into the East Asian Summit that began in 
2005 with the blessings of Japan. The summit was enlarged to include Russia and the US from 
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the sixth summit in 2011 with the US and Russia first participating as guests when Vietnam 
hosted the fifth Summit in October 2010.  
Additionally, China had long been pushing for a China-ADMM but ASEAN resisted 
such overtures and instead created the ADMM Plus Eight, which included Australia, China, 
India, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, Russia, and the United States. Vietnam hosted the 
inaugural ADMM-Plus Eight meeting in October 2010 with the objectives of enhancing 
regional peace and stability, promoting mutual trust, and contributing to the realisation of an 
ASEAN security community. Still, the China-ADMM has been held informally on the sidelines 
of the ADMM Plus Eight since 2011.90 Additionally, the US has hosted two Defence Forums 
with ASEAN Defence Ministers. The inaugural U.S.-ASEAN Defense Forum was held in 
April 2014 in Honolulu after then U.S. Secretary of Defense, Chuck Hagel extended an 
invitation at the 2013 Shangri-La Dialogue. China certainly made note of this; it hosted, for the 
first time in China, a China-ASEAN Informal Defense Ministers’ Meeting in October 2015. At 
this meeting, China put forth a five-point proposal to boost security and defence cooperation 
between the two sides.91 October 2016 also saw a US-ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Informal 
Meeting held in Honolulu.92 The simultaneity of these events is worth noting as ASEAN 
attempts to deepen security cooperation with major powers.  
 The hedging strategy of ASEAN has led to small breakthroughs in the organisation's 
attempts to peacefully manage the South China Sea dispute and establish a code of conduct 
there. The ASEAN Regional Senior Officials Meeting (SOM) – China meeting in Tianjin in 
July 2015 saw the establishment of a hotline between their respective foreign ministers in order 
to quickly and smoothly handle disputes. More recently, progress has been made in setting up 
a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea with China indicating its willingness to 
negotiate one since mid-2016.93 Following this, China set a deadline for mid-2017 for drafting 
a framework COC, something that was completed ahead of schedule. In August, China and 
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ASEAN agreed to adopt the framework at the ASEAN Plus 1 meeting in Manila.94 Despite 
question marks surrounding whether the COC will be legally binding or not, the framework 
will serve as the basis for formal discussions, expected in November 2017 after the ASEAN 
Plus China Summit meeting.  
As part of its efforts to be a more proactive member of the UN, Vietnam set up a 
Peacekeeping Centre in February 2014 to coordinate, train, and evaluate peacekeeping 
missions. Shortly after the centre’s foundation, and for the first time in its history, Vietnam 
sent officials to participate in a UN internal peacekeeping mission in South Sudan.95 In March 
2015, Deputy Minister of National Defence General Nguyen Chi Vinh led a Vietnamese 
delegation to the first ever United Nations Chiefs of Defence Conference at the United Nation’s 
headquarters in New York. Hervé Ladsous, UN Secretary General for Peacekeeping 
Operations, noted Vietnam’s determination to join peacekeeping operations.96 At the same 
event, Vietnam’s Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Nguyen Phuong Nga, 
registered Vietnam for UNSAS, a two-way information sharing system that better educates 
members states and the UN on the resources, information, and financial situations in order to 
smoothly facilitate peacekeeping operations.  
By 2017 the number of officers sent on peacekeeping missions had grown to twelve 
with Vietnam eager to increase the number to nineteen by 2018. In fact, the UN has allocated 
two new positions for Vietnam, allowing one intelligence analyst officer and one military 
observer to join operations in the Central African Republic as part of Vietnam’s attempts to 
deepen its involvement in peacekeeping operations.97 Vietnam hopes to set up a field hospital 
in South Sudan by early 2018.  Vietnam has also worked closely with bilateral partners to 
organise workshops and training for its officers to bolster their skills and preparation for future 
engagement in peacekeeping operations. In November 2015 Vietnam and France organised a 
two-day conference to share their experiences in the UN Peacekeeping Operations. In addition, 
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the British Council has been providing English training to Vietnamese peacekeeping officers 
as part of the Defence Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding between Vietnam and the 
UK. 98  Meanwhile, Vietnam and China signed a Memorandum of Understanding on 
Peacekeeping Cooperation in April 2015 aimed at stimulating further collaboration between 
the two armies with numerous meetings on peacekeeping cooperation being held since.99 
 Vietnam has ultimately shown its willingness to proactively engage in UN 
peacekeeping missions.  Its intentions have been backed up by concrete measures with further 
deepened cooperation likely to continue. Additionally, Vietnam was also elected as a member 
of the UN Human Rights Council, the UN Economic and Social Council for the second time 
in its history, the board of governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, serves as a 
member of the UNESCO Executive Board (2015-2019), and seeking to become a member of 
the UN Security Council in 2020-2021.100  
The APEC region represents a vast amount of Vietnam’s foreign trade, 80 percent of 
FDI comes from APEC countries and Vietnam’s trade with APEC countries totalled around 
$146 billion in 2016. 101  After joining APEC in 1998, Vietnam has achieved substantial 
economic growth and since 2006 began to be a more active member of the organisation.  In 
2006 Vietnam was, for the first time, the APEC chair in which it successfully hosted the APEC 
Ministers’ Meeting. Since then it has hosted various committee chairmanship positions, such 
as the chairman of the budget and management committee in 2007, vice chairman of the health 
working group from 2009 to 2010 and chairman of the working group on emergency 
preparedness from 2012 to 2013.  
Vietnam successfully hosted APEC leaders meeting in November 2017.  As chair of 
the 2017 APEC Summit, Pham Binh Minh attended the 2017 G20 Foreign Ministers’ Meeting 
in Bonn, Germany. He used the opportunity to call for the adherence to international law and 
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the promotion of multilateralism. He emphasised the need for cooperation in a complex world 
full of complex problems. He stated that despite Vietnam’s modest resources it has tried to 
positively contribute towards international organisations, notably the UN peacekeeping 
missions and ASEAN, all of which is key to peacefully resolving disputes, he added.102 Minh 
believes that economic growth has put Vietnam in a better position to contribute more to APEC 
and its contributions thus far certainly demonstrate Vietnam’s commitment to multilateralism. 
Being the host of the APEC Summit allows for Vietnam to demonstrate its commitment to 
multilateralism and gives it a platform for pursuing its political goals.103 
Certainly, the APEC allowed Vietnam to demonstrate its cooperative approach to 
foreign relations. Notable events included the CPTPP agreement, Donald Trump and President 
Tran Dai Quang reaffirming the Comprehensive Partnerships between the two countries, along 
with Vietnam welcoming world leaders such as Xi Jinping, Shinzo Abe, and Vladimir Putin. 
Despite the contrasting nature of speeches given by Donald Trump and Xi Jinping, Vietnam 
proclaimed that it brought a balanced approach to the summit to ensure diplomacy and its 
national interests prevailed. 104 
Proactive engagement in regard to security has taken place via the Shangri-La Dialogue. 
This is an inter-governmental security think tank forum held annually. Defence ministers of 
over 28 states attend it each year. Vietnam obtained full ministerial status in 2009 and since 
then has been proactively engaged in the organisation.  Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung gave 
a keynote address at the opening session of the conference on May 31, 2013 in which he called 
for the need for “strategic trust for the sake of peace, cooperation, and prosperity in the Asian 
region.”  He added that countries, big or small, must “build their relations on the basis of 
equality and mutual respect and, at a higher level.105 Ultimately, strategic trust can be fostered 
through multilateral forums and adherence to international laws and ASEAN’s core principle 
of consensus.  
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Exactly one year on from Dung’s Speech, and whilst the HS-981 incident was on-going, 
Defence Minister General Phung Quang Thanh addressed the conference by stating that China 
must “immediately withdraw its drilling rig” and “join talks with Vietnam to maintain peace, 
stability and friendship between the two countries.”106 On the sidelines of the meeting, Thanh 
also held bilateral meetings with counterparts from the UK, France, and the US. The involved 
parties called for restraint and respect for international law to ease the on-going tensions. At 
the 2017 forum, Deputy Defence Minister Nguyen Chi Vinh called on nations to “increase 
cooperation to settle differences and prevent conflicts.”107 Tran Viet Thai of the Vietnam 
Diplomatic Academy claimed that this sends a message that Vietnam conforms to the norms 
of international law.108 Meanwhile on the sidelines of the 2017 forum, US Defense Secretary 
Jim Mattis held a meeting with representatives of ASEAN in which they called for greater 
commitment to the block, particularly through the ADMM Plus framework.109  
 Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy seeks greater engagement with the 
international community whilst at the same time safeguarding its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity in order to foster national construction. In line with this, Vietnam has sought broader 
and deeper cooperation at the multilateral level and has taken proactive steps to do this. 
ASEAN provides Vietnam with a greater political voice vis-a-vis China. Meanwhile, it has 
also taken steps to enhance its engagement with the UN, APEC, and the Shangri-La Dialogue 
to help it achieve its national interests. Doing so brings Vietnam political support, economic 
benefits, and eases security concerns. 
Conclusion 
Vietnam implements its multidirectional foreign policy through three key mechanisms: 
strategic/comprehensive partnerships, trade deals, and multilateralism. The 
strategic/comprehensive partnerships enhance cooperation bilaterally across a wide array of 
areas with pivotal partners, providing economic, political, and security benefits. While not 
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always being defence orientated, a large number of the strategic partnerships include defence 
arrangements that can counter an assertive China. The merits of cooperation are reaped and the 
risks are managed. Trade deals contribute to Vietnam’s economic development, by bolstering 
national construction, support development goals, increase exports abroad, and attract 
investment into Vietnam. Maintaining a diverse portfolio of trade agreements also reduces 
dependence and lessens the economic leverage that China maintains over Vietnam.  Meanwhile, 
multilateralism enhances Vietnam’s bargaining power, particularly in relation to China, creates 
greater cohesion amongst ASEAN members, and brings immense economic benefits. Being 
proactive in ASEAN also allows Vietnam to safeguard the policy of non-intervention: which 
provides comfort to the regime.   
Vietnam remains committed to ensuring a peaceful international environment that 
allows for cooperation in dealing with today’s highly complex, integrated problems, further 
economic development, and the peaceful management disputes.  China’s recent assertiveness 
has injected greater importance into Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy given the 
asymmetries that exist in Vietnam-China relations. A multidirectional foreign policy offsets 
problems associated with such a relationship. Given Vietnam’s strong determination not to be 
over-reliant on any one power, nor be drawn into a bipolar conflict, it is easy to see why 
Vietnam continues to pursue a multidirectional foreign policy.  
Ultimately, Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy has developed significantly over 
the past thirty years. Since 2011, Vietnam has significantly deepened and broadened the scope 
of its cooperation via the three-key mechanisms outlined above. It has greatly contributed to 
the VCP’s stated and implicit interests. Whilst it is still an evolving process it is easy to see 
that the benefits are continually being reinforced and that the collective memory of the Party 
as a whole will continue to be positively influenced by this policy. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
This thesis sets out to answer the question ‘Why does Vietnam continue to emphasize a 
multidirectional foreign policy and how does it implement it?’ In doing so it adopted a 
constructivist outlook to complement previous studies that adopted a realist perspective.  
Ultimately, a multidirectional foreign policy has given Vietnam a strong sense of 
international presence. The intertwining of domestic and structural benefits material furthered 
the countries national interests, and indeed contributed to the regime’s own self-interests. As 
such it has reinforced the Party’s legitimacy. It is therefore, easy to understand why Vietnam 
has continued to pursue such a policy. By tracing the evolution and learning involved with 
multidirectionalism, one can also see the impacts it has had on the collective memory of the 
Party. Memories such as reverting the crises it faced and becoming an economic success story, 
reversing diplomatic isolation, and boosting its international profile have all become associated 
with multidirectionalism. These in turn have reinforced the Party’s legitimacy and therefore 
we can answer why it continues to strengthen, emphasise, and implement such a policy.  
In regards to the ‘how’ part of the question, it is clear that in recent years strategic 
partnerships, FTAs, and enhanced activities at the multi-lateral level have become a typical 
framework for Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy. A member of the Diplomatic 
Academy told the author that Vietnam’s multidirectional approach to foreign relations has been 
a case of incremental development. He noted that in order to pour a glass of water, you must 
first build the structure, then you can gradually fill it with liquid. Essentially Vietnam’s period 
throughout the nineties and early twenty-first century was building the glass. Since 2006, 
however, they have gradually poured more and more liquid into that glass.1 
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Whilst a realist interpretation of Vietnam’s multidirectional foreign policy origin boasts 
a strong degree of explanatory power, the continued adherence to multidirectionalism can lend 
itself to different interpretations. Certainly, this thesis set out to examine the thirty-year period 
since its inception by taking a holistic approach. Yet the time frame also examined the 
beginnings of multidirectionalism. The post-reunification period represented a failed attempt 
to implement a multidirectional foreign policy. Miscalculations led to missed opportunities to 
restore relations with the US. Meanwhile, the worsening of relations with China essentially 
drove the Vietnamese into the arms of the Soviet Union, losing a substantial amount of 
autonomy. This, along with a host of economic mismanagement ushered in the decade of 
disaster. 
Politburo Resolution 13 in 1988 marked the start of multidirectionalism. Vietnam quickly 
turned around its fortunes. It quickly restored relations with countries across the globe, 
achieving the feat of having relations restored with all five permanent members of the Security 
Council in 1995. That same year, it joined ASEAN, well and truly diversifying and 
multilaterlising its relations. This laid solid foundations for multidirectionalism to continue to 
develop. 
Debates still wrangled within the VCP, however, about the scope and scale of domestic 
reforms and the degree to which Vietnam was integrating itself into the international political 
economy. The Thai Binh protests and 1997 Asian Financial Crisis exposed the VCP to the 
pitfalls of losing control and threatened the much-coveted domestic stability.  
Yet internationally, things had never been more peaceful and prosperous. Therefore The 
Party accepted the inevitable, and adopted international integration as a key component of 
multidirectionalism. However, integration, as pointed out throughout chapter three and four, 
required Vietnam changing itself based on externally determined factors. It was not just a 
182 
 
 
 
simple calculation based on national or Party interests. Certainly, the learning period taking 
place after multidirectionalism, the greater prestige on the international arena, and of course 
the abatement of the legitimacy crisis the regime had faced meant that integration was the only 
way forward.  
As such, the 2001 Ninth Party Congress incorporated integration as a key aspect of 
multidirectionalism and indeed elevated the strategic importance of such a policy. The VCP 
began to tout itself as being a “friend and reliable partner” vis-à-vis promoting diversity, 
multilateralism, and integration, to boost aggregate economic strength. Yet taking the plunge 
into the international political economy saw Vietnam exposed to the harsh demands of 
renovating oneself internally.  
This exposition, however, did not go without some significant policy adjustments. 
Vietnam codified its national interests in its white papers, outlining “lagging behind” and the 
‘three no’s as cornerstones of its national interests. Subsequently, Resolution 08 in 2003 
significantly adjusted how Vietnam viewed the external environment. The cooperation and 
struggle shifted it away from a black and white approach to relations and this was clearly 
demonstrated in negotiations to join the WTO. Vietnam achieved this monumental feat in 2006. 
Nevertheless, relations with China began to become more intertwined, particularly at the 
economic level. Very little prioritization was given to cooperation areas other than economic 
ones.  
The years 2006-2011 saw a significant trade imbalance grow with China. Additionally, 
China’s more assertive posture in the South China Sea presented Hanoi with some pressing 
problems. An emergent focus on defence relations emerged and deepening ties with major 
powers such as the US, Russia, India and Japan. Nevertheless, Vietnam was required to walk 
a fine line given China’s growing clout over the country. At the same time, domestic 
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undercurrents began stirring. They touched on issues relating to democracy, corruption, the 
environment and Vietnam’s mute responses to China. Both domestic and international stability 
became threatened.  
Therefore, the period after the Eleventh Party Congress necessitated greater mechanisms 
for the VCP to manage its asymmetrical relations with China – whilst at the same time adhering 
to the ‘three nos,’ promoting friendly relations with China, and ensuring stability in order to 
foster economic growth. As such, Vietnam employed a host of strategic partnership agreements 
with regional and global powers alike, ratified and entered into negotiations for a host of FTAs, 
and deepened its multilateral engagement – both within ASEAN and other organisations. 
Notably, this deepened cooperation was not centred solely on economic issues, but 
incorporated, defencive, and cultural elements too. Whilst this deepened, diversified approach 
to cooperation is ongoing it is fair to say that enhanced autonomy and strong set of hedging 
mechanisms have been put into place. Mistakes of the past have been learnt.  
One can see how Vietnam’s foreign policy has evolved into a core-component in the Doi 
Moi process. The VCP sees itself as the keeper of stability, the promoter of economic growth, 
and protector against threats from China. On the international front, it also sees itself as a 
promoter of multi-lateral forums, international law, and a seeker of mutually beneficial 
partnerships. Certainly, the learning process undergone re-affirms the positive benefits of 
multidirectionalism. At the same time it achieves the country’s national interests along with 
internal ones – ensuring the legitimacy of the VCP.  
Throughout this thesis, I have demonstrated how the VCP promotes itself as a friend and 
reliable partner to the international community, along with, in recent years, a commitment to 
multilateralism, international law, and economic liberalism. Another interesting development 
that is ongoing is how Vietnam is touting itself as an example to other countries looking to 
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implement economic reforms without ceding political ground. North Korea and Cuba are an 
ongoing case in point. After Kim Jong-Un momentously send shock-waves around the world 
when he became the first North Korea leader to cross the demilitarised zone and meet with 
South Korean President Moon Jae. The Vietnamese media was keen to point out that Un 
allegedly mentioned Vietnam as an example for his own countries reforms. He even went so 
far as to say that the Vietnam-model was more favourable since it had successfully maintained 
a “great relationship with the US.” 2 
In a visit to Cuba in March 2018, Nguyen Phu Trong told Vietnam’s long standing ally 
of the numerous benefits of market-oriented reforms. In a speech at Havana University Trong 
remarked that “the market economy of its own cannot destroy socialism.” He added: “to build 
socialism with success it is necessary to develop a market economy in and adequate and correct 
way.” Therefore, the Vietnam-model may be an interesting development to observe in the 
future but for the time being, it certainly demonstrates the degree to which Vietnam has able 
to fuse its socialist image with seemingly contradictory notion of market-reform. It is testament 
to the uniqueness of Vietnamese market reforms, and certainly multidirectionalism has played 
its part in aiding the process.3  
This thesis will now turn to a brief discussion of future issues that will continue to 
influence Vietnamese foreign policy-thinking going forward. Whilst this is speculative, it is 
based on ongoing trends. The conclusion will look at three aspects that may be of prominence 
in the future: growing domestic undercurrents, the diminishing role of ASEAN, and relations 
with China. 
Constraining Factors: 
Ning Liao states, in reference to China’s collective memory, that: 
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Social norms embedded in the collective memory both enable and constrain 
the state’s action on the foreign relations front. With regards to the state-
society relationship, these ideational codes, as the normative underpinnings 
of the purposive action of the Chinese state, serve as the scripts for the 
regime’s performance and the criteria for the domestic audience to assess the 
legitimacy of the state’s behaviour on the diplomatic stage.4 
Vietnam, as a geostrategic yet arguably, small state, is becoming more subject to 
domestic audiences, which have the potential to constrain its foreign policymaking. 
Chapter five made note of the domestic currents, such as corruption, nationalistic 
outbursts and environmental issues that place added pressure on the VCP. Whilst the 
analysis of these factors is beyond the scope of this thesis it is certainly worth noting the 
growth of these currents since 2016. They are opening up new channels of influence in 
Vietnamese foreign policy, most notably through the current crackdown on corruption 
and dissent.  
The 2016 Twelfth Party Congress was notable for the high-profile tussle for 
leadership between Nguyen Tan Dung and Nguyen Phu Trong. Dung, noted for his pro-
US stance, yet highly corrupt in nature - including the mismanagement of a large state-
owned enterprise -  lost out to the latter. Prior to the Congress, Trong talked extensively 
about corruption. Notably, he compared combating corruption to catching mice in that 
you must be careful not to break the vase the mouse is in. This vase was obviously 
referring to the VCP itself.  Trong, after his successful re-election, vowed to reform the 
Party in the right direction and significantly address crony-capitalism.5 
Corruption had become even more endemic. In the 2017 Transparency 
International report, it ranked Vietnam as one of the worst countries in the Asia-Pacific 
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region in terms of corruption. Trong’s promise to get rid of corruption was demonstrated 
in numerous high-profile cases. Dinh La Thang became the highest politician to be 
expelled from the Party since General Tran Do, who was expelled in 1999 for calling for 
democratic reforms. Thang had been a member of the Politburo and was eventually 
sentenced on two separate charges. First, he received a 13-year sentence for economic 
mismanagement of a coal-fired power plant overseen by PetroVietnam in January 2018. 
Then in March that same year, he was handed an 18 years sentence for “deliberate 
violation of state regulations on economic management.”6  
In late 2017 the VCP sacked Nguyen Xuan Anh, Party Secretary of Da Nang and 
also a member of the Party Central Committee for misleading the public regarding his 
educational record, along with receiving a car from a company.7  The battle against 
corruption also extended into the business realm. Nguyen Xuan Son, former Director 
General of Vietnam’s Ocean Bank, was handed down a death sentence for embezzlement. 
The bank’s former board chairman also received a life sentence.8 The Party’s recent 
heavy crackdown on corruption is both political and strategic. It is political in the sense 
that Trong is purging those formerly close to Dung, and strategic in the sense that it 
shows the Party as being proactive in the fight against corruption – both to its domestic 
and its international audiences (more of the former of course). However, the willingness 
of the Party to fight corruption also impacts its foreign relations, as demonstrated in the 
alleged kidnapping of Trinh Xuan Thanh.  
Thanh’s case was detailed in Chapter Six. But what is incredibly telling about this 
event were the lengths to which Vietnam went to bring Thang to justice and be seen as 
being tough on corruption. Certainly, it was a calculated decision that meant damaging 
relations with a strategic partner. In fact, Nguyen Xuan Phuc had met with German 
Chancellor Angela Merkel in Germany the month before Thanh’s kidnapping. Here he 
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stated that “Vietnam attaches special importance to developing relations with 
Germany.”9  Vietnamese specialist Anton Tsvetov echoed the “surprising” nature in 
which Vietnam was willing to take a blow to its relationship with Germany.10 The event 
was a major embarrassment for the VCP, in particular for the Ministry of Public Security, 
which allegedly carried out the kidnapping.  Certainly, this demonstrates that domestic 
issues are becoming a bigger factor, and even in this case, a hindrance to international 
relations and, as Carl Thayer notes, “portrays Vietnam as a quasi-police state that does 
not respect the rule of law.”11 This goes against Vietnam’s attempts to promote an 
international-law based solution to the South China Sea. 
This “quasi-police” state can be seen in the VCP’s clamp-down on dissent as well. 
The outbreak of protests in response to the HYSY-81 incident was a hot potato for the 
VCP. On the one hand, the VCP’s nationalist narrative is keen to be portrayed as standing 
up to China, and therefore the protests were justified. However, the VCP is also eager to 
uphold its principle of stability, and given the fact that anti-Chinese protests can 
sometimes turn into anti-regime protests, this is all the more pressing. Nevertheless, the 
regime has ramped up its clampdown on dissent.  
The year 2017 and early 2018 saw a wave of dissidents detained or imprisoned. 
Nguyen Ngoc Nhu Quynh, otherwise known as Me Nam or Mother Mushroom, saw 
herself imprisoned and sentenced under Vietnam’s notoriously vague Article 88, which 
prohibits “conducting propaganda against the state.” She was sentenced to 10 years in 
prison in June 2017, a sentence that was upheld in November of the same year.12 Her 
imprisonment saw a wave of international condemnation. But Mother Mushroom is just 
one of the many dissidents detained by the authorities. Tran Hoang Phuc, Tran Thi Nga, 
Truong Minh Duc, and Vu Quang Thuan, are just some of the prominent activists 
arrested.13 In fact, in June 2017 the National Assembly criminalised actions preparing to 
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perform activities that threatened national security. The law also holds lawyers criminally 
responsible for failing to report their clients if they have committed violations. This gave 
the Vietnamese security forces greater pre-emptive measure to quell dissidents.14 
Whilst Vietnam, at the international level, continues to promote international 
norms, its domestic situation is worsening. Still, however, the future looks to be a 
reduction of international pressure on the issue. On his visit to Vietnam during the APEC 
summit US President Donald Trump mentioned little about human rights. Additionally, 
a diplomat told the Author that in reality the EU has very little ability to influence the 
Vietnamese government stance on human rights. Yes, criticisms are noted, but that is as 
far as it goes. He even pointed out that after the EU-Vietnam Tree Trade Agreement 
comes into force, ‘the carrot will have essentially been eaten,” meaning that ‘the stick is 
the only remaining way, which given the EU’s own domestic woes, would be difficult to 
enforce.15 
The managing of dissidents and continued socio-economic performance means that 
Hanoi will avoid any potential knee-jerk reactions to Chinese assertiveness and 
international pressure. Also, it demonstrates the degree to which stability plays into the 
collective memory of the Party. It will even jeopardise its image as a “friend and reliable 
partner of the international community” in the name of fighting corruption. Therefore, 
we can see that the normative underpinnings of the Vietnamese state will continue to be 
stability and economic performance. As a result, foreign policy drivers will be designed 
to achieve these aims and to preserve the VCP’s legitimacy.  However, avenues are 
emerging for greater domestic influences – and therefore future studies may involve 
further consideration of this issue.  
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The Diminishing Importance of ASEAN 
Since its inception in 1967, people have often murmured the question of ASEAN’s 
relevance. The ASEAN way is often criticised as limiting ASEAN’s ability to solve 
crises and take meaningful action. The concept of non-interference, consensus, and its 
informal approach have shown that, in times of crisis, ASEAN is limited in its ability to 
resolve issues. Lee Jones has noted that scholarship surrounding ASEAN is centred 
around a “boring consensus,” for its refusal to intervene in each other’s internal affairs. 
Yet Jones also notes that non-intervention has been violated in attempts to revise this 
concept and is a result of the organisation's attempts to defend its international image.16  
Nevertheless, ASEAN has evolved and expanded significantly since its initial 
formation and despite its criticisms. The very fact that the organization continues to exist 
fifty years after its creation deserves recognition.17 Vietnam’s joining of ASEAN in 1995 
was a pivotal moment in its diplomatic history. Subsequently, and as this thesis has noted, 
Vietnam has played a prominent role within ASEAN, most notably with the ASEAN 
Charter and ASEAN Community initiatives. Yet looking forward, there may be a case to 
argue that for Vietnam, ASEAN will play a diminished strategic role.  In fact, a diplomat, 
reflecting on Vietnam’s membership of ASEAN, stated that ASEAN will play a 
diminishing role of importance for Vietnam in the coming years. He argued that the 
complexity of threats facing the region combined with ASEAN’s immobilisation means 
ASEAN’s perceived strategic significance will wane. 18  ASEAN’s “liberal–turn” too 
would see ASEAN’s role diminish given Vietnam falling into the ASEAN way promoter 
camp. In other words, Vietnam promotes the concept of non-intervention and conecesus 
based decision making. Therefore, it will likely continue back the very things that prevent 
ASEAN from becoming effective.  
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Two issues have certainly demonstrated this. The much-publicised failure to issue 
a joint communique on the South China Sea in 2012 and again in 2016. In 2012, 
Cambodia refused to issue a statement brought forth by the Philippines and Vietnam to 
reference Chinese aggression in the South China Sea. Reports even indicated that 
Cambodia was consulting with Beijing during negotiations.19 Whilst, a Six-Point-Plan 
was subsequently issued, the failure to issue a joint communique for the first time in its 
history meant a diplomatic win for Beijing and reaffirmed the immobilisation of 
ASEAN’s attempts to present a united front on the issue. This event was replayed in 2016. 
The Permanent Court of Arbitration issued a legal victory to the Philippines in its case 
brought against Beijing.   In the first meeting since that ruling, however, Cambodia again 
blocked any mention of the ruling.20 
Additionally, ASEAN’s lack of support for the Philippines in its court of arbitration 
ruling will have been duly noted by Hanoi.21 Ultimately, no consensus regarding the 
South-China Sea will be realised so long as ASEAN adheres to the non-consensus 
approach. This may lead to further states being sucked into Beijing’s gravitational pull – 
as has been recently seen with Filipino President Rodrigo Duterte. Since his election, 
Duterte has firmly aligned himself with Beijing stating: “I need China more than anybody 
else at this time of our national life.”22 Based on this, the author agrees with Christopher 
Roberts when he states that “recourse to any form of protection and/or enforcement 
provided under international law will be the more reliable option.”23 
Despite the diminishing role of ASEAN in settling disputes and protecting Vietnam 
from aggression, there is no doubt that ASEAN will provide two potential areas of 
growth: economic benefits and enhanced visibility. One of the main criticisms aimed at 
ASEAN has been its emphasis on rhetoric and lack of actual action to tackle issues such 
as the South China Sea and human rights. However, one area that cannot be included in 
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this is ASEAN’s its Economic Initiatives. The AFTA, proliferation in FTAs, and recently 
formed ASEAN Economic Community demonstrate one area of deepened, meaningful 
cohesion.  
For Vietnam itself, ASEAN has become Vietnam’s second largest trading partner 
after China. Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade, Nguyen Cam Tu noted that 
continued integration with the AEC will lead to more opportunities for FDI, improve the 
development of Vietnam’s local service markets, improve opportunities for infrastructure 
development, and strengthen the status of Vietnam in relation to other countries. He 
stresses, that despite challenges, the AEC will no doubt create better capacities and 
incentives for reform.24 The author agrees with Munir Majid in that there is “one true 
ASEAN Centrality, the promise of its economy.”25 
Similarly, ASEAN has given Vietnam enhanced visibility. The plethora of 
mechanisms put into place has certainly acted as a forum for bringing countries and 
stakeholders to discuss issues, at the very least. Adrienne Woltersdorf stated “Other than 
ASEAN, there is no other organization in Asia that can bring so many countries, 
including Japan, China, and South Korea, to one table.” 26  Certainly this has been 
demonstrated with the ASEAN Defence Ministers Meeting, the ASEAN Regional Forum, 
the East Asian Summit, the ASEAN + 3 initiative, to name just some.  
So while on the one-hand, ASEAN’s effectiveness of shielding Vietnam from 
Chinese assertiveness will likely continue to wane because of its assertive action and 
economic clout. Economically speaking, however, ASEAN will rise in importance as it 
is one of the fastest growing regions. Similarly, its mechanisms will provide a forum for 
discussing the wide array of issues dominating the region, and indeed the globe, today. 
Still it is expected that ASEAN members will continue to act based on self-interest.  
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What this means for multidirectionalism is three things. First, Vietnam will 
promote international law whilst still cautiously cooperating with China. Secondly, it will 
prioritise economic-driven initiatives with ASEAN countries. And lastly, it will continue 
to bolster its participation in other international organisations as well as take steps to 
foster greater and deeper bi-lateral cooperation with larger powers.   
Relations with China 
China is Vietnam’s largest and arguably most important partner. The asymmetries in 
their relations have, and will always, exist. In recent years the relationship has become 
defined by one of economic dependence, coupled with Chinese assertiveness in the South 
China Sea. Yet this has not stopped the two sides from riding out storms to foster 
deepened, enhanced engagement, even if it is at the ire of Vietnamese nationalistic 
sentiments. Given the interdependent nature of the current international system, 
managing the trade imbalance will be the most pressing challenge for Vietnam. Therefore, 
the future trajectory of Vietnam-China relations will likely be one of engagement, and 
broad-based, non-antagonistic balancing.  
Engaging will take place in the form of utilising mechanisms already in place to 
foster greater cooperation on the political and economic front. Certainly, recent 
ministerial visits are continuing. In September 2016, Nguyen Xuan Phuc paid a visit to 
China where he declared that Vietnam “treasures its relations with China.” The two 
countries highlighted the role of the China-Vietnam Steering Committee for Bilateral 
Cooperation and the role it has in promoting cooperation.27 Indeed, trade and investment 
is still going strong, with China running 127 new investment projects in Vietnam, 
generating an increased capital of $537.6 million. 28  Similarly, tourist numbers have 
improved significantly since the post-HYSY 981 downturn. An estimated 10 million 
Chinese citizens visited in 2016, and 13 million in 2017.29 Given that tourism accounts 
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for roughly 10 percent of Vietnamese GDP – this is highly promising and emphasises 
that cooperation is more conducive to economic benefits.30 
Broad-based balancing involves economic and security dimensions. As stated 
throughout this thesis, economic dependence is a significant threat to Vietnam. Vietnam 
will continue to promote a liberalist, free-trade, integrated approach to economic 
relations to gain greater autonomy for its economy and reduce its reliance on China. 
Over-reliance has a negative connotation in the Party’s collective memory and the 
proliferation of FTAs has demonstrated this. Furthermore, it has been vocal in its 
rejection of the recent protectionist narrative stemming from countries with low growth 
rates.  
Interestingly, Vietnam and China are allies when it comes to trade liberalisation 
and resisting the recent spate of protectionism emerging within the global system. In a 
recent visit to Vietnam, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Li stated that “protectionism 
harms others without benefiting oneself, it is a one-way street that leads nowhere.”31 This 
narrative suits Vietnam well as it seeks to foster greater integration in the coming years. 
Although the death of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) was met with a strong sense 
of concern in Hanoi, the subsequent Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) that has emerged in its place has provided cause for 
reassurance. Donald Trump himself has indicated that he is open to rejoining the revived 
deal - should it meet US terms, of course.32 
The security element will be in the sense of deepened defencive cooperation. 
Chapter five and six laid out the wide array of deepened defencive agreements with 
Russia, the US, India, and Japan amongst others This is likely to continue.  In March 
2018, for example, the USS Carl Vinson, became the first US aircraft carrier to visit 
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Vietnam since the US-Vietnam War. A Vietnamese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman 
labelled the visit as a continued effort to “promote bilateral relations within the 
framework of the two countries’ comprehensive partnership” fostering the maintenance 
of “peace, stability, and security in the region.”33 However, the response from China was 
muted. This is largely down to the fact that China understands the rationale behind 
Vietnam’s bourgeoning defencive relations with the US, and recognises that it will not 
firmly ally itself with Washington. China realises that Vietnam has the ‘three no’s’ policy 
in place. Vietnam has certainly demonstrated its resilience in promoting it. In October 
2016, after media reports surfaced that Russia was seeking to build a base in Cam Ranh 
Bay, Hanoi sought to clarify the position by re-affirming that it does not allow foreign 
countries to have bases on Vietnamese soil.34 
The rising tensions in the South China Sea within the past decade has led to a 
plethora of literature and analysis on the subject. The area is certainly a hotbed of 
contention and warranting a strong sense of strategic thinking from the VCP. Ha Anh 
Tuan argues that since 2007, Vietnam has developed three strategies:  improving 
relations with China, building up domestic capabilities, and engaging regional and extra-
regional stakeholders to manage disputes.35 He adds, that due to complications arising 
from Duterte and Trump’s election, Vietnam has tried to avoid public confrontations with 
China.36 China’s promotion of the Belt and Road Initiative, and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, along with its continued militarisation of the South China Sea, fuels 
Hanoi’s sense of uncertainty. The 2014 Oil Rig Crisis reinforced Hanoi’s perception of 
Chinese assertiveness.37 Koh Swee Lean Collin’s has gone on to state that Vietnam is 
changing its strategy in the South China Sea from one of Sea-Denial to one that would 
raise the cost of Chinese aggression. In other words, Vietnam acknowledges its naval 
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inferiority and will therefore simply try to raise the cost of any potential Chinese 
aggression. 38 
Yet for all this talk of assertiveness and militarisation in the South China Sea, it is 
important to note that managing economic issues takes precedence. In 2016, Vietnam’s 
trade deficit with China equalled 14 percent of GDP. Many Vietnamese enterprises are 
becoming reliant on China, and should China choose to disrupt the flow of goods, the 
economic ramifications would be problematic indeed.39 Surely, Chinese assertive actions 
in the South China Sea stoke nationalistic sentiments, which threaten the legitimacy of 
the regime. Yet, as the above analysis on domestic currents shows, the regime is currently 
stepping up its crackdown on dissenters and demonstrating its commitment to tackling 
corruption.  
Arguably the infamous 2013 outburst of Colonel Tran Dang Thanh, an instructor 
on the South China Sea issue at the Political Academy of the Vietnamese Ministry of 
Defence, encapsulates the repolitikal outlook on China-Vietnam relations. In that 
outburst, he lambasted Communist Party Members who were administrators at 
universities for letting the anti-Chinese protests from getting out of hand. He reminded 
them “there are 1.3 billion of them (Chinese) and only 90 million of us.” He stated that 
Vietnam must preserve the peace and stability because, if the VCP goes down, then so 
do people’s living standards.40 Bill Hayton similarly points out the South China Sea issue 
has now become one intertwined with a nationalistic narrative, which “stakes the 
legitimacy of the ruling elite upon the performance on these tiny islands.”41 
However, as Le Hong Hiep has advocated – the VCP increasingly derives its 
political legitimacy from its socio-economic performance.42 Combined with Chinese 
economic leverage, it is easy to understand why the VCP walks a fine line when speaking 
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out against China. Additionally, a diplomat described to the author that outsiders 
typically view Vietnamese foreign policy from the outside in. That is, they view the 
China problem as deeply problematic. Yet looking from within, one can see that the state 
is prioritises socio-economic growth.43  This leads to the “China problem” as being 
overstated, or overblown. Multidirectionalism is about equity, not traditional forms of 
balancing and bandwagoning.  Therefore, if Vietnam can achieve equity in the economic 
sense, promote an international rule-based approach, and foster non-antagonistic 
behaviour, the South China Sea issue will revert to its irritant status, rather than a 
combative one.  
The Future: 
Based on the finding of this thesis it is likely that Vietnamese foreign policy will continue on 
its current trajectory. Multildirectionalism will continue to be implemented; efforts to deepen 
existing and new relations, a continued promotion of multilateral forums, along with enhanced 
efforts at integration will all continue to grow. The Eleventh Party Central Committee’s Report 
on the documents of the 12th National Party Congress dedicated a significant amount of focus 
on building a clean and strong Party whilst promoting the entire nation’s strength and the goals 
of a peaceful and stable environment.   Regarding its foreign policy, it made note of numerous 
achievements. But tellingly, it stated that it wanted to do the following: 
To further improve the efficiency of foreign activities. Continue deepening 
our cooperative relations. To enhance the efficiency of international 
economic integration, fulfil all international commitments and new-
generation free trade agreements as part of an overall plan with a rational 
roadmap, in accordance with our national interests. To strengthen and deepen 
our relations with partners, particularly the strategic partners and major 
powers that play important roles toward our country’s development and 
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security. And substantiate the established framework of relations. To 
proactively participate in multilateral mechanisms, particularly ASEAN and 
the United Nations and bring into play our role therein. To participate 
proactively and energetically in multi-lateral defence and security 
mechanisms, including in cooperation operations at higher levels, such as 
U.N. peacekeeping operations, non-traditional security exercises, and other 
activities. To push ahead international integration in the cultural, social, 
scientific-technological, education-training and other fields.44 
When a foreign policy of multidirectionalism was first launched in 1988, the name 
of the game was to simply reverse the isolation and stimulate economic growth after 
years of economic hardship. Thirty years later, that growth and stability have certainly 
been achieved. But during that time, Vietnam has significantly codified and put into place 
mechanisms for realising that foreign policy.  
Vietnam has reaped the international and domestic benefits as such, in a time of 
growing structural uncertainty and interdependence. The Party’s achievements have been 
significant, and the VCP now very much views itself as a friend and reliable member of 
the international community. Looking ahead, however, much will depend on two things. 
First, a continued strong economic performance, and secondly how it manages its 
relationship with China. As long as these two things remain stable, then the VCP will 
rest assured. Ultimately, multidirectionalsim and the VCP themselves look here to stay.  
1 Anonymous, interview by the author, Hanoi, Vietnam, August 4, 2017. 
2  Dang Khoa, "Kim Jong-un Believes North Korea Should Follow Vietnam’s Economic Reforms: 
Report," Vietnam Express, May 8, 2018, accessed May 15, 2018, https://e.vnexpress.net/news/business/kim-jong-
un-believes-north-korea-should-follow-vietnam-s-economic-reforms-report-3746650.html. 
3 Acosta, Nelson. "In Cuba, Vietnam Communist Party Chief Advocates Economic Reforms." Rueters, March 30, 
2018. Accessed May 15, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cuba-vietnam/in-cuba-vietnam-communist-
party-chief-advocates-economic-reforms-idUSKBN1H531C. 
4 Ning Liao, "Dualistic Identity, Memory-encoded Norms, and State Emotion: A Social Constructivist Account 
of Chinese Foreign Relations," East Asia 30, no. 2 (June 2013): 156. 
                                                 
198 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
5 Thu Le Huong, "The Vietnamese Communist Party’s Corruption Hunt," The Interpreter, January 25, 2018, 
accessed March 5, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vietnamese-communist-party-corruption-
hunt. 
6 "Former Vietnam Politburo Member Dinh La Thang Jailed for 18 Years over $45.6m Losses," The Straight 
Times, March 29, 2018, accessed April 2, 2018, http://www.straitstimes.com/asia/se-asia/former-vietnam-
politburo-member-dinh-la-thang-jailed-for-18-years-over-s456m-losses.  
7 "Party Central Committee Dismissed Da Nang Leader," Saigon Online, October 7, 2017, accessed March 3, 
2018, http://sggpnews.org.vn/national/party-central-committee-dismissed-da-nang-leader-70401.html. 
8 "Vietnam Fraud Trial: Death Penalty for Ex-head of OceanBank," BBC, September 29, 2017, accessed October 
12, 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41439866. 
9 "Prime Minister Nguyen Xuan Phuc Talks with German Counterpart," Vietnamplus, July 7, 2017, accessed July 
27, 2017, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/prime-minister-nguyen-xuan-phuc-talks-with-german-counterpart/1144 77.v 
np.  
10 Anton Tsvetov, "Vietnam Kidnaps Corruption Suspect in Berlin," The Diplomat, August 3, 2017, accessed 
March 8, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2017/08/vietnam-kidnaps-corruption-suspect-in-berlin/. 
11  Carl Thayer, Vietnam: How Are Anti-Corruption and Factional In-fighting Linked?, 4, January 5, 2018, 
accessed March 4, 2018, https://www.scribd.com/document/368573166/Thayer-How-Are-Anti-corruption-and-
Factional-in-fighting-Linked. 
12  Prisoners of Conscience in Vietnam (Amnesty International, 2018), 9, accessed April 5, 2018, 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/asa41/8162/2018/en/. 
13 Ibid, 14-16.  
14 Vietnam: Events of 2017. 2018. Accessed April 3, 2018. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-
chapters/vietnam. 
15 Anonymous, interview by the author, Hanoi, August 2, 2017. 
16 Lee Jones, ASEAN, Sovereignty and Intervention in Southeast Asia (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 
223. 
17 Mark Beeson, "Living with Giants: ASEAN and the Evolution of Asian Regionalism," Trans: Trans-Regional 
and - National Studies of Southeast Asia 1, no. 2 (July 2013): 318. 
18 Anonymous, interview by the author, Hanoi, August 2, 2017. 
19 Christopher B. Roberts, "ASEAN: The Challenge of Unity in Diversity," in The South China Sea Maritime 
Dispute: Political, Legal and Regional Perspectives, ed. Christopher B. Roberts and Leszek Buszynski (New 
York: Routledge, 2015), 136. 
20 Manuel Mogato, Ben Blanchard, and Michael Martina, "ASEAN Deadlocked on South China Sea, Cambodia 
Blocks Statement," Reuters, July 25, 2016, accessed March 4, 2018, https://www.reuters.com /article/us-
southchinasea-ruling-asean/asean-deadlocked-on-south-china-sea-cambodia-blocks-statement-idUSKCN1050F6. 
21 Conclusion in The South China Sea Maritime Dispute: Political, legal and regional perspectives, 213.  
22  Pia Ranada, "Duterte: 'I Need China,'" Rappler, April 9, 2018, accessed April 10, 2018, 
https://www.rappler.com/nation/199873-philippines-duterte-need-china-xi-jinping. 
23 Roberts, "ASEAN: The Challenge," 144. 
24 Nguyen Cam Tu, "AEC 2025: Fresh Opportunities and Challenges for Vietnam," Vietnam Law and Legal 
Forum, January 9, 2016, accessed February 6, 2018, http://vietnamlawmagazine.vn/aec-2025-fresh-opportunities-
and-challenges-for-vietnam-5511.html. 
25 Munir Majid, "No Political Leadership in Failing Asean," The Star Online, July 30, 2016, accessed February 5, 
2018, https://www.thestar.com.my/opinion/columnists/comment/2016/07/30/no-political-leadership-in-failing-
asean/. 
26 Rodion Ebbighausen, "The ASEAN Way: Where is it Leading?," DW, July 8, 2017, accessed March 3, 2018, 
http://www.dw.com/en/the-asean-way-where-is-it-leading/a-39998187. 
27 "Vietnam Treasures Comprehensive Cooperation with China: PM," Nhan Dan, April 1, 2018, accessed April 6, 
2018, http://en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/external-relations/item/5994902-vietnam-treasures-comprehensive-co 
operation-with-china-pm.html.  
28  "Vietnam-China Relations Continue Positive Development," Vietnamplus, September 9, 2016, accessed 
February 4, 2018, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/vietnamchina-relations-continue-positive-development/98783.vnp. 
29 "Chinese Tourists Top List of Foreign Arrivals to Vietnam," The Voice of Vietnam, March 1, 2018, accessed 
April 4, 2018, http://english.vov.vn/travel/chinese-tourists-top-list-of-foreign-arrivals-to-vietnam-365939.vov. 
30  Travel and Tourism Economic Impact 2017, 3, March 2017, https://www.wttc.org/-
/media/files/reports/economic-impact-research/regions-2017/world2017.pdf. 
31 "China, Vietnam Promise to Keep Peace in South China Sea," Channel News Asia, April 2, 2018, accessed 
April 17, 2018, https://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/asia/china-vietnam-promise-to-keep-peace-in-south-
china-sea-10094024.  
199 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
32 Erica Werner, Damian Paletta, and Seung Min Kim, "Trump Weighs Rejoining Trans-Pacific Partnership amid 
Trade Dispute with China," The Washington Post, April 12, 2018, accessed April 17, 2018, 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/trump-weighs-rejoining-trans-pacific-partn 
ership/2018/04/12/37d59500-3e71-11e8-8d53eba0ed2371cc_story.html?noredirect=on& 
utm_term=.06b2163a7e05. 
33 "US Aircraft Carrier Arrives in Vietnam for Historic Visit as China Ties Are Put to the Test," South China 
Morning Post, March 5, 2018, accessed April 17, 2018, http://www.scmp.com/news/asia/southeast-
asia/article/2135725/us-aircraft-carrier-arrives-vietnam-historic-visit-china. 
34 Prashanth Parameswaran, "A Vietnam ‘Base’ for Russia?," The Diplomat, October 15, 2016, accessed April 6, 
2017, https://thediplomat.com/2016/10/a-vietnam-base-for-russia/. 
35 Tuan Anh Ha, "Vietnam's South China Sea Strategy since 2007," in Vietnam's Foreign Policy Under Doi Moi, 
ed. Hiep Hong Le and Anton Tsvetov (Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2018), 231. 
36 Ibid, 228-229. 
37 Trung Thang Nguyen and Vu Truong-Minh, "The 2014 Oil Rig Crisis and Its Implications for Vietnam-China 
Relations," in Vietnam's Foreign Policy Under Doi Moi, ed. Hiep Hong Le and Anton Tsvetov (Singapore: ISEAS 
Publishing, 2018), 73. 
38 Koh Collin S.L. Collin, "Vietnam's Got a New South China Sea Strategy," The National Interest, February 16, 
2017, accessed February 14, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/feature/vietnams-got-new-south-china-sea-strategy-
19470. 
39 Nguyen and Truong-Minh, "The 2014," 84. 
40 Bill Hayton, The South China Sea: The Struggle for Power in Asia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), 
156. 
41 Ibid, 176. 
42 Elliot Brennan, "Vietnam's Foreign Policy: Fewer Enemies, More Friends," The Interpreter, November 29, 
2013, accessed April 17, 2018, https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/vietnams-foreign-policy-fewer-
enemies-more-friends. 
43 Anonymous, interview by the author, Hanoi, Vietnam, August 4, 2017. 
44 The Vietnamese Communist Party, Report of the Party’s 11th-tenure Central Committee presented by General 
Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong on the Party’s 12th Congress Documents, January 28, 2016, http://www.vnembassy-
jp.org/en/11th-party-central-committee%E2%80%99s-report-congress-documents. 
